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CONTENTS

AN WITH THE FUTURE. A. C. MOORHOUSE	1
CALLIMACHUS AND ARISTOTLE: AN INQUIRY INTO CALLIMACHUS' <i>ΠΡΟΣ ΠΑΡΜΕΝΙΔΗΝ</i> . K. O. BRINE	11
IMAGERY IN PLATO'S REPUBLIC. DOROTHY TARRANT	27
THE LAST DELPHIC ORACLE. E. A. THOMPSON	35
NOTES ON SOME PASSAGES OF ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS <i>DE FATO</i> . R. HACKFORTH	37
HESYCHIANA. SIR D'ARCY W. THOMPSON	44
NOTE ON THE ATHENIAN CALENDAR. B. D. MERITT	45
NOTES ON ANTONINUS. G. ZUNTZ	47
THE MIRROR OF THE SARONIC GULF. J. A. K. THOMPSON	56
BORROWINGS IN THE ARCHIDAMIAN WAR. B. D. MERITT	60

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THE CLASSICAL QUARTERLY

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AN WITH THE FUTURE

THE construction of *άν* with the future¹ has been hotly denied as impossible, so far as Attic Greek and indeed post-Homeric Greek generally are concerned. The opponents of the construction have had among their number such scholars as Dawes and Cobet; and of late, it seems, editors of texts generally. The view of Cobet is given on p. 469 of his *Miscellanea Critica*, with reference to Demosth. 9. 70 (128) *πάλοι τις ήδέως άν ίσως έρωτήσων κάθηται*. Cobet, who has been followed by later editors, altered *έρωτήσων* (the universal reading of the codd.) to *έρωτήσας*, commenting 'ubi semel constiterit ήδέως άν έρωτήσω, ήδέως άν πεύσομαι aut simile quid pro έρωτήσαιμι vel πυθοίμην recte dici, tum demum librorum lectioni acquiescemus. quod equidem nunquam futurum esse satis scio.' This view, which must of course be understood as excepting Homer from its scope, is nothing more than a blank denial of the possibility of the construction. We see more of an argument in Kühner—Gerth (*Griech. Gramm.* ii. 1. 209), where it is remarked that the construction, frequent in Homer, was later given up because *άν* with the optative was sufficient to express a future possibility; and that possibly emenders have done right to alter passages in Attic which contain it. This is not expressed with any great certainty. Nevertheless it has become to such an extent the prevailing view among editors that in modern texts it is extremely rare to find the construction allowed to remain.

There has been, on the other hand, no lack of distinguished supporters of the construction. Wolf dealt with it as it occurs in Demosth. 20. 124 (494) *ούκ, εί τών πάντων άδικησόμεν τινα, ή μείζονα ή ελάττονα, δεινόν έστιν· άλλ' εί τας τιμάς, αίς άν άντ' εϋ ποιήσομέν τινας, άπίστοις καταστήσομεν*. The accepted reading is now *ποιήσωμεν*, and Wolf himself proposed this change, on the grounds that the subjunctive has better support from the codd., and that a future sense is inappropriate: but despite this he affirmed his belief in the existence of the future indicative with *άν* in Attic, because of the close connexion between the future and the subjunctive, and claimed that more examples would have to be admitted as authors were edited more correctly.

Hermann devoted pp. 28—38 of his treatise *De Particula AN* to discussion of the future indicative, and must be counted a lukewarm supporter of the construction. Thus he says on p. 29 that it is not found in the more settled stage of the development of the language, quoting Lucian, *Pseudosoph.* c. 2, t. iii, p. 555, where *συνήσων άν* is attacked as a solecism. But having said so much he proceeds with the discussion on the basis that the construction is possible, and admits its justification, at any rate in theory (p. 31). His examples, however, are not good ones.

Passow (edn. of 1841) accepted the construction unreservedly.

Goodwin (*Moods and Tenses*, para. 197) is cautious, but seems inclined to admit the construction as a rarity, especially in Plato *Rep.* 615 D *οϋχ ήκει, φάναι, οϋδ' άν ήξει δεϋρο*. On this passage he says that the colloquial style makes *άν* less objectionable.

Liddell and Scott (9th edn.) appears to accept it with the future indicative (A. I. 2 b of the article on *άν*), remarking that it occurs rarely in the codd. of Attic prose writers. Four examples are given in Attic prose, including that of *Rep.* 615 D. Regarding *άν* with the future participle and infinitive in Attic, L. and S. shows more doubt, and remarks that it never occurs in Epic and is probably always corrupt in Attic (A. IV. 4 of the article). We need not, however, be persuaded by the absence of this particular construction in Homer, for the fact is that *άν* does not occur there with the participle

¹ That is, with the indicative; and with the optative, infinitive, and participle used in place of the indicative.

of any tense whatever, and is found only once with the infinitive of any tense (an aorist infinitive, in *Il.* 9. 684). It is plain that, if we can accept the construction with the future indicative in Attic, we are bound to accept it also at least in theory in Attic with the future participle and infinitive. L. and S. goes on to quote, apparently with approval, later examples from Polybius, Plutarch, and Lucian.

Gildersleeve in his *Syntax of Classical Greek* (i, pp. 171-2) admits the legitimacy of the construction in theory. He says that it lapsed from popularity because Greeks preferred to use the optative (and the subjunctive) with *ἄν*. Most examples found in codd. have been, or can easily be, corrected. But he is inclined to accept the 'famous' passage in *Rep.* 615 D. He remarks that *ἥξοι* is impossible; that *ἥκοι* would mean 'he can't have come', which is not the sense required; and dislikes the substitution of *δή* for *ἄν* (a remedy in favour elsewhere). He concludes, 'if ever *ἄν* was needed with the future indicative, it is needed here'.

Support for the construction has also come from Riddell (para. 58 β of the *Digest of Platonic Idioms* in his edn. of the *Apology*) and Jebb (*Sel. from Attic Orators*: Isaeus 1. 23). Finally, reference should be made to the discussion in Thompson, *Syntax of Attic Greek*², pp. 308-10. Thompson will not come to any conclusion for himself.

It may appear rash to make yet another attempt to dispose of this long-debated matter. But there is possibly room to make this new approach to it, which I do from the point of view of the meaning of the passages in which the construction is found. If it is possible to show that a special meaning can be attached to the construction, we shall have greatly increased the chances of its admission in our texts.

We must start by asking what is the meaning of *ἄν* (*κεν*) with the future in Homer.¹

ἄν can be seen here fulfilling its regular function of limiting a statement, by making it dependent on some condition, or by otherwise weakening its effect. So in (1) *Il.* 1. 139 *ὃ δὲ κεν κεχολώσεται, ὃν κεν ἴκωμαι* 'he to whom I come will then be angry'. The first *κεν* can be taken to imply that this is what will happen given the condition that Agamemnon chooses for himself the prize rightly belonging to one of the other heroes. (2) *Il.* 4. 176 *καὶ κέ τις ὦδ' ἐρέει Τρώων* 'and thus will one of the Trojans then speak'. Agamemnon views with foreboding what would happen if Menelaus should die of his injury, and *κε* 'then' could be expanded to 'if you die'.² (3) *Il.* 1. 523 *ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν νῦν αὖτις ἀπόστιχε, μή τι νοήσῃ | "Ἥρῃ· ἐμοὶ δέ κε ταῦτα μελήσεται* 'do you now go back, lest Hera notice anything; I for my part (*κε* = if you do so) will see to these matters'. (4) *Il.* 9. 167 *εἰ δ' ἄγε, τοὺς ἄν ἐγὼν ἐπιόψομαι· οἱ δὲ πθέσθων* 'come now, I myself will choose them, and let them obey'. I take *ἄν* as in effect emphasizing *ἐγὼν*; Nestor has asked that the Greek leaders should in concert choose envoys to go to Achilles (*ὀτρύνομεν*, l. 165), but then overrides this by taking the alternative course of choosing them himself; the implication of *ἄν* is 'I will do it, if no one else will'. Note that in this example there can be no suggestion of 'watering down' the strength of the future.

The condition, on which the statement depends, is not always a definite line of action, clearly stated in, or implied by, the context. Thus in the phrase *ἐγὼ δέ κε τοι καταλέξω*, *κε* is sometimes an expression of politeness, 'I will tell you (if you wish to hear)', as in (1) *Od.* 3. 80 (following immediately on *εἴρῃαι ὀππόθεν εἰμέν*), and *Od.* 14. 99. (2) *Il.* 14. 267-8 *ἐγὼ δέ κε τοι Χαρίτων μίαν ὀπλοτεράων | δώσω ὀπνιέμεναι* 'I will (if you wish) give you one of the younger Graces to wed'.

¹ Unfortunately it is often doubtful whether we have to do with the future indicative or the sigmatic aorist subjunctive, not only in the 1st person sing. of the active (e.g. *Il.* 9. 262 *εἰ δὲ σὺ μὲν μὲν ἀκουσον, ἐγὼ δέ κε τοι καταλέξω*), but also in other persons, where Epic has the short-

vowel subjunctive of the sigmatic aorist (e.g. *Il.* 22. 49-50 *ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ζῶουσι μετὰ στρατῷ, ἢ τ' ἂν ἔπειτα | χαλκοῦ τε χροσσοῦ τ' ἀπολυσόμεθ'*).

² Agamemnon varies the expression by repeating the formula without *κεν* at the end of his speech, *ὡς ποτὲ τις εἴρει* in l. 182.

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Elsewhere the effect of *ἄν* (*κεν*) is to introduce a further element of contingency, since we are not told—and possibly the speaker himself does not know—what the condition is on the fulfilment of which the validity of his statement depends. The future here approaches the meaning of the optative. 'I will go—under certain conditions' naturally shades off into 'I shall probably (perhaps) go, am likely to go' when the conditions are not named. (1) *Il.* 17. 514–15 *ἀλλ' ἢ τοι μὲν ταῦτα θεῶν ἐν γούνασι κεῖται* | *ἤσω γὰρ καὶ ἐγὼ, τὰ δὲ κεν Διὶ πάντα μελήσει* 'but verily these things lie on the knees of the gods; for I too will make a throw, and haply all my actions will be the care of Zeus'. (2) *Il.* 22. 66–7 *αὐτὸν δ' ἄν πύματόν με κύνες πρώτῃσι θύρῃσιν* | *ὠμησται ἐρύουσιν* 'and likely it is that last of all the ravening dogs will tear me myself at the outer door'. (3) *Od.* 17. 546–7 *τῷ κε καὶ οὐκ ἀτελὴς θάνατος μνηστῆρσι γένοιτο* | *πᾶσι μάλ', οὐδέ κέ τις θάνατον καὶ κῆρας ἀλύξει* 'wherefore death may not even be unaccomplished for the suitors, nor is any of them like to escape death and doom'. It is likely too that the future with reduced force is the right translation in some of the cases where it is easy to see in the context a condition. *Il.* 1. 139 *ὁ δὲ κεν κεχολώσεται* may mean 'he is likely to be angry'; and *Il.* 4. 176 *καὶ κέ τις ὦδ' ἐρέει Τρώων* 'and thus may one of the Trojans speak'.

A remark must finally be made about the use of *ἄν* in meiosis, which is of importance because I believe it to hold the key to the post-Homeric use of our construction. As Ebeling says (*Lexicon Homericum*, p. 696, col. 1), 'non necesse est ea quae futuro cum *κε* coniuncto exponuntur, re vera esse incerta; quin etiam saepe res eo, quod mollius profertur, per *εἰρωνειαν* gravius affirmatur'. In particular, this kind of meiosis is used in making a threat. (1) *Il.* 8. 404–5 *οὐδέ κεν ἐς δεκάτους περιτελλομένους ἐνιαυτούς* | *ἔλκε' ἀπαλθήσεσθον* 'nor, I fancy, will you two be cured of your wounds in ten years' time'. Zeus threatens Hera and Athena with blasting by his thunderbolts. Plainly it would be most inappropriate if we were to suppose that Zeus had any doubts about the efficacy of his weapon. It is hardly fanciful to see a touch of sinister humour in the construction. (2) *Il.* 9. 60–2 *ἀλλ' ἄγ' ἐγὼν, ὅς σεῖο γεραίτερος εὐχομαι εἶναι*, | *ἐξείπω καὶ πάντα δίδξομαι* | *οὐδέ κέ τις μοι* | *μῦθον ἀτιμήσει*, *οὐδέ κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων* 'but come, let me, who boast that I am older than you, speak out and declare everything. Perhaps no one will spurn my speech, not even king Agamemnon.' Bentley read optative *ἀτιμήσει*; a simple change, but unnecessary. If, as I believe, Nestor is here being ironical, it is not the only remark of that kind in this speech.¹ (3) *Il.* 1. 139 *ὁ δὲ κεν κεχολώσεται*, *ὃν κεν ἴκωμαι* (already quoted above) must belong here, as deliberate under-statement, if we accept the rendering 'he is likely to be angry'. (4) *Il.* 22. 42 *τάχα κέν ἐ κύνες καὶ γῦπες ἔδονται* 'swiftly, I think, would the dogs and vultures eat him'. Aristarchus' *ἔδοιεν* is generally read in place of *ἔδονται* in the codd. If we accept the future it gives excellent sense, adding an extra touch to the bitter irony of Priam's previous remark about Achilles, *εἴθε θεοῖσι φίλος τοσσόνδε γένοιτο* | *ὅσσον ἔμοι*. (5) *Il.* 22. 66–7 *αὐτὸν δ' ἄν πύματόν με κύνες πρώτῃσι θύρῃσιν* | *ὠμησται ἐρύουσιν* (already quoted). This occurs in the same speech of Priam as the previous example. (6) *Od.* 17. 546–7 (already quoted), on the fate of the suitors.²

The various meanings of *ἄν* with the future which have been described are not, of course, always rigidly divided from each other. In some cases it is impossible³ to say that the meaning is precisely and exclusively this or that: thus, *Il.* 1. 139 *ὁ δὲ κεν κεχολώσεται* can mean, to take two opposite poles, either 'he will then be angry', or 'he is likely to be angry'. But it is necessary to assume that all the meanings exist,

¹ Cf. l. 54, where Nestor tells Diomedes that his counsel is best among his equals in age; and again ll. 57–8, where he commends Diomedes' speech while impressing on him how very youthful he is.

² It is interesting to note that similar tones of irony are sometimes conveyed by *ἄν* with the subjunctive: cf. *Il.* 1. 205; 11. 387; 22. 505.

³ For us: and I might say for Homer's first audiences too.

in order to be able to explain all the passages. The cases of meiosis in the preceding paragraph fall in a special category, since they are separated from other examples of 'probably, perhaps' not logically, but stylistically. I would regard this use as having become part of the stylistic material of the language, rather than as an idiosyncrasy of a particular author.

We come now to the construction in post-Homeric Greek. Here it is only rarely found in codd.; and we must meet the difficulty of deciding whether, wherever it is found, we must emend and remove it, on the ground that it is in any case illegitimate: or else whether it is in principle legitimate, and in particular cases sufficiently supported by the manuscript tradition. For the present I postpone general argument on its legitimacy.

It is unfortunately true that *άν* is a word which lends itself to corrupt insertion. The examples quoted by Kühner-Gerth, ii. 1. 210, of *άν* attached to the present indicative and to the imperative are a sign of this. Further, it is frequently easy to provide emendations of the future tense occurring with *άν*, as may be seen from Richards's article¹ on the subject. Richards notes the following regular forms of emendation: (a) fut. indic. to first aor. opt., *καταστήσετε* > *-αιτε* Thuc. 1. 140; *τιμωρήσεσθε* > *-αισθε* Lycurg. *Leocr.* 76; (b) fut. opt. to first aor. opt., *δόξουτ'* > *-αιτ'* Lycurg. *Leocr.* 15; (c) fut. partic. to first aor. partic., *ποιήσοντος* > *-αντος* Plat. *Apol.* 30 c; (d) fut. inf. to first aor. inf., *ήσυχάσειν* > *-αι* Thuc. 8. 71; (e) fut. inf. to pres. inf., *προσέξειν* > *-εχειν* Demosth. 18. 147 (276).

Nevertheless Richards finds nineteen passages in Attic in which the evidence of the codd. is strong, if not uncontradicted, in favour of *άν* with the future, and in which correction cannot be made by alteration of the verb on the lines mentioned. He himself works on the assumption that the construction must be wrong, and therefore proceeds to emend it out of existence even in the stubborn nineteen, especially by applying his own favourite remedy of *δή* for *άν*. But it is noteworthy that there is this number of difficult passages outstanding, and that in Attic alone.

Let us start with Richards' nineteen passages. They are the following: Thuc. 2. 80; Plat. *Apol.* 29 c, *Crat.* 391 A, *Crit.* 53 c, *Euthyd.* 287 c, *Rep.* 492 c, *Rep.* 615 D, *Symp.* 221 E; Lys. 1. 22; Aeschin. 2. 6; *ibid.* 2. 11; Dinarch. 1. 68; Demosth. 24. 115 (736); Aristot. *Pol.* 2. 6. 10 (1265^a 40); Eur. *El.* 484, *Hel.* 448; Aristoph. *Av.* 1314, *Nub.* 465; Philemon fragm. 91 (Kock). An examination of them, from the point of view of their meaning, soon makes it plain that only one (Aristoph. *Av.* 1314) could be argued to contain a weak, 'watered-down' future statement, and even in this one case such an interpretation is by no means certain. Of the others a majority, amounting to eleven, have decidedly emphatic futures. These are the cases which I regard as emphatic:

- (1) Plat. *Apol.* 29 c λέγων πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὥς, εἰ διαφευξοίμην, ἤδη ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ νιεῖς ἐπιτηδεύοντες ἃ Σωκράτης διδάσκει διαφθαρήσονται [ἀρ' Richards: ἂν secl. Cobet].
- (2) Plat. *Euthyd.* 287 c ἡ δὲ ἄληθινον . . . ὅτι σὺ νῦν πάσσοφός τις ἡμῖν ἀφίξει περὶ λόγους καὶ οἷοθ' ὅτε δεῖ ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ὅτε μή; καὶ νῦν οὐδ' ἂν ὀτιοῦν ἀποκρίνῃ, ἅτε γινώσκων ὅτι οὐ δεῖ;
- (3) Plat. *Rep.* 615 D οὐχ ἥκει, φάναι, οὐδ' ἂν ἤξει δεῦρο. [αὐτ' varii: οὐδὲ μὴ ἤξει Cobet: δὴ Richards.] This is the example already quoted, for which Goodwin and Gildersleeve are particularly inclined to accept *άν*.
- (4) Lys. 1. 22 τοῦτω ἡλίον δεδυκότος ἰόντι ἐξ ἀγροῦ ἀπήντησα· εἰδὼς δ' ἐγὼ ὅτι τῇ καὶτα ἀφικόμενος οὐδὲν ἂν καταλήψοιτο οἶκοι τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἐκέλευον συνδειπνῆν [οὐδένα pro οὐδέν ἂν Cobet].

¹ 'An with the future in Attic', H. Richards, *C.R.* vi. 336-42.

- (5) Aeschin. 2. 6 ἐγὼ δ' ἐπ' αὐτῷ τούτῳ δικαίως ἂν ὑπολαμβάνω μάλιστα σωθήσεσθαι [σφύζεσθαι varii].
- (6) Aeschin. 2. 11 οὕτω γὰρ ἂν μάλιστα μεμνήσομαι καὶ εἰπεῖν δυνήσομαι, καὶ ὑμεῖς μαθήσεσθε [ἂν om. varii: δὴ Richards]. Hermann, accepting ἂν, explained that a word like ποιῶν should be understood with it; but that is hardly a satisfactory form of explanation.
- (7) Demosth. 24. 115 (736) πολλοὶ γὰρ ἂν αὐτῷ ἐδόκουν οὕτω γ' οἱ κλέπται ἔσεσθαι [ἂν codd., secl. Cobet].
- (8) Eur. *El.* 484 κἄν | ἔτ' ἔτι φόνιον ὑπὸ δέραν | ὄψομαι αἶμα χυθὲν σιδάρω [ἦ μὲν pro κἄν Nauck: σάν Dindorf].
- (9) Eur. *Hel.* 448 πικρῶς ἂν οἰμαί γ' ἀγγελεῖν τοὺς σοὺς λόγους [ἄρ' edd.].
- (10) Aristoph. *Nub.* 465 ἄρα γε τοῦτ' ἂν ἐγὼ ποτ' ὄψομαι; [ἄρ' edd.]. As Brunck said, the combination of ἄρα . . . ἄρα is *prorsus invenusta*, and it is suspect: I have not found a parallel for it.
- (11) Philemon fragm. 91 (Kock)
 ὃν οὐδὲ εἰς λέληθεν οὐδὲ ἔν ποιῶν
 οὐδ' ἂν ποιήσων οὐδὲ πεποιηκὼς πάλαι.
 [aῶ Wakefield.]

It is remarkable that such a high proportion of emphatic statements should be found in a selection of Attic passages chosen, it must be repeated, purely on textual, and not on semantic, grounds. It creates a presumption in favour of the hypothesis that we have here a genuine construction, possessing its own peculiar sense. This sense I take to be an emphatic future which is a development of the Homeric ironic use of ἂν with the future in understatement. It may be supposed that the irony is sometimes evident, for example in passages (1), (3), and (9) above, where there is a colloquial tone; but in most cases we should have to conclude that the irony, having made the construction possible, has taken a subordinate place in the consciousness of the speaker.

It must not be thought that the list of eleven passages quoted is exhaustive of all Attic passages with good textual support and with the meaning of emphatic futures; nor that none exists outside Attic. It would be unnecessary, as well as laborious, to present a full list. But a selection may be quoted, in order to fill out the picture for Greek as a whole.

- (12) Pindar, *Nem.* 7. 68 μαθὼν δέ τις ἂν ἐρεῖ. This passage presents some difficulty, since an emphatic future is unsuitable. If we are not to accept Gildersleeve's ἀνερεῖ, there are two possible explanations, both presupposing an archaism in Pindar's language which might not be out of character. (a) ἂν may have the Homeric meaning of 'in that case', referring to μαθὼν. (b) Or, ἂν ἐρεῖ could have the (optative) sense of 'may say'. Either interpretation was seen above to fit Hom. *Il.* 4. 176 καὶ κέ τις ὦδ' ἐρέει Τρώων, to which Pindar offers a close parallel. It is perhaps worth noting that the Homeric phrase καὶ ποτέ τις εἴησιν (e.g. *Il.* 6. 459) is also apparently archaic, being the only example of a pure subjunctive (without *κεν* or *ἂν*) with affirmative future sense in the second and third person (Monro, *Homeric Grammar*, para. 275 (b)): it may be suggested that a phrase with this meaning, being in common use, became stereotyped and therefore preserved archaic features of syntax.
- (13) Pindar, *Ol.* 1. 108-10 εἰ δὲ μὴ ταχὺ λίποι, ἔτι γλυκυτέραν *κεν* ἔλπομαι . . . κλειῖξεν, 'but if he (the god) should not soon desert you, I firmly trust that I shall

celebrate a still sweeter victory'. This seems to be the emphatic use: the force of *κεν*, strengthening the fut. inf. *κλείζειν*, is better transferred in translation to the main verb *ἐλπομαι*.

- (14) Soph. *Ant.* 390 *σχολῇ ποθ' ἤξειν δεῦρ' ἂν ἐξήχουν ἐγώ*, 'I vowed that I should be very slow to come here again'. An ironical interpretation of *ἂν* is fitting in this speech of the herald: *σχολῇ* points to the same mood. This is also a further example of the use in colloquial speech, which I have suggested was the main source of the construction in post-Homeric Greek. Cf. passage (9) (Euripides) in which the speaker is an old woman servant. Jebb (as others) takes *ἂν* with *ἐξήχουν* 'I could have vowed', quoting in support Eur. *Hel.* 1619 *οὐκ ἂν ποτ' ἤρχουν*. But the herald in *Antigone* has actually said before, in l. 329, *οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ὄψει σὺ δεῦρ' ἐλθόντα με*, and we would therefore most naturally take *ἐξήχουν* (without *ἂν*) as referring back to that remark.
- (15) Aristophanes, as might be expected where a colloquial idiom is concerned, has a number of examples beside the two already quoted; e.g. *Nub.* 1157 *οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν με φλαῦρον ἐργάσεσθ' ἔτι [ἐργάσαισθ' edd.]*. *Ach.* 392 and *Vesp.* 942 are also worth mention.
- (16) Thuc. 1. 140 *ἀπισχυρισάμενοι δὲ σαφὲς ἂν καταστήσετε αὐτοῖς*. [δῆ Richards: *-στήσατε* Oxford and Teubner texts after a variant *-στήσονται*]. 'By a definite refusal you will make it quite clear to them (that they must deal with you more as equals).'
- (17) Thuc. 2. 80 *λέγοντες ὅτι, ἣν ναυσὶ ἐλθωσιν, ἀδυνάτων ὄντων ξυμβοηθεῖν τῶν ἀπὸ θαλάσσης Ἀκαρνανῶν, ῥαδίως ἂν Ἀκαρνανίαν σχόντες καὶ τῆς Ζακύνθου κρατήσουσιν*. [*ἂν* has strong support from the codd.: δῆ Richards.] Hermann, Stahl, and Kühner-Gerth take *ἂν* with *σχόντες*, but this is an evasion: *σχόντες* by itself conveys all the meaning that could be required of it, and *ἂν* could add nothing to it. *ῥαδίως* reinforces the sense of emphasis. Cf. the use of *ῥαδίως* with *ἂν* and the fut. inf. also in 2. 80 (*ῥαδίως ἂν σφίσι τὰλλα προσχωρήσειν*); and the superlatives in 5. 82 (*νομίζων μέγιστον ἂν σφᾶς ὠφελήσειν*), and 6. 66 (*ἦκιστ' ἂν . . . λυπήσειν*).
- (18) Thuc. 6. 66 *ἐν ᾧ (χωρίῳ) . . . ἔμελλον . . . οἱ ἱππῆς τῶν Συρακοσίων ἦκιστ' ἂν αὐτοὺς . . . λυπήσειν*. [*λυπήσειν* codd.: *-εῖαν* Meineke: *ἂν* om. Stahl.] The Oxford text keeps *ἂν* and *λυπήσειν*; since everywhere else in Thucydides it is against *ἂν* with the future, it might seem that *ἂν* is meant to be construed with *ἔμελλον*. But I cannot believe that we should so take it. One example is quoted of *ἂν* with *μέλλω* (Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, para. 428 b): Andoc. 1. 21 *τοὺς φίλους ἂν οἴεσθε ἢ ἐπιτρέπειν αὐτῷ μένειν ἢ ἐγγυήσασθαι, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν παραιτεῖσθαι καὶ δεῖσθαι ἀπέναι ὅπου ἂν ἔμελλον αὐτὸς σωθήσεσθαι*, 'to depart to a place where he would have been likely to be safe'. *ἂν ἔμελλον* forms an unreal apodosis: the probability that he would have been safe if he had gone to the place is only an imaginary hypothesis, since he did not go. In Thuc. 6. 66 we are told that the Athenians chose a favourable position for their army 'in which they could begin a battle whenever they wished, and the Syracusan cavalry were least likely to harass them both during the engagement and before it'. If *ἂν* is taken with *ἔμελλον* (*λυπήσειν*), and if, as in the Andocides passage, it constitutes an unreal apodosis, its effect would be to make the Athenian intention frustrated; we should be told that they chose the position in the belief that in it there was the greatest likelihood of protection from the Syracusans, but that in fact the belief was vain and they did not get the desired protection. However, this is not true. There is nothing in Thucydides' account to indicate that the position did not

protect themselves as they hoped. We must, therefore, take *ἄν* (if it is to be read) with *λυπήσων*. It reinforces *ἥκιστα*.

- (19) Plat. *Apol.* 30 B ἡ ἀφίετέ με ἢ μή, ὥς ἐμοῦ οὐκ ἂν ποιήσοντος ἄλλα, οὐδ' εἰ μέλλω πολλάκις τεθνάναι. [*ποιήσαντος* Cobet.] Cobet's easy emendation is generally accepted. The passage is one which calls for a statement in strong terms: the aor. opt. with *ἄν*, unsupported adverbially, hardly seems strong enough.
- (20) Plat. *Phaed.* 61 C σχεδὸν οὖν ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ ᾗσθημαι οὐδ' ὅπωστιοῦν ἂν σοι ἐκὼν εἶναι πείσεται.
- (21) Xen. *Cyr.* 2. 1. 3 οὐκ ἂν ὁ ἀριθμὸς σε ἀκούσαντα εὐφρανεῖ. An 'original type' of ironical under-statement.
- (22) Xen. *Cyr.* 7. 5. 21 ὅταν δὲ καὶ αἰσθωνται ἡμᾶς ἔνδον ὄντας, πολὺ ἂν ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν ἀχρεῖοι ἔσονται ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐκπεπληχθαι. [δή Richards.]
- (23) Xen. *Comm.* 2. 2. 3 αἱ πόλεις ἐπὶ τοῖς μεγίστοις ἀδικήμασι ζημίαν θάνατον πεποιήκασιν, ὥς οὐκ ἂν μείζονος κακοῦ φόβῳ τὴν ἀδικίαν παύσοντες. [sic codd.: *παύσαντες* edd.]
- (24) Demosth. 9. 70 (128) πάλαι τις ἡδέως ἂν ἴσως ἐρωτήσων κάθηται. [ἐρωτήσας edd.] *ἴσως* is to be taken as modifying the sentence as a whole, based as it all is on supposition: it cannot go with *ἐρωτήσων*. 'Perhaps many a one has long been sitting here who would be very glad to ask.'
- (25) Demosth. 19. 342 (450) τοὺς ὅτιοῦν ἂν ἐκεῖνῳ ποιήσοντας ἀνηρηκότες ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἔσεσθε. [*ποιήσαντας* al.]
- (26) Isaeus 1. 23 ἡγοῦμενοι γὰρ οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸν βεβαιώσων οὐδὲν ὧν ἡμῖν ἀπέστη ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ, δισχυρίζομεθα πρὸς Μικίωνα . . . οὐκ ἂν ποτε οἴομενοι αὐτὸν ἐναντία οἷς ὡμολόγησε πρᾶξαι, 'for, believing that he would certainly not confirm another claim to any part of the property which he had resigned in our favour before the lawcourt, we insisted on this point against Mikion, . . . never dreaming that he would violate his agreement'. The appearance of the two constructions, first the fut. inf. (*βεβαιώσων*) and then the aor. inf. (*πρᾶξαι*), is interesting: the first represents a deep-rooted belief concerning what seemed sure to happen, the second an hypothesis which was not even considered.
- (27) Isocr. 8. 81 τὰ μὲν πικρότατα καὶ μάλιστ' ἂν ὑμᾶς λυπήσοντα παραλείψω. [*λυπήσαντα* Cobet.]
- (28) Callimachus, *H. to Zeus* 93-4

τεὰ δ' ἔργματα τίς κεν αἰεῖδοι;

οὐ γένητ', οὐκ ἔσται· τίς κεν Διὸς ἔργματ' αἰεῖσει;

[94 αἰεῖδοι Stephanus: *τίς καὶ* Wilamowitz.]

Dawes, *Misc. Crit.* paras. 103-5, preferred αἰεῖδοι in l. 94. But he also thought that the rest of the line needed amending, on the ground that, after the question put in l. 93 has been answered in the first part of l. 94 ('there has been, will be no one who could sing of your works'), it is intolerably flat to have the same question simply repeated in the latter part of l. 94; and he therefore emended l. 94 to οὐ γένητ', οὐκ ἔσται τις, ὃ κεν Διὸς ἔργματ' αἰεῖδοι. I do not feel sure that the repetition in his version is any less wearisome. The same objection can be brought against Wilamowitz's reading. If, however, we keep the future with κεν in l. 94, and it has as I suggest a different meaning from the optative with κεν in l. 93, there is more point in the passage. 'Who could sing of your works? There has been, will be no one who could do it. Who can possibly sing of

Zeus' works?'¹ The question in l. 94 is put in a form which presupposes the answer 'No'. The same effect of *ἄν* with the future in a question appears in passages (2) 'And so now you will not answer a word, knowing that this is not the time for it?', and (10) 'Shall I ever really see that?'; and also in the next passage.

- (29) Theocr. 27. 38 πατρὶ δὲ γηραλέῳ τίνα κεν, τίνα μῦθον ἐνίψω; [μὲν Ahrens: δὴ Richards.] The girl is resisting the temptations of her lover. As in (28), the question has a negative implication. 'What tale can I possibly tell my old father?'

- (30) Herodas 6. 35-6

χιλλῶν εὐντων

εἴν' οὐκ ἂν ὅστις λεπρός ἐστι προσδώσω.

[προσδώσω P: προσδοίην suprascript.] 'If I had a thousand, I certainly would not give her even a rotten one.' Colloquial, as in (29).

It now remains to turn to some more general considerations.

At the start I quoted the views of Gildersleeve and Kühner-Gerth to the effect that in post-Homeric Greek *ἄν* with the future was unnecessary, its place being taken by *ἄν* with the optative. Goodwin has a similar opinion (*Moods and Tenses*, para. 235). This leads us to the question, Is the construction *a priori* a likely one in post-Homeric Greek? It is quite regular in Homer; that shows that it was good Greek at any rate for one period. But though it is theoretically possible in later Greek, can it also be regarded as likely?

For the expression of the future Homeric could use the future indicative, the subjunctive, and the optative, each of them with and without *κεν* (*ἄν*)—a total of six different constructions (beside *μέλλω* with the infinitive). It would be too much to say that this gave Homeric separate expressions for six different nuances of future meaning: the effect of the addition of *κεν* to the subjunctive and optative was generally to indicate dependence on some condition, thus modifying the content of the sentence as a whole rather than of the verb by itself.² But I have shown, in the Homeric examples, that Homeric *κεν* joined with the future indicative sometimes caused change in the meaning of its verb, importing an element of doubt and uncertainty as in *Il.* 17. 515, 'my actions will perhaps be the care of Zeus', and of ironic meiosis as in *Il.* 8. 405, 'you are not likely to be cured'. The Homeric optative for weakened statement (with or without *κεν*) need not be distinguished here from the Attic potential use (with *ἄν*). But the Homeric subjunctive, in addition to the hortatory and deliberative use which is also found in later Greek, including Attic, also expressed (with or without *κεν*) a future statement of strong resolution or insistence, which conveys a force exceeding that of the future indicative. Thus Homeric Greek possessed a richer fund of expressions with future meaning than Attic and later Greek generally, even if we allow the post-Homeric use of *ἄν* with the future indicative (which, if allowed, must be taken as rare). The comparative poverty of post-Homeric Greek in this regard is surprising; for poverty it is. The Homeric abundance should not here be regarded as a sign of the needless redundancy which is frequently found in the early stages of languages, in syntactical as well as in formal apparatus; for the manifold constructions served to express a number of different concepts of future meaning, which it was useful to keep distinguished. In particular, it enabled some modal meanings to be expressed distinctly by modal form, i.e. in the optative and subjunctive: although this

¹ One may compare the crescendo in Hom. *Od.* 16. 437 οὐκ ἔσθ' οὗτος ἀνὴρ οὐδ' ἔσσεσθαι οὐδὲ γίνεσθαι.

² See the examples in Monro, *Homeric Grammar*, paras. 275-6 (subj.); 299-300 (opt.).

did not absolve the future indicative from also conveying modal meaning. Classical Greek had to lean far more on the future indicative, supplemented adverbially.¹

This general background seems to make it more likely that at any rate one of the Homeric constructions, the future indicative with *ἄν*, which had developed a markedly individual sense, was allowed to remain in existence in order to supplement the poor stock of constructions available to Classical Greek for the expression of the future. Further, it will at the same time explain its later disappearance, as noted by Lucian:² for the Greek of his day was rich just where Classical Greek had been poor, and was therefore able without any difficulty to dispense with a construction that had come to seem strange. *Ἄν* had become stereotyped in Hellenistic Greek, either in the sense (the more frequent) of adding indefiniteness to a relative or conjunction, or else in apodosis: and neither of these senses could explain *ἄν* with the future indicative. Moreover, even in New Testament Greek we can see that *ἄν* was beginning to disappear from use except where specially retained in certain compound forms.

A last remark may be made here, on the connexion between the abnormal (i.e. from the literary standpoint) constructions with future meaning, and popular speech. We are often tempted to appeal to popular usage to explain unusual constructions, and no doubt the tendency may be excessive: evidence either for or against is commonly too slight. But there can be no doubt, in view of the remarkable changes which have affected the future forms of expression in many branches of the Indo-European language family and at widely separated dates, that we are faced here with an influence of a fundamental, psychological nature. No other influence would be so widespread. What that influence was seems to me to have been reasonably described by Meillet (loc. cit.): it was the close union of a number of other modal types of thought with the mood of assertion related to future time, which made it desirable to have other forms of expression to supplement the future indicative. We should therefore for this reason alone be predisposed to regard any new future expression as having its roots in popular speech, rather than as a literary creation; and this view should also include the survival, or renewal, of expressions which were once regular literary Greek, but which were later given up in the literary language. In support of the latter part of this thesis, there is the example of the volitive subjunctive in the first person quoted by Wackernagel (loc. cit.) from Timotheus, *Nome* 162 (Wil.), where a Phrygian says *ἀδῆς οὐδ' ἄμ' ἔλθω* 'I will never come here again': we miss here the introductory imperative which is found with this subjunctive in the classical literary language, as in Eur. *H.F.* 1058-9 *σῖγα πνοᾶς μάθω· φέρε πρὸς οὗς βάλω*.

¹ The restriction of forms in Classical Greek was not (apart from *μέλλω*, which was also Homeric) compensated by the use of auxiliary verbs, to which English and French have made such extensive resort. See Jespersen, *Modern English Grammar*, iv, chapter 18, 9 (2), and Meillet, *Linguistique historique et Linguistique générale*, ii, 29-35. After the Classical period both the use of auxiliaries extended, and the subjunctive with future prospective and volitive sense returned to wider use: see Wackernagel, *Vorlesungen über Syntax*, i, pp. 233-5; Moulton, *Grammar of New Testament Greek*, pp. 184-6, 240. The search for forms which may be used as alternatives to the future proper, the fruit of which we observe in Homeric and post-Classical Greek, is a further example to be added to those which Meillet cites. Meillet sees the basic reason for the fluctuation in this, that we are not so

anxious to be able to express 'pure' future time, as to express the various modal (affective) meanings associated with the future. This it was that led to the eventual disappearance of the Classical Greek future indicative, and its replacement by a new form *θά* plus subjunctive: as also to the loss of the Latin future in the Romance languages, which have made new forms. Even Indo-European, so far as can be seen, had no distinctive future tense. In Classical Greek we see the future indicative in its heyday.

² Unless Lucian was castigating the construction as a live idiom, but belonging to the vulgar speech of his day: on that aspect, see the remarks below. On either interpretation of Lucian's attitude in the *Pseudosophista*, it seems that we are forced to reject *ἄν* with the future participle in *Asin.* c. 26, t. ii, p. 595.

Note that it is a Phrygian speaking, from whom one would expect the vulgar speech. Wackernagel quotes Slotky (*Der Gebrauch des Konjunktivs und Optativs in den griech. Dialekten*) for the view that this construction, of the volitive subjunctive without the preceding imperative, was maintained in the vulgar language when it was avoided in the literary language. It would be a continuation of the Homeric use, as seen in *Il.* 9. 121 ὑμῖν δ' ἐν πάντεσσι περικλυτὰ δῶρ' ὀνομήνω: by the side of which we must of course put the frequent Homeric use of the volitive subjunctive with the introductory imperative, as in *Il.* 6. 340 ἀλλ' ἄγε νῦν ἐπίμεινον, ἀρήϊα τεύχεα δύω. The use seen in Timotheus recurs in the language long afterwards: cf. *Anth. Pal.* 4. 21. 1 σήμερον ἐσθλὰ πάθω. It is especially a popular use. That, then, is one example of the retention, or reappearance, of an old future expression in the popular language. I am inclined to see a second in our construction of ἄν with the future indicative: there is a fair amount of evidence for regarding it as a colloquialism in its post-Homeric use.

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ADDENDUM

After the above article had passed through proof, there appeared the very helpful article 'Colloquial Expressions in Aeschylus and Sophocles' by Mr. Stevens in *C.Q.* xxxix (1945), pp. 95-105. It now appears desirable to add ἄν with the future to 'ἄν with past tenses of the indicative, in iterative sentences' (example F.1 of Mr. Stevens).

My example of ἄν with the future in Soph. *Ant.* 390 (passage (14) above)—which is a line also quoted by Mr. Stevens, under B.7, with reference to the use in it of σχολῇ—is now seen to occur in a context where there is an abundance of colloquial expressions used 'in character'. The guard in *Antigone* (not 'herald', as I have wrongly called him above) has, in addition to the two usages in l. 390, three more, in ll. 268 (οὐδὲν πλέον: Mr. Stevens's F.7), 276 (οἶδ' ὅτι: D.3), and 315 (οὕτως: F.8); and Creon in addressing him also has two, in l. 320 (οἴμοι: A.3, and λάλημα: E.2).

On the other hand, it seems that it would be wrong to insist strongly on the colloquial nature of ἄν with the future in the mouth of the old woman servant in Eur. *Hel.* 448 (my passage (9)), though plainly that interpretation remains open to us as a possibility. Mr. Stevens has shown, in the article quoted and in his earlier 'Colloquial Expressions in Euripides' in *C.Q.* xxxi (1937), pp. 182-91, that there is considerable difference between Euripides and the other two tragedians, and that Euripides does not exhibit the same inclination to use colloquialisms in 'character'.

It may be useful to summarize all the passages in the three tragedians and in Aristophanes which may contain ἄν with the future, in order to supplement Mr. Stevens's lists. They are:

Aeschylus	No examples.	Aristoph. (1)	<i>Ach.</i> 392.
Sophocles	(1) <i>Ant.</i> 390. Passage (14) above.	(2)	<i>Av.</i> 1314.
	(2) <i>O.C.</i> 1076 (lyr.). [lect. dub.]	(3)	<i>Nub.</i> 465. Passage (10).
Euripides	(1) <i>El.</i> 484 (lyr.). Passage (8).	(4)	<i>Nub.</i> 1157. Passage (15).
	(2) <i>Hel.</i> 448. Passage (9).	(5)	<i>Vesp.</i> 942. ¹
	(3) <i>Andr.</i> 464 (lyr.). [lect. dub.]		

A. C. M.

¹ Some slight errors can be corrected here in Mr. Stevens's statistics given in *C.Q.* xxxix, p. 95 (5th and 6th lines from bottom). On my reckoning of his passages, this sentence should read 'Out of 23 examples of colloquialism in Aeschylus 9 are given to these minor characters;

in Sophocles the proportion is 20 out of 92 (not including 5 from the Fragments, where the speaker is not known)'. The total will be 9 for Aeschylus if an asterisk is given, as apparently it should be, to *Pers.* 260 (D. 1(c)), spoken by a messenger: otherwise, it will be 8.

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CALLIMACHUS AND ARISTOTLE:

AN INQUIRY INTO CALLIMACHUS' ΠΡΟΣ ΠΡΑΞΙΦΑΝΗΝ.¹

I. THE PROBLEM

THE transition from the Athenian Peripatos of Aristotle to the Alexandrian Museion of Callimachus has often attracted notice. So closely akin was the organization of scholarship in the two centres of learning, so definite was the personal connexion between the two, that it seemed possible to trace an uninterrupted line of succession from the older to the younger school. That Callimachus the scholar worked in the Aristotelian tradition appeared obvious: 'he might be called a Peripatetic in the same sense as his pupils, but with more justification' (Wilamowitz, *Hellenist. Dicht.* i. 214). Regarding Callimachus the poet and literary critic the picture seemed less clear. The non-classical character of his poetry had often been emphasized, and cannot be overlooked. But quite recently an attempt has been made to turn Callimachus into an Aristotelian even by virtue of his literary criticism.² The alleged harmony of this development rouses suspicion and calls for inquiry. In the following pages I have tried to collect and discuss what material I could find for the relation of Callimachus to Aristotle and his school. I hope to show that such influences as there were are of a different and more subtle nature, and that this poet, if any, was his own Longinus.

II. THE PERIPATOS AND ALEXANDRIA

The relations between Aristotle's School and the new cultural centre in Alexandria were, at the outset, friendly enough. Theophrastus, Aristotle's successor, had been invited to teach in Alexandria.³ His own pupil and successor, the great scholar Straton, was for a time tutor to Philadelphus,⁴ and some connexion with Queen Arsinoë can be gathered from a collection of Straton's letters to her the title of which is preserved.⁵ Another pupil of Theophrastus, Demetrius of Phaleron, seems to have assisted Ptolemy Soter in laying the foundations which were to be made into the Museion and the Library under Philadelphus.⁶ The organization of the new centre of learning and some of the subjects studied and methods used in Alexandria recall the Peripatos. A man who seems to have been equally at home in Athens and Alexandria was the distinguished naturalist and doctor, Erasistratus of Ceos. He had studied in Athens under Theophrastus, Straton, and Metrodorus, and also in Cos and Alexandria.⁷

In this context a fact of nomenclature may be mentioned. The name *Περικατητικός*, which by the middle of the third century B.C. denoted a member of the Peripatetic School in Athens, changed its significance about that time. With the wider influence of Peripatetic studies it is not only used for the Athenian School but can also denote any writer of biography or literary history connected with Alexandria. The two non-Peripatetics to whom the name appears to have been applied first are two pupils of Callimachus, Hermippus and Satyrus.⁸ I think F. Leo⁹ was right in saying that

¹ I am greatly obliged to Dr. R. Pfeiffer for reading my manuscript and offering various suggestions.

² See below, p. 15.

⁴ Ib. 5. 58.

⁶ The actual development, and the part taken by the first Ptolemy and Demetrius, are not very clear. The question was opened by F. Ritschl,

³ Diog. Laert. 5. 37.

⁵ Ib. 60.

Opusc. i. 5, 15, and has been debated often.

⁷ Diels, *Sitzungsber. d. pr. Ak.* (1893), p. 106; Wellmann, PW s.v. 'Erasistratos' (1907), col. 334; W. Jaeger, *Herm.* xlviii, 1913, 62; *Diokles von Karystos*, 1938, p. 221 ff.

⁸ Hermippus in Suet. fr. 1 R., Satyrus often in Athenaeus.

⁹ F. Leo, *Gr. Röm. Biog.* 118.

two conditions constitute this new usage of an older name, viz. connexion with Alexandria on the one hand, and the refined form which Alexandria had bestowed on the literary and biographical studies of the Peripatos. This goes to show that there must have been something in those Alexandrian works which suggested the Peripatetic method, and the reason for that is obvious.¹

Our survey has led us close to Callimachus. What was his relation to the Aristotelian School? Running through the list of his works, one cannot help being struck by the Peripatetic character of his scholarly writings. *Ἐθνικαὶ ὀνομασίαι, Βαρβαρικά νόμματα, Περὶ ἀγώνων, Περὶ ὀρνέων, Περὶ ἰχθύων, Περὶ ἀνέμων, Μηνῶν προσηγορίαι, Περὶ ποταμῶν*, the *Κτίσεις, Θανύματα, Παράδοξα*, and especially the *Πίνakes*—this looks indeed like the *œuvre* of a Peripatetic scholar. And yet, we never find Callimachus called a Peripatetic. That partly shows that in his time the name was not yet applied to writers outside the Athenian school. Aristotelian though he may have been in method, there was no *Callimachus Peripateticus* as there were *Satyrus* or *Hermippus Peripatetici*. It also opens our eyes to the fact that Callimachus did not make use of that form of modern biography which seems to have earned the name 'Peripatetic' for his pupils. But more important than that is the problem it poses. What were Callimachus' relations with the school to which he owed so much?

III. CALLIMACHUS, THE *ARATI* GENUS, AND THE FLORENTINE PAPYRUS

In his book on the Greek Novel E. Rohde tentatively put forward the suggestion that Callimachus along with Aratus had studied in the Peripatos at Athens under Praxiphanes, a well-known pupil and colleague of Theophrastus.² At the time when the suggestion was made there was at least some ground for the assumption of a stay at Athens of Callimachus, for the poet was reported to have told the tale of a banquet *παρὰ τῷ Ἀθηναίῳ Πόλλιδι* at which he had been present himself;³ and Aratus' studies in the Athenian Stoa (not, however, in the Peripatos) are a well-attested feature of his biography.⁴ When, however, Pap. Oxy. 1362 appeared some forty years later⁵ the banquet had to be transferred from Athens to Egypt, and Rohde probably would have been the first to confess that there was no longer any independent evidence for Callimachus' journey to Athens apart from an obscure Latin passage which he had combined with the banquet of Pollis. The passage occurs in the so-called *Arati Genus*, a translation into barbarous Latin of Aratus' biography by one Theon.⁶

Theon's Greek biography is fully preserved except for two small gaps immediately before and after the passage we have to deal with. The first lacuna can be filled up with tolerable certainty as to the general sense⁷ with the help of another

¹ There seems to have been a third stage in which the name lost its connexion even with Alexandria, and did not mean more than 'grammarians' or 'literary critic'. This may be the explanation of the title *Peripateticus Tubursicensis* of the grammarian Nonius. I should have made that point in my article 'Peripatos' in PW, offprint 1936, col. 6; conclusion for the history of the Peripatos, ib., col. 37.

² E. Rohde, *Gr. Roman* (1876), p. 99, n. 3.

³ Athen. xi. 477 C, Schneider ad fr. 109.

⁴ Knaack, PW, s.v. 'Aratus', col. 392 (but fanciful on Callimachus); Wilamowitz, *Hellenist.* D. ii. 275.

⁵ Oxy. Pap. no. 1362 (vol. xi. 1915); fr. 8 Pf., from the *Aetia*.

⁶ I quote the biographies after the edition of E. Maass in *Commentariorum in Aratum Reliquiae* (1898). The same scholar discovered Theon as the author of the biography mentioned in the text: *Anal. Eratosthenica*, 1883, pp. 38 ff. It is, however, uncertain whether this Theon is the fourth-century mathematician of Alexandria as Maass, following one Renaissance MS., maintained, or the grammarian under Augustus who specialized in commentaries on Hellenistic poets (K. Ziegler, PW, s.v. 'Theon 15', col. 2079).

⁷ The retranslation given by E. Maass, *Aratea*, p. 243, is convincing, and even *Carystius* for the name *Gecraustius* looks right, but cf. Wilamowitz, *Hellenist.* D. ii. 275, n. 2.

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biography, the so-called *Vita Achillis*, which shows a similar arrangement. Then there follows

Theon 2, p. 149 M.

ἐγένετο δὲ (Ἄρατος) σφόδρα
πολυγράμματος ἀνὴρ, ὡς μαρ-
τυρεῖ Καλλίμαχος.

Arati Genus, ib.

factus est autem nimis multum
litteratus vir, sicut testatur
Callimachus, adsistens ei ab
infantia propter Praxiphanem
Mytilenum.

A literal translation of *adsistens ei ab infantia* would be something like 'being with him from childhood'. That is manifestly wrong since we know that Callimachus and Aratus did not grow up together. Therefore guessing had to be substituted for translating. Rohde retranslated the Latin words by *συστάς αὐτῷ ἐκ νέου*, and, not without hesitation, combined this translation with the apparent evidence of Callimachus' stay in Athens. So young Callimachus and Aratus had been together in Athens. *Propter Praxiphanem Mytilenum* was rendered by Rohde *ἐν τοῖς Πρὸς Πραξιφάνην*; so he concluded that the teacher of the two young men must have been Praxiphanes because otherwise Callimachus would not have commented on this fact in a book addressed to Praxiphanes. This combination is so fantastic that it is hardly necessary to point out the mistakes, and the translation is just as unconvincing.¹

There was a more promising way, to look again for the parallel passage in the *Vita* by Achilles. There we find *μένεται γοῦν αὐτοῦ (Ἀράτου) καὶ Καλλίμαχος ὡς πρεσβυτέρου οὐ μόνον ἐν τοῖς Ἐπιγράμμασι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς Πρὸς Πραξιφάνην, πάντῃ ἐπαινῶν αὐτὸν ὡς πολυμαθὴ καὶ ἀριστον ποιητήν*.² The end of this sentence is covered by the beginning in Theon (Greek and Latin), but apart from that the two versions do not tally.³ In fact so great is the difference that we must query whether Theon really did give a version similar to the one quoted from Achilles. That biographer maintained that Callimachus called Aratus older than himself, and cites as evidence the Epigrams and *Πρὸς Πραξιφάνην*. But there is in the Epigrams no reference to the question of age, either in no. 27 to which it is usually referred,⁴ or anywhere else in the poems preserved. Moreover, in another *Γένος Ἀράτου* it is said that Callimachus was an old man when he got to know Aratus,⁵ and there is a third remark, this time again in Theon, that Callimachus and Aratus were contemporaries.⁶

These assertions have provoked some painstaking arithmetic⁷ with a view to reconciling the irreconcilable. We do not know whether there was in Callimachus

¹ The translation does not even make a complete sentence; on the rendering of *propter* cf. n. 3.

² Below, p. 20. Praxiphanes T 5a = Callim. fr. 100 g Schn.

³ *propter Praxiphanem Mytilenum* is not a translation of *ἐν τοῖς Πρὸς Π.*, as Susemihl pointed out (*Alex. Lit.* i. 287, n. 10); the translator throughout renders *πρὸς* or *εἰς* in titles by the rather inapposite preposition *apud*. Nor is *adsistens ei ab infantia* in any way similar to *ὡς πρεσβυτέρου*. If the words mean anything the original text might have had *κατὰ Πραξιφάνην Μυρ.*; that would account at the same time for *Μυτιληναῖον* which does not form part of the Callimachean title. Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.* iv. 2², 1927, 591, and Herter, PW, Supp. vol. v, 1931, s.v. 'Kallim.', col. 388, although right in rejecting Rohde's *fantasia*, were a little sanguine in

declaring the Latin passage to square with the *Vita Achillis*.

⁴ Wilamowitz's explanation (*Hellenist. D.* i. 212, n. 1) that this is merely inferred from Callimachus' praise of Aratus in Epig. 27, and that the man who makes compliments was taken to be younger than the man complimented is not exactly convincing. But he rightly infers that this fact also discredits the same statement purporting to come from *Πρὸς Π.*

⁵ *Γένος Ἀράτου*, § 2, p. 326 M. *γηραιῷ δὲ τῷ Κυρηναίῳ ἐπέβλετο, παρ' οὗ καὶ ἐπιγράμματος ἤξιώθη*. This of course refers to Epig. 27, and here the reference is justified.

⁶ Theon, 3, p. 150 M. *ὁ Καλλίμαχος συνεγγίζων αὐτῷ κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους*. Then there follows again a sensible reference to Epig. 27.

⁷ A particularly involved specimen is Couat's account, *Alex. Poetry* 50.

evidence from which biographers could rightly infer anything about the age of the two poets. The way in which Epig. 27 is used differently in the different sources makes it doubtful. And whether Aratus was older than Callimachus, or of more or less the same age, or whether the two poets met when Callimachus was old is quite uncertain. Thus we do not know which of the versions is represented by *adsistens ei ab infantia*, and the barbarous nature of the Latin does not allow of any certainty. This is a negative result from which I infer the following points: (1) The translator of the *Arati Genus* found in his Greek source a sentence about Callimachus and Aratus which he did not understand and put it in a sentence which we do not understand. This sentence cannot therefore serve as evidence. (2) Speculations about the relative ages of Callimachus and Aratus are doomed to failure since our sources contradict each other and we have no independent evidence to settle the question.¹ Since we know that the two poets were contemporaries the problem is really unimportant. (3) There is no indication in our sources that Callimachus went to Athens,² or indeed ever left Africa.³ The only places connected with his biography are Cyrene and Alexandria.

Rohde's hypothesis would have been without much interest had it not seemed to make sense of the title *Πρὸς Πραξιφάνην* which now appeared to be the title of a work of Peripatetic literary criticism which Callimachus had dedicated to his old teacher Praxiphanes. Rohde of course adopted Bentley's translation of *πρός* as *ad*.⁴ On the other hand Preller, in his monograph on Praxiphanes, had taken the opposite view and rendered *πρός* by *contra*.⁵ Neither party had very much to say for their views, and the discussion rather resembled a guessing game, so that one sympathizes with the third, and most influential, party which confessed to a *non liquet*.⁶ Even at that time, however, it would have been possible to arrive at a more settled view of the matter by a comparison of Alexandrian and Peripatetic literary criticism.

This was carried out by Professor A. Rostagni in a series of articles in which he sought to establish the outlines of a history of ancient literary criticism.⁷ These

¹ This has often been tried. Beloch even sought to refute Rohde's hypothesis by reference to one of the other unestablished versions, *Gr. Gesch.* iv. 2^a, 1927, p. 591 (but iv. 1^a, 1925, p. 488, he talked of Aratus as a pupil of Praxiphanes). Another cul-de-sac was to emend one of the divergent testimonies; so several times since Ritschl, *Die alexand. Bibl.* 1838, p. 88 (*Opusc.* i. 72) and Clinton, *Fast.* ii. 7.

² Rohde's hypothesis is to be found not only in older handbooks like Susemihl, *Alex. Lit.* 1891, i. 287, n. 384, Knaack, PW, 1896, s.v. 'Aratus', col. 392, Lübker's *Reallex.* 1914, s.v. 'Praxiphanes', but also recently in Christ-Schmid, *Gr. Lit.* ii⁶, 1920, pp. 80, 126, 163, in popular editions like the Loeb Callim. and Aratus 1921, pp. 2, 362, and was revived again in such recent monographs as E. Cahen's *Callimaque*, 1929, pp. 26 ff., 347 f., and A. Rostagni's articles to which I must return later. Against Cahen and Rostagni see H. Herter, *Bursian's Jahresb.* cclv, 1937, p. 84 f.

³ In fact, on our evidence we can well believe what Theagenes of Icos says to Callimachus at the banquet mentioned before: *τρισμακάρι, ἡ παύρων ἑλβός ἐσσι μέτα, ναυτιλῆς εἰ νῆν ἔχεις βίον* (fr. 8. 33 Pf.).

⁴ So, after Bentley, A. Hecker, *Comment. Callim.* 1842, p. 68; K. Dilthey, *De Callim. Cydippa*, 1863, p. 18; and, after Rohde, Susemihl, *Alex. Lit.* i, 1891, p. 145; Knaack, PW, s.v. 'Aratus', 1896, col. 392; W. Crönert *Kolotes u. Men.* 1906, p. 74, n. 355 a. Recently propounded again by Cahen and Rostagni, cf. above, n. 2.

⁵ L. Preller, *De Praxiphane Peripatetico*, 1842, pp. 7 and 18 (= *Ausgew. Aufsätze*, pp. 97, 105). Both meanings of *πρός* are so usual in titles as to make examples unnecessary. F. Schmidt (*Die Pinakes d. Kallim.* 1922, p. 102), however, was too ready to assume the meaning *against* in certain titles without proof.

⁶ Schneider, *Callimachea*, 1870, p. 351; A. Wilhelm, *Öster. Jahresh.* viii, 1905, p. 4; Willamowitz, *Hellenist.* D. i, 1924, p. 212; Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.* iv. 2^a, 1927, p. 587, and others. H. Herter, PW, Supp. v, 1931, s.v. 'Kallim.' col. 403 was rather undecided but inclined towards the first party, later he changed his mind, as he well might, and cautiously argued for the second party, *Bursian's Jahresh.* cclv, 1937, p. 110.

⁷ A. Rostagni, *Studi It.*, N.S. ii, 1922 'Aristotele e Aristotelismo nella storia dell' estetica'; *Riv. Fil.*, N.S. i, 1923, and ii, 1924 'Filodemo contro

articles have advanced our knowledge considerably, but the somewhat reckless use of their author makes of his evidence invites open criticism. Our problem is a case in point. Rostagni had accepted Rohde's long-exploded hypothesis about Callimachus in Athens and the solution of the 'ad' party of the title *Πρὸς Πραξιφάνην*.¹ He makes so much of Callimachus' discipleship that, at the very outset, one tends to become suspicious of this way of writing biography without biographical facts.

As his guiding thread through the labyrinth of Hellenistic criticism, Rostagni uses the question of the so-called Cyclic Epic and the quarrel about Antimachus' merits as a poet. It is not hard to show that Peripatetics and Callimachus alike condemned the Cyclic Epic, and certain Peripatetics and Callimachus alike condemned Antimachus as belonging to the cyclic tradition.² Combining this with the biographical question and the general Peripatetic character of Callimachus' scholarly work, Rostagni arrived at his picture of the Aristotelian Callimachus. But this picture was drawn with little discrimination, for the Cyclic Epic is only one part of the story; the other, more important, part is the question of the long heroic epic which Aristotle is at such pains to distinguish from its degenerate cyclic form. Rostagni, astonishingly, makes no use of that side of Aristotle's doctrine, and thus the whole picture is put out of focus, as I hope to establish in this article. How little Rostagni was able to fit his idea of Callimachus into the general framework of Hellenistic literary theory became clear when a new piece of evidence turned up on a papyrus, which disposes of earlier conjectures and allows us to put the question on a firmer and more reliable basis.

In 1933 Medea Norsa and G. Vitelli published a Florentine papyrus with fragments of a commentary on Callimachus' *Aetia*.³

Its beginning comments on the introduction to the *Aetia*, called by some editors the *Elegy of the Telchines*, which had been recovered a few years before.⁴ In that poem Callimachus' adversaries in the question of the Long Epic are attacked in the guise of the mythical Telchines. The scholiast professes to give the names of those adversaries. Before the commentary appeared the only name which used to be associated with this Battle of the Books was Apollonius of Rhodes.⁵ Even then some critics had warned us against the assumption that Apollonius must needs be the only antagonist of Callimachus.⁶ The papyrus brought a whole list of them which, among other names, contains Praxiphanes. Here, then, we have the Peripatetic in

l'estetica classica'; iv, 1926, and v, 1927 'Il dialogo Aristotelico *Περὶ ποιητῶν*'; vi, 1928 'Nuovo Callimaco'; xi, 1933 'I nuovi frammenti di commento agli *Aetia* e la polemica letteraria di Callimaco'; xii, 1934 'Nuovi frammenti Callimachei nel contesto degli *Aetia*' and 'Le nuove *Διηγέσεις* e l'ordinamento dei carmi di Call.'; there are also the valuable introductions to his editions of Aristotle's *Poetics*, 1927, and Horace's *Ars Poetica*, 1930.

¹ First in his *Poeti Alessandrini*, 1916, p. 240, n. 18; cf. *Riv. Fil.* v, 1927, p. 172; vi, 1928, p. 21; 'Arte Poet. di Orazio,' 1930, p. xiii; *Riv. Fil.* xi, 1933, pp. 196 ff.

² Arist. *Poet.* chaps. 8, 18, 23 f. on the Cyclic Epic; Duris 76, *FGH*, F 83 Jac. (= Antimachus T 1 Wyss) and Callim. ib. on Antimachus, also Epig. 28 on the Cyclic Epic and the well-worn fr. 74 b Schn. *Λύδη καὶ παχὺ γράμμα καὶ οὐ τορόν*. Whether τὸ μέγα βιβλίον ἴσον εἶναι τῷ μεγάλῳ κακῷ fr. 359 Schn. was used in any

particular context is unknown. Cf. also below, p. 17, n. 3. From the one certain mention in Aristotle of Antimachus (*Rhet.* 3. 6) B. Wyss concludes that Aristotle was a *modicus et cautus amator* of the poet (*Antim. Col. Frag.* 1936, p. xlii).

³ Pap. Soc. It. no. 1219, publ. by Norsa and Vitelli, *Bulletin de la Société archéol. d'Alexandrie*, xxviii, 1933, p. 123, also in *Pap. Soc. It.* (PSI), xi, 1935, p. 139.

⁴ Oxy. Pap. 2079 (vol. xvii, 19 7); cf. Mr. Lobel's edition of 1935 in *Herm.* lxx. 32 f.

⁵ Controversy was rife in connexion with the end of the *Hymn to Apollo* and its possible reference to Apollonius.

⁶ So R. Pfeiffer, *Herm.* lxx, 1935, p. 340 f.; Rostagni's mind, however, was set on Apollonius: *Riv. Fil.* vi, 1928, pp. 5, 36 ff.; xi, 1933, p. 194. On Apollonius' name in the Florentine papyrus cf. Herter, *Burs. Jahresh.* cclv, 1937, p. III.

opposition to the Alexandrian on a question of literary principles. The importance of that point was recognized at once.¹

The list makes a trustworthy impression. We can prove that the two critics whom, apart from Praxiphanes, we can with certainty identify, i.e. the epigrammatists Posidippus and Asclepiades, did indeed not share Callimachus' views on Antimachus and, consequently, the Cyclic Epic.² But the scholiast actually promises more than that. After the list of names which ends with *Πραξιφάνη τῷ Μυτιληναίῳ* he goes on to say *τοῖς μεμφομένοις αὐτοῦ τὸ κάτισχον τῶν ποιημάτων καὶ ὅτι οὐχὶ μῆκος ἦρα*. . . . Whether he really lived up to the promise to mention critics who had been in direct polemic contact with Callimachus I do not profess to know. But that fact surely does not discredit the list as such. Praxiphanes certainly was in polemic contact with Callimachus as is borne out by the title *Πρὸς Πραξιφάνην*. I would admit it as possible that the man said more than he could really warrant, and that some of the authors he mentions are merely critics known to be opposed to Callimachus' views without direct literary contact with the poet. That, however, does not concern Praxiphanes.

These facts would have surely suggested a re-examination of any picture of Hellenistic literary criticism drawn before the papyrus appeared. Professor Rostagni, however, did not review the position afresh but tried to fit the new evidence into his old account.³ The evidence did not fit, and the supplement which he made in the crucial sentence of the Greek text just quoted does not carry much conviction, and in fact did not convince his fellow critics.⁴

If, then, the Alexandrian poet was opposed to the Peripatetic critic, in what way are we to understand the supposedly Aristotelian character of Callimachus' literary criticism? This question could have been asked even before the new papyrus was found; it is certainly indicated now when Callimachus and Praxiphanes appear in two opposed camps.

IV. CALLIMACHUS' LITERARY CRITICISM AND ARISTOTLE'S POETICS

A comparison of Callimachus' and Aristotle's literary principles might seem unfair to both since we have to confront fragments of poetry with a closely reasoned philosophical treatise. But many utterances of Callimachus deal with matters of principle, and his criticism is so consistent that I believe a comparison to be possible. Callimachus was bound to speak differently in prose, but that difference concerns his style, not his outlook.

Homer is considered *ὁ αἰδῶν ἔσχατος* (*Epig.* 27 W.); he is so great that a modern writer should leave him alone, for the penalty of the traditional epic writer is imitateness. To homerize is not a title of honour: *Ὀμήρειον δὲ καλεῖται γράμμα· Κρεωφύλω, Ζεῦ φίλε, τοῦτο μέγα* (*Epig.* 6). The great mass flock behind the imitators of Homer,

¹ Vitelli, *Bull. Soc. Alex.* xxviii, 1933, p. 130: 'C'erano sembrate buone le ragioni del Rostagni (*Riv. Fil.* 1928, 21) per intendere che lo scritto Callimacheo *Πρὸς Πραξιφάνην* fosse "diretto a" Prassifane non "contro" P.; ma il nuovo testo ci consiglia di intendere "contro" (così intende ora anche il Pfeiffer) ritornando perciò alla interpretazione del Preller (*Ausgew. Aufs.* p. 97 e 105). Pohlenz, *Herm.* lxxviii, 1933, p. 319: 'Dass die Schrift *Πρὸς Πραξιφάνην* gegen einen Gegner gerichtet war, muss jetzt als sicher gelten.'

² Antim. T 14 Wyss (*Asclep. A.P.* ix. 63); T 15 W. (Posid. *A.P.* xii. 168). Therefore I cannot agree with Dr. P. Maas's opinion, ex-

pressed *PRIMI* i, 1937, 159, that the names are without foundation. We can, after all, check the list at some important points.

³ In the article of 1933 referred to p. 14, n. 7.

⁴ On Rostagni's supplement *μεμφομένο[ι]ς* instead of *μεμφομένο[ι]ς* see Vitelli *PSI*, xi. 143, n. 8 'nella piccola lacuna è possibile *ι*, non è possibile *υ*'; cf. also Herter, *Burs. Jahresh.* cclii, 1937, p. 109 with references. Rostagni thought that the datives in the list of names were governed by an expression like *περὶ τούτων πολλοὶ ὁ λόγος παρὰ . . .*, thus turning the list of Callimachus' opponents into as many sources for the Long Epic.

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the Cyclic poets. But Callimachus avoids the Cyclic epic: ἐχθαίρω τὸ ποίημα τὸ κυκλικόν (*Erig.* 28). The simile of the well-trodden path of the vulgar herd offers itself: οὐδὲ κελεύθῳ χαίρω τίς πολλοὺς ὦδε καὶ ὦδε φέρει (ib.). τὰ μὴ πατέουσιν ἀμαξαί [τὰ στείβε]ν, ἐτέρων ἵχνια μὴ καθ' ὅμα [δίφρον ἐλ]ᾶν μὴδ' οἶμον ἀνὰ πλατύν (*Aet. Oxy.* 2079. 25 ff.). The poet who hates vulgarity is told by Apollo to go his own way, narrow though it may be, εἰ καὶ στε[ινοτέρην] ἐλάσεις (scil. κέλευθον, ib. 27 f.). This is the 'clean way' (καθαρή ὁδός) which failed to lead Theaetetus to the success of the moment but is likely to grant him lasting fame (*Erig.* 7). At the end of the Hymn to Apollo the god declares that the big river in Assyria carries much mud because it is big and violent. With that are contrasted the priestesses of Deo who carry water not from every spring, ἀλλ' ἥτις καθαρὴ τε καὶ ἀχράντος ἀνέρπει πίδακος ἐξ ἱερῆς ὀλίγη λιβάς ἀκρον ἄωτον (*Hym. Apol.* 108 ff.).

What are the forbidding features of pseudo-Homeric poetry? First, it is long-drawn, as if poetry could be measured by the yard (σχόινῳ *Περσίδι Aet. l.c.* 18), and has many thousand lines (ἐν πολλαῖς . . . χιλιάσιν *l.c.* 4).¹ Second, it makes a mighty noise, but the poet leaves the thunder to Zeus: βροντᾶν οὐκ ἐμὸν ἀλλὰ Διὸς (*l.c.* 20); the grand style is no longer desired. Third, the uninterrupted sequence is deprecated: οὐχ ἐν αἰσῶμα διηγεκῆς (*l.c.* 3).² And last, with epic length, grandeur, and unity there also go the Homeric kings and heroes (*l.c.* 3 and 5). I have given the different points under different headings. For Callimachus, however, all these elements are one; what he condemns is the long, uninterrupted, epic poem, grand in style and subject-matter. That is the reason why *Aetia* or *Hecale* are not considered an αἰσῶμα διηγεκῆς. Both may be long but have not that epic unity and style which palled on Callimachus.

It will be observed that the elements of this form of literary criticism are little defined. Long, large, broad, thick, voluble, and messy continually merge into each other, and can be quantitative as well as qualitative terms.³ This cannot be taken as a feature of Callimachus' style only; it is a fundamental part of his literary theory. The same applies to his positive terms. 'Brevity' merges into 'thinness', and either may be a qualitative or a quantitative term. Hence the aims of poetic endeavour are the ὀλιγόστιχον (*Aet. l.c.* 9), the Μοῦσα λεπταλέη (24), the λιγὸς ἦχος of the cicada (29), or the λεπταὶ ῥήσιες (*Erig.* 27); ἐγὼ δ' εἶην οὐλαχύς, ὁ πτερόεις (*Aet. l.c.* 32).⁴ In the same way Hesiod can earn the predicate μελιχρός (*Erig.* 27), another fashionable term of Alexandrian criticism,⁵ not because his verse satisfied the fastidious ear of Callimachus but because he did not write an αἰσῶμα διηγεκῆς in the sense defined before.

This, then, is the outline of Callimachus' theory of style which he propounded in epigrams likely to be early, followed as far as we can see throughout his literary

¹ The usual terms are μακρός (in the comparisons *Aet. Oxy.* 2079. 10 and 15; Dr. Pfeiffer considers it possible also in 13) and μήκος *Aet. l.c.* 6. 1 τάμῳ δ' ἀπο μήκος ἀοιδῇ and, perhaps, *Iamb. Oxy.* 1011, fol. vi v, l. 6; cf. notes 2 and 3.

² The strict unity of an αἰσῶμα διηγεκῆς excludes variability of metre and literary style. In the last Iambus of his collection the poet defends himself against τοὺς καταμειφόμενους αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῇ πολυειδίᾳ (*Diag.* 9. 32). Dr. Pfeiffer points out to me that this also may have been connected with the idea of μήκος, since the word perhaps occurs in the Iambus (*Pap. Oxy.* 1011, fol. vi v, l. 6, ed. Lobel, *Herm.* lxix, 1934, p. 176).

³ Therefore the well-known fragment τὸ μέγα βιβλίον ἴσον εἶναι τῷ μεγάλῳ κακῷ (359 Schn.) might well belong to the discussion on the Long

Epic despite current opinion to the contrary. Cf. μέγας in the comparison with the μέγας ῥόος *Hym. Apol.* 108, and the μεγάλη γυνή *Aet. Oxy.* 2079. 12.

⁴ E. Maass, *Aratea*, 228, stated a difference in the use of λεπτός; he thought that it was applied to the quality of Aratus' style in χαίρετε λεπταὶ ῥήσιες (*Erig.* 27), but had a quantitative meaning in the title of Aratus' (and Virgil's) collections of small poems ἐν τοῖς Κατὰ λεπτόν, for which he cites the parallel ἐν τοῖς Κατὰ βραχὺ ὑπομνήμασιν. The vagueness with which Callimachus uses his terms should warn us against pressing that distinction.

⁵ E. Reitzenstein, *Festsch. f. R. Reitzenstein*, 1931, p. 47.

production until we find it again in unmistakable terms in the late *Telchines*. His principles are consistent enough though from a poet's, not a philosopher's, point of view.

It is hard to believe that such a conception could be called Aristotelian. It is certainly opposed to the *Poetics*. Aristotle, too, condemns Cyclic poetry and puts Homer in a class by himself; but he does so for very different reasons. He charges the Cyclic poets with mistaking the outward unity of a myth for its inner unity. 'Hence the error, as it appears, of all poets who have composed a Heracleid, a Theseid, or other poems of the kind. They imagine that as Heracles was one man, the story of Heracles must also be a unity. But Homer, as in all else he is of surpassing merit, here too . . . seems to have happily discerned the truth. In composing the *Odyssey* he did not include all the adventures of Odysseus . . . incidents between which there was no necessary or probable connexion: but he made the *Odyssey*, and likewise the *Iliad*, to centre in an action, that in our sense of the word is one.'¹ Here the term 'unity' occurs which we have met with in Callimachus. The Alexandrian poet, however, rejected imitation of Homeric poetry for the very quality for which Aristotle admires it, viz. its inherent unity. He did not want to write an *ἄεσμα διηγετικές*, which would be a necessary condition for the distinction Aristotle makes between the epic cycle and Homer. Callimachus thus evades the principle on which Aristotle's doctrine is founded.

From the idea of unity certain important conditions follow. They are all equally remote from Callimachus. Real unity implies an 'organic' relation of all parts.² It further implies completeness and a certain definite size.³ It must produce a definite order⁴ and thus, through size and order, be *εὐσύνοπτον* or *εὐννημόνευτον*.⁵

Epic and Tragedy equally are *μύμησις τῶν σπουδαίων* or *πράξεως σπουδαίας*;⁶ this fact defines their form since Aristotle's theory of adequate style⁷ demands a serious style for a serious matter. His theory of imitation postulates that epic style should be objective; 'the poet should speak as little as possible in his own person, for otherwise he would not be an imitator'.⁸ Here again it is Homer who shows insight into the poet's art. 'The others act upon the stage throughout, and imitate but little and in a small way'.⁹

We have again given these items under their different headings without much comment, to show how incompatible Aristotle's and Callimachus' views are. The

¹ Arist. *Poet.* 8. 1451^a 19 ff. (in Butcher's translation). This idea of unity recurs throughout the work. Aristotle introduced it, ready-made as it were, from his speculative philosophy, and finds that it is attained in epic poetry by Homer though not by his followers (cf. 23. 1459^a 33). In chap. 23 we have the same idea, but there he condemns the external unity of time in the Cyclic epics and praises Homer for concentrating on one aspect of the story only, and for using the technical device of 'episodes' to deal with other elements of the myth. Tragedy is a still stricter unity because it excludes, or at any rate should exclude, the *πολύμυθος* (18. 1456^a 11). This is also one reason why tragedy is 'better' than epic; it fulfils its end within a narrower compass and attains a higher degree of unity (chap. 26).

² I.c. 8. 1451^a 31 *χρῆ* . . . τὰ μέρη συνεστάναι τῶν πραγμάτων οὕτως ὥστε μετατιθεμένου τινὸς μέρους ἢ ἀφαιρουμένου διαφέρεισθαι καὶ κινεῖσθαι τὸ ὅλον.

δ γὰρ προσὸν ἢ μὴ προσὸν μῆδεν ποιεῖ ἐπιθῆλον, οὐδὲν μέρος τοῦ ὅλου ἐστίν.

³ Tragedy: I.c. chap. 7, esp. 1450^b 40 *μέγεθος ὑπάρχειν μὴ τὸ τυχόν* (. . . οὔτε πάμμικρον . . . οὔτε παμμέγεθες); Epic: 23. 1459^a 35; 24. 1459^b 20 ff.; Epic and Tragedy compared 26. 1462^a 18 ff.

⁴ I.c. 7. 1450^b 35 *μήθ' ὁπόθεν ἔτυχεν ἀρχεσθαι μήθ' ὅπου ἔτυχε τελευτᾶν*: ^b39 *ταῦτα τεταγμένα δεῖ ἔχειν*: ^b40 *τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστίν κτλ.*

⁵ *εὐσύνοπτον* 7. 1451^a 3; *εὐννημόνευτον* 26.

⁶ Chaps. 5, 6, etc.

⁷ *Rhet.* 3. 6. 1408^a 10 *τὸ δὲ πρέπον ξεῖν ἢ λέγειν ἐὰν ᾖ παθητικὴ τε καὶ ἡθικὴ καὶ τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασιν ἀνάλογον. τὸ δὲ ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν ἐὰν μήτε περὶ εὐδύγκαν αὐτοκειβόθλως λέγηται μήτε περὶ εὐτελῶν σεμνῶς, μήδ' ἐπὶ τῷ εὐτελεῖ ἐπὶ κόσμος*: *εἰ δὲ μὴ κωμωδία φαίνεται κτλ.*

⁸ *Poet.* 24. 1460^a 8 *αὐτὸν γὰρ δεῖ τὸν ποιητὴν ἐλάχιστα λέγειν οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ κατὰ ταῦτα μιμητής*.

⁹ Ib. 210 *οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι αὐτοὶ μὲν δι' ὅλον ἀγωνίζονται, μιμούμενται δ' ὀλίγα καὶ ὀλιγάκις*.

conclusions which the two critics drew from these premisses were equally remote. Aristotle held that tragedy had reached its 'nature' in classical Attic drama, and yet can ask as a question still to be discussed *εἰ ἄρα ἔχει ἡδὴ ἡ τραγωδία τοῖς εἶδεσιν ἰκανῶς ἢ οὐ, αὐτό τε καθ' αὐτὸ κρίνεται ἢ καὶ πρὸς τὰ θέατρα*.¹ How much more evident must it have seemed to him that a modern heroic epic was possible if only it was modelled on his theory of organic unity and size which was taken from the drama.² Callimachus, on the other hand, held that the heroic epic was dead and could not be renewed without loss of vitality and distinction.

The only positions in the field of literary criticism which Callimachus can be said to owe to Aristotle are such as any Hellenistic or Roman man of letters might owe to the philosopher. Callimachus regards literature as something remote from education or doctrine. This obviously owes something to Aristotle's successful battle against the Platonic strictures on poetry, but it does not make Callimachus an Aristotelian. He further takes it for granted that Homer and the writers of the Cyclic Epic belong to two different classes of literature. That distinction is something very definite and can be traced back to Aristotle, but, again, it does not make Callimachus a Peripatetic. For we have seen already that the two critics seem never more apart than when they speak of Homer and the Epic Cycle.

It would appear then that Callimachus' literary criticism is not of the Aristotelian brand. Callimachus was neither a Peripatetic nor any other sort of philosopher; he cannot be attached to any of the great Athenian schools. What he has learned from the Peripatos belongs to that exoteric kind of scholarship which could be detached easily from its place of origin.³ His own literary doctrine shows the poet's not the philosopher's point of view. It is consistent enough but thoroughly and refreshingly unphilosophical.⁴

This result clears the way for a comparison of Callimachus and his Aristotelian contemporary Praxiphanes.

V. PRAXIPHANES OF MYTILENE

Since the material at our disposal has increased not inconsiderably since L. Preller's *De P. Peripatetico*, Dorpat, 1842 (also in his *Gesammelte Aufsätze*, 1864, p. 94) and Susemihl's *Alex. Lit.* i. 144, a renewed collection of the testimonies and fragments is advisable. I have given it in this chapter. References to Preller and Susemihl have not been made unless their account still calls for discussion; in the case of fragments which Preller was already able to quote I have added his numbers in brackets after mine.

Praxiphanes

Testimonia

T 1. IG xi. 4 (1914), no. 613 Θεοί. ἔδοξεν τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ· Χοιρύλος Θαρσύνοντος εἶπεν· ἐπειδὴ Πραξιφάνης [] Διονυσιφάνους χρήσιμος ὦν διατελεῖ τῇ πόλει τῇ Δηλίων καὶ ποιεῖ ὅ τι δύναται ἀγαθὸν Δηλίου καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ· δεδόχθαι τῷ δήμῳ· εἶναι Πραξιφάνη Διονυσιφάνου εὐεργέτην τε τοῦ ἱεροῦ τοῦ ἐν Δήλῳ καὶ πρόξενον

¹ Arist. *Poet.* 4. 1449^a 7, text uncertain.

² Cf. *Poet.* chaps. 23 f., esp. 24. 1459^b 22 where Aristotle confronts the old epics (τὰ ἀρχαῖα) with other possible ones which conform to his standard. These ideas have left important traces in contemporary and later writers like Apollonius Rhodius and Virgil.

³ I should contend the same even if it could be proved that the doctrine of the 'characters of

style' was worked out in the Peripatos and had become known early enough to make possible a connexion of Callimachus' λεπτότης with the Peripatetic γένος ἰσχυρόν; cf. H. Herter, *Bursian's Jahresb.* cclv, 1937, p. 214.

⁴ The non-Aristotelian character of the Hellenistic combination of poetry and criticism has been recently emphasized by R. Pfeiffer, *Arch. f. Kulturgesch.* xxviii, 1938, p. 192.

Δηλίον καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἐγγόνους αὐτοῦ καὶ εἶναι αὐτοῖς ἀτέλειαν πάντων καὶ γῆς καὶ οἰκίας ἐγκτήσιν καὶ πολιτείαν καὶ προεδρίαν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι κτλ.

'Litterae accurate incisae . . . quales intra annos 270-260 scribi solebant' (Roussel). Wilhelm, *Jahresh. Öst. Arch. Inst.* viii, 1905, p. 1; Crönert, *Kolotes u. Mened.* 1906, pp. 74, n. 355 a, 179; Tarn, *Antig. Gen.* 1913, 469; Wilamowitz, *Hellenist. Dicht.* i. 212, ii. 276, n. 1; Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.* iv. 1². 1925, p. 598.

T 2. a. Lists of Peripatetic σχολάρχαι: *Vita Menag. Aristot.*, p. 10 R³. Aristoteles Theophrastos Straton Praxiteles Lykon Ariston Lykiskos *Praxiphanes* Hieronymos Prytanis Phormion Kritolaos.

b. Epiphan. *De Fide* 3. 31-5 lemm. (= Diels, *Doxog.* p. 592) Aristoteles Theophrastos Straton *Praxiphanes* Kritolaos. Cf. T 7.

On the lists cf. Brink, 'Peripatos' PW, Supp. vii, offprint 1936, col. 10; Prax. was not head of the School: Preller 8.

T 3. Strab. 14. 655 among famous Rhodians Ἀνδρόνικος ὁ ἐκ τῶν Περιπάτων καὶ Λεωνίδης ὁ Στωικός, ἐτι δὲ πρότερον Πραξιφάνης καὶ Ἱερώνυμος καὶ Εὐδήμιος.

Preller 5; Wilamowitz, *Hellenist. D.* ii. 276, n. 1; Bignone, *L' Aristot. perduto* ii. 54 n. 1.

T 4. Apollod. *Chron.* ap. Diog. Laert. 10. 13 (on *Epicurus*) τοῦτον Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν Χρονικοῖς Ναυσифάνους ἀκούσαι φησι καὶ Πραξιφάνους.

Preller 6 f.; Hirzel, *Unters. Cic. phil. Schr.* i, 1877, p. 165; Zeller, *Phil. d. Gr.* iii. a³, p. 364, n. 2; Susemihl, i. 145 n. 738; Jacoby, *Apollod. Chronik*, fr. 75; FGH, 244, F 41; Bignone, l.c. 54, n. 1.

T 5. a. Callim. fr. 100 g Schn. (Achilles, *Vita Arati* in *Comm. Ar. Rel.*, p. 78 Maass) μέμνηται γοῦν αὐτοῦ (Ἀράτου) καὶ Καλλίμαχος ὡς πρεσβυτέρου οὐ μόνον ἐν τοῖς Ἐπιγράμμασιν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς Πρὸς Πραξιφάνην, πάνν ἐπαινῶν αὐτὸν ὡς πολυμαθῆ καὶ ἀριστον ποιητήν.

b. ? Cf. *Vita Arati Latina*, p. 149 M. factus est autem nimis multum litteratus vir, sicut testatur Callimachus adstistens ei propter Praxiphanem Mytilenum.

Cf. above, p. 13 and below, p. 25.

T 6. *Schol. Flor.* Callim. PSI 1219 (vol. xi, 1935, p. 146) Διονυσίους δυ[σ]ῖ . . . καὶ Ἀσκλη[πιάδῃ τῷ Σικε]λίδῃ καὶ Ποσειδίππῳ τῷ ονο . . .] υριππῳ τῷ ῥήτορι καὶ Ἀνα . . .] βῳ καὶ Πραξιφάνῃ τῷ Μιτυληναίῳ, τοῖς με[μφομένο]ις αὐτοῦ τὸ κάτισ[χρον τῶν ποιη]μάτων καὶ ὅτι οὐχὶ μῆκος ἦρα . . .

Cf. above, p. 16.

T 7. Epiphan. *De Fide* 3. 34 (= Diels *Doxog.* p. 592) Πραξιφάνης Ῥόδιος τὰ αὐτὰ τῷ Θεοφράστῳ ἐδόξε. Cf. T 2 b.

T 8. Clem. *Strom.* I. 16. 79. 4 (p. 51. 21 Stählin) ὠνομάσθη δὲ γραμματικὸς ὡς νῦν ὀνομάζομεν πρῶτος Πραξιφάνης Διονυσιφάνους Μυτιληναῖος.

T 9 a. *Schol. Vat. Dion. Thrax*, p. 164 Hilgard (*Gram. Gr.* vol. iii) = Diels *Vorsok.* 72, no. 1 a διττὴ δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ γραμματικὴ· ἡ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τοὺς χαρακτήρας καὶ τὰς τῶν στοιχείων ἐκφωνήσεις καταγίνεται, ἥτις καὶ γραμματικὴ λέγεται παλαιά, οὕσα καὶ πρὸ τῶν Τρωϊκῶν, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ ἅμα τῇ φύσει προελθοῦσα· ἡ δὲ περὶ τὸν ἑλληνισμόν, ἥτις καὶ νεωτέρα ἐστίν, ἀρξαμένη μὲν ἀπὸ Θεαγένους, τελεσθεῖσα (δὲ) παρὰ τῶν Περιπατητικῶν Πραξιφάνους τε καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους· καὶ τῆς μὲν γραμματικῆς τέλος τὸ εὖ ἀναγινώσκειν, τῆς δὲ γραμματικῆς τὸ εὖ γράφειν.

T 9 b. *Schol. Lond. ib.* p. 448 διαφέρει δὲ γραμματικὴ γραμματιστικῆς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ γραμματικὴ νεωτέρα ἀπὸ Θεαγένους, τετέλεσται δ' ἀπὸ τῶν Περιπατητικῶν Πραξιφάνους τε καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους· ἡ δὲ γραμματιστικὴ παλαιά, ἴσως δὲ σχεδὸν ἅμα τῇ φύσει προελθοῦσα· καὶ τῆς μὲν τέλος τὸ γράφειν, τῆς δὲ τὸ ἀναγινώσκειν.

Laqueur PW, s.v. 'Theagenes', no. 9, and the works quoted there.

Fragments

F 1. (1 Preller) Philod. *Περὶ ποιημάτων* v, fr. 9. 28 Jensen *Πραξιφάνης* δ' ἔτερα μὲν τινα λέγει περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐν [τῷ] πρώτῳ *Περὶ ποιημάτων*, [ἣν] ἐνόησε καὶ π[ραγ]μάτων ὄντων [ἀγα]θ[ῶν] ο[ὕ]κ ἐνεύει [φησιν].

F 2. (2) Diog. Laert. 3. 8 'Ο δ' οὖν φιλόσοφος (Πλάτων) καὶ Ἰσοκράτει φίλος ἦν. καὶ αὐτῶν Πραξιφάνης συνέγραψε διατριβὴν τινα *Περὶ ποιητῶν* γενομένην ἐν ἀργῷ παρὰ Πλάτωνι ἐπιξενωθέντος τοῦ Ἰσοκράτους.

Preller 15; R. Hirzel, *Der Dialog*, i. 310; Wilamowitz, *Platon*, ii², 106, n. 1.

F 3. Pap. Oxy. (vol. viii, 1911) no. 1086, col. 1. 11-18 (Comm. on part of *Il. B*) [ἵπποι μὲν μέγ' ἀριστοὶ (B 763)· τὸ σημεῖον ὅτ]ι πρὸς τὸ δεύτερον πρότερον ἀπήντησεν. τὴν δ' ἀ[πο]λογίαν τοῦ ποιητοῦ ἐντεῦθεν ὁ Ἀρ[ίσ]ταρχος πεποιήται πρὸς Πραξιφάνην. ἐκεῖνος [γὰρ] θαυμάζει τὸν Ὀδυσσεῆα διὰ τὸ] παρη[γ]ορικῶς ὠμοληκότα τῇ μητρὶ κα[τὰ] τὴν τελευταίην περὶ Τηλεμάχου καὶ Πηνελόπης ἐρωτῆσαι, ἐπειδὴ περ ὡς ἐν μάλιστα [ἀκοῦσαι θέλει τὰ συμβάντα ἐν τῇ ἀ]πουσίᾳ. ἡ δέ, φησὶν, ἡ Ἀντίκλεια συνετωτάτῃ [οὔσα εὐθὺς περὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα κατα]γίνεται κτλ. σημειοῦται δὲ ὅτι διὰ παντὸς [ὁ ποιητῆς οὕτως εἰς τὰ ὕστερα πρ]ότερος ἀπαντᾷ κατὰ ἰδίαν συνήθειαν.

Supplements by Wilamowitz and Hunt; transl. by Hunt, p. 94: 'The sign is affixed because he has dealt first with what comes second. This is the basis of Aristarchus' defence of the poet against Prax. The latter is surprised at Odysseus', etc. The ref. is to λ 164-203, where Anticleia answers Odysseus' questions in inverse order (ὕστερον πρότερον).

F 4. (4) Demet. *De eloc.* 55-8 τοῖς δὲ παραπληρωματικοῖς σύνδεσμοις χρηστέον οὐχ ὡς προσθήκαις κεναῖς καὶ ὅλον προσφύμασιν ἢ παραξύμασιν, ὥστερ τινὲς τῷ δὴ χρῶνται πρὸς οὐδὲν καὶ τῷ νῦν . . . ἀλλ' ἂν συμβάλλονται τι τῷ μεγέθει τοῦ λόγου κτλ. λαμβάνεται δὲ καὶ παθητικοῖς πολλάκις ὁ σύνδεσμος οὗτος, ὥστερ ἐπὶ τῆς Καλυψοῦς πρὸς τὸν Ὀδυσσεῆα

Διογενὲς Λαερτιάδῃ πολυμήχαν' Ὀδυσσεῦ,
οὕτω δὴ οἰκόνδε φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαίαν (ε 203).

εἰ γοῦν τὸν σύνδεσμον ἐξέλοις, συνεξαιρήσεις καὶ τὸ πάθος. καθόλου γάρ, ὥστερ ὁ Πραξιφάνης φησὶν, ἀντὶ μυγμῶν παρελαμβάνοντο οἱ τοιοῦτοι σύνδεσμοι καὶ στεναγμῶν, ὥστερ τὸ αἰ αἰ καὶ τὸ φεῦ καὶ ποῖον τί ἐστιν, ὡς αὐτὸς φησι, τὸ

καὶ νῦν κ' ὀδυρομένοισιν (π 220)

ἔπρεψεν, ἔμφασιν τινα ἔχον οἰκτροῦ ὀνόματος. οἱ δὲ πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀναπληροῦντες, φησί, τὸν σύνδεσμον εἰκάσαν τοῖς ὑποκριταῖς τοῖς τὸ καὶ τὸ πρὸς οὐδὲν ἔπος λέγουσιν, ὅλον εἰ τις ὥδε λέγοι

Καλυδῶν μὲν ἦδε γαῖα Πελοπίας χθονός
(φεῦ)

ἐν ἀντιπόρθμοις πεδί' ἔχουσ' εὐδαίμονα
(αἰ αἰ).

(Eur. *Meleag.* fr. 515 N².)

ὡς γὰρ παρέλκει τὸ αἰ αἰ καὶ τὸ φεῦ ἐνθάδε, οὕτω καὶ ὁ πανταχοῦ μάτην ἐμβαλλόμενος <σύνδεσμος>.

On the corrupt sentence cf. Radermacher's and Rhys Roberts's editions.

F 5. (6) Proclus *Comm. Hes.*, praef. p. 3 f. Gaisf. ὅτι δὲ τὸ προοίμιόν τινες διέγραψαν, ὥστερ ἄλλοι τε καὶ Ἀρίσταρχος ὀβελίζων τοὺς στίχους καὶ Πραξιφάνης ὁ τοῦ Θεοφράστου μαθητῆς, μηδὲ τοῦτο ἀγνοῶμεν. οὗτος μέντοι καὶ ἐντυχεῖν φησιν ἀπροοιμιάσῃ τῷ βιβλίῳ καὶ ἀρχομένῃ χωρὶς τῆς ἐπικλήσεως τῶν Μουσῶν ἐντεῦθεν 'οὐκ ἄρα μόνον ἔην ἐρίδων γένος' (Hes. *Op.* 11).

S. Martin, *D. Proem. zu d. Erga des Hes.* 1898, p. 4; Rzach, *Hes. Carm.* (ed. mai.) 1902, on ll. 1-10; Wilamowitz, *Hes. Erga*, 1928, p. 38 f.

F 6. (5) Proclus *Plat. Tim.* p. 14 Diehl (on Plato *Tim.* (init.) εἰς δύο τρεῖς, ὁ δὲ δὴ τέταρτος ἡμῖν, ὃ φίλε Τίμαιε, ποῦ . . . κτλ.). Πραξιφάνης δὲ, ὁ τοῦ Θεοφράστου ἐταῖρος,

ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ Πλάτῳ πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι πρόδηλον ὃν καὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει γνώριμον τῷ Σωκράτει περιέθηκε τὸ εἰς δύο τρεῖς· τί γὰρ ἔδειτο τοῦ ἀριθμεῖν ὁ Σωκράτης, ἵνα γνῶ τὸ πλήθος τῶν ἀπηντηκόντων εἰς τὴν συνουσίαν; δεύτερον δέ, ὅτι τὸ τέταρτος ἐξήλλαξε, καὶ οὐ συμφώνως τοῖς προειρημένοις· ἀκόλουθον γὰρ τῷ μὲν εἰς δύο τρεῖς τὸ τέταρτος, τῷ δὲ τέταρτος τὸ πρῶτος δεύτερος τρίτος.

F 7. (3) Hesych. διατροχάδες· εἶδος ποιήματος, ὡς ἱστορεῖ Πραξιφάνης. (?) ὄνομα κύριον.

F 8. (7) Schol. (L) Soph. Oed. Col. 900 σπεύδειν ἀπὸ ῥυτῆρος· ἀντὶ τῆς βλαύτης· τῶν δ' ἐξηγησαμένων ἀπάντων αὐτὸ Πραξιφάνης δοκεῖ ἄμεινον ἀποδιδόναι ἀκούων τὸ ὑπόδημα, οἷον τῶν ποδῶν τὸ κάλυμμα.

αὐτὸ Elmsley, αὐτόν cod. (sc. ῥυτῆρα Papag.). Cf. Preller.

F 9. (8) Lex. Seg. no. 6, Bekker Anecd. Gr. p. 348. 14 (= Phot. s.v. δζα p. 38 ed. Reitzenstein, *Der Anfang d. Lex. d. Phot.* 1907) δζα· ξηρασία· σημαίνει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν ἀργείῳ ὀλίγον ὑγρόν· οὕτω Πραξιφάνης.

Cf. Hesych. s.v. δζα; Schol. Theoc. 5. 109 a and b.

F 10 (2) Marcellinus, *Vit. Thuc.* 29 συνεχρόνισε δ', ὡς φησι Πραξιφάνης ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἱστορίας, Πλάτῳ τῷ κωμικῷ, Ἀγάθῳ τραγικῷ, Νικηράτῳ ἐποποιῷ καὶ Χοιρίῳ καὶ Μελανιππίδῃ· καὶ ἐπεὶ μὲν ἐξ Ἰ. Ἀρχέλαος, ἀδοξος ἦν ὡς ἐπὶ πλείστον (viz. Thucydides), ὡς <δ> αὐτὸς Πραξιφάνης δηλοῖ, ὕστερον δὲ δαμονίως ἐθαυμάσθη.

Wilamowitz, *Herm.* xii, 1877, p. 353; *Einl. i. d. gr. Trag.* 16, n. 25; *Hellenist. D.* i. 54. 2; Hirzel, *Herm.* xiii, 1878, p. 46; Schöll, *ib.* 446; P. Scheller, *De Hellenistica historica conscribendae arte*, 1911, p. 70; Leo, *Göt. Gel. N.* 1912, p. 274; B. L. Ullman, *History and Tragedy* (Trans. Am. Philol. Assoc. lxxiii, 1942), p. 28, n. 14.

F 11. Carneiscus *Philista*, *Pap. Herc.* 1027 (Crönert *Kolotes u. Mened.* 1906, 69 ff.):

a. fr. viii . . . ὁ Πραξιφάνης . . .

b. col. viii ὥσπερ [καὶ] Πρα[ξ]ιφάν[ης, οὐ ἀγ]ασ[τ]έον, εἰ οὕτως . . . τῶν [ἐ]μ[ε] μέσῳ κα . . .]γτων ἀσύνοπτον . . . θε[ω]ροῦντας, ὅτι οὐ . . . γῆν ἀνθρώπος ἀνεστρ[έ]φε[τ]ο πρὸς τὰς παν . . . , ἥτ[ε]ρον ἐχόμενος [τῶν πα]θῶν καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν διαθέσεων, ὥσπερ αἱ κτλ.

c. col. x τοῦτων δὲ π[ρ]ο[ε]ρημένων, Ζώπυρε, νομίζω φανερόν γεγ[ο]νέναι, διότι μακρὰν ἀπέχευ Πραξιφάνης τοῦ τῶν δεόντων τι λελογίσθαι περὶ φιλίας καὶ τὴν προσήκουσαν ἔχειν κατὰστασιν ἐμ[ε] φίλων τελε[υτ]αῖς καὶ ὡς πολλῆς ἀσυμφωνίας ἔγμεν ὁ λόγος, ὃν ἐποίησατο περὶ τούτων καὶ κτλ.

d. col. xiii εἰσάγει ο[δ]ὲν ἐν τῷ σ[υ]γγραμμάτι Πραξιφάνης κακὸν μὲν, <ὅς> ἐξαπατᾷ τὸν ἴδιον [υἱ]όν, μ[ε]τ[ε]ρῶς δὲ φίλοις συν[α]ναστραφῆσεται οὐ . . . λουν γνη[σ]ίως τ . . . α δὲ καὶ παντ[ε]λῶς οὐ φιλή[σ]ει ὥσπερ ἐαν[τ]όν· ἔπειτα δὲ εἰσάγει Π[ρ]αξιφάνης κτλ.

Crönert, l.c. 72. An Epicurean work on friendship arguing throughout against a book by P. on the same subject. Crönert, with much probability, infers from d that Praxiphanes' work was a dialogue; b treats of the subject of the emotions (πάθη), c mentions the chief subject, i.e. friendship, and specifies another, i.e. behaviour on the death of a friend.

P., son of Dionysiphanes, was born at Mytilene in the island of Lesbos (T 5b, 6, 8). He studied at Athens in the Peripatos under Theophrastus (F 5, 6), but did not become head of the school (T 2). In Strabo and the doxographic tradition he is called a Rhodian (T 3, 7; whether the inscription T 1 contained 'Ρόδιος or Μυτιληναῖος in the lacuna after the name and in the *subscriptio* is uncertain). This has been rightly understood to imply migration to Rhodes (Wilamowitz and Bignone T 3) where there had been a flourishing Peripatetic tradition since Eudemus, the pupil of Aristotle. Crönert (*Kolotes u. Men.* 74) has drawn attention to the fact that his name does not appear among the scholars to whom Theophrastus, in his will (Diog. Laert. 5. 2. 51), leaves the school. This probably means that at the time of Theophrastus' death he was not in Athens, possibly in Rhodes; other explanations, however, are possible.

Rhodes was nearer to the cultural centre of Egypt than Athens; this fact may or may not account for the relation with Callimachus which is attested by the title of the Alexandrian's book *Πρὸς Πραξιφάνην* (T 5a). He is called a teacher of Epicurus, mistakenly (Jacoby ref. T 4), since he was of about the same age as, or even younger than, Epicurus; Bignone's recent arguments to the contrary (T 4) will hardly convince. Through the fact of his studies under Theophrastus, who lived from 372/3 to 288/7, he is dated at about 340 to ? . The Delian inscription in his honour (T 1) was put up sometime about the middle of the third century; no more precise date has as yet been fixed (reff. T 1).¹ The dates in the Greek and Latin Lives of Aratus do not help for P. Callimachus praises Aratus in *Πρὸς Πραξ.* in a way similar to Epig. 27; if then the prose work, like the epigram, is to be put after the *Phaenomena* which was published in the sixties (Wilamowitz, T 1, convincingly), *Πρὸς Πραξ.* is dated at about 260. Whether the Delian inscription was granted for political or literary activity is unknown.

The following titles are mentioned in our sources: *Περὶ ποιημάτων* in at least two books (F 1 ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ *Περὶ ποιη[μ]άτων*); a dialogue *Περὶ ποιητῶν* (F 2);² and *Περὶ ιστορίας*, also very probably a dialogue (F 10). The title of the ethical work is lost (F 11); *Περὶ φιλίας* is the most likely conjecture. The book was probably a dialogue also. F 3-9 are not with certainty to be assigned to any of these titles, which in any case cannot be more than a selection.

Even if we had the titles of all his critical works we should misjudge Praxiphanes if we thought of him as a literary critic of the Alexandrian brand. We are likely to make the same mistake with regard to other early Peripatetics. These men represented a philosophical tradition. We may well be disappointed if we measure it by Aristotelian standards, but if we compare it with Alexandrian criticism, we must realize that it is there none the less. Our sources took that tradition for granted and, consequently, tell us little of the philosophical background of post-Aristotelian teaching in the Lyceum. A comparison with Callimachus reveals some important differences.

Praxiphanes forms part of the so-called doxographic tradition. That tradition is a philosophical one; it does not concern literary criticism. Its contents belong to philosophy proper, particularly to metaphysics and what was then called physics. That is the meaning of T 7: *Πραξιφάνης Ῥόδιος τὰ αὐτὰ τῷ Θεοφράστῳ ἐδόξασε*.³ To metaphysics we add ethics; the work from which F 11 is quoted must have represented traditional Peripatetic teaching to evoke Epicurean polemic such as we find in Carneiscus' fragments. Thus we do well to take an expression like *ὁ τοῦ Θεοφράστου ἐταῖρος* (F 6, cf. 5) at its face-value. Praxiphanes appears to have been an orthodox Peripatetic.

We must therefore expect similar traces in his poetic criticism. We have seen that Callimachus' literary views lack philosophical consistency. This fact should show up the opposite tendency in the Aristotelians. Aristotle's *Poetics* is built on a set of philosophical terms which were applied to poetry, not deduced from it. Professor

¹ All the arguments put forward by Wilhelm (ref. T 1) in favour of an exact date have proved of no avail. In particular, no argument based on Agathostratus is valid since the inscription adduced by Wilhelm does not contain Agathostratus' name, cf. Roussel, *CBH* 1911, p. 443 and Tarn, *Antig. Gen.* 1913, p. 469. This fact also disposes of Beloch's date for Praxiphanes in *Gr. Gesch.* iv. 1². 1925, p. 598.

² The existence of two similar works on poetics has sometimes been doubted, e.g. recently by

A. Rostagni, *Riv. Fil.*, N.S. iv, 1926, p. 465, n. 2, on *Περὶ ποιη[μ]άτων*: 'si non è falsa lettera, è probabilmente un equivoco'. This inference seems rash; *Περὶ ποιημάτων* may have been an acroamatic work. Later Hellenistic works bear the same title, e.g. Philodemus's book in which it is quoted; the title seems to appear here first. Aristotle also wrote two main works on literary criticism, a dialogue *Περὶ ποιητῶν* and an acroamatic work *Περὶ ποιητικῆς*, our *Poetics*.

³ Cf. also T 2 b.

Rostagni has shown this for the Aristotelian καθόλου or 'universal';¹ it equally applies to the whole set of terms developed in the decisive chapters 8 and 9.² The idea of organic unity is one of them. It lies at the root of Aristotle's philosophy of art, and remained one of the most typical Peripatetic tenets. It is the basis for the more specified doctrines of organic size, majesty of style, etc., which we have discussed in our last section. And it is from those ideas that the doctrine of tragedy and the long (Homeric) epic, as the two ideal forms of serious poetry, is derived. This we should expect to find in any traditional Peripatetic system, and we cannot therefore be astonished to find Praxiphanes among the advocates of the Long Epic of organic size,³ and thus in the camp opposed to Callimachus. What he thought about the Cyclic Epic in general, and Antimachus in particular, we are not told; but we have seen already that this is a question of secondary importance. In the opinion of an Aristotelian critic, any epic writer who tried to proceed according to the principles of unity and style laid down in the *Poetics* could rightly be judged on his merits; Callimachus, on the other hand, would have thought him wrong as a matter of principle.

There was a considerable amount of criticism levelled against Aristotle in his own school,⁴ but that seems not to have affected the doctrine of dramatic unity and its corollaries. Aristotle himself had applied it to the epic.⁵ Another important application of the same principle was probably discussed in the works of Praxiphanes, and his master Theophrastus, entitled *Περὶ ἰστορίας*. It is true that nothing survives apart from the one fragment, F 10; and that looks like an unimportant 'synchronism' rather than a piece of philosophical discussion. This synchronism, however, is likely to represent the scene of a dialogue at the Macedonian court of Archelaus with Thucydides and the poets as *dialogi personae* (Hirzel, Schöhl, reff. F 10). If this is so, the further inference is indicated by the title that in the dialogue Thucydides discussed the principles of historical writing with the poets named in the fragments, and with that we are back in the atmosphere of the *Poetics* (chap. 9). I conclude then that the main subject of the dialogue was the 'universal character' (καθόλου) of poetry as opposed to the particularity (καθ' ἑκάστων) of history, as laid down by Aristotle in that famous chapter. This must of course remain an inference, but it seems to me a likely one.⁶

¹ Cf. particularly the introduction to his edition of the *Poetics*.

² I am thinking of the ἐν καὶ ὅλον, the καθόλου and καθ' ἑκάστων, the ὅλον ἂν γένοιτο and τὰ γινόμενα, and, most important, the κατὰ τὸ εἰκός ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον.

³ Arist. *Poetics* 7. 1450^b 36 μέγεθος generally; 1451^a 1 ff., esp. *10, for tragedy; chap. 24, esp. 1459^b 28, on epic; cf. above, p. 18, n. 3, Praxiphanes T 6 μήκος. On Callimachus' use of μήκος see above, p. 17.

⁴ Criticism seems to have been directed particularly against 'dualistic' doctrines which had a Platonic ring, such as the immortality of the soul, the νοῦς θύραθεν εἰσιών, and the primacy of the 'theoretical' life. I have tried to give an account of this type of heterodoxy in my article 'Peripatos', col. 19 ff. A different, and perhaps more important, type is represented by non-Aristotelian conclusions drawn from Aristotelian premisses.

⁵ Ar. *Poet.* chaps. 23 f.; 26. 1462^b 4.

⁶ With the evidence at our disposal we are at present unable to tell how Theophrastus or Praxiphanes solved the problem. It remains to be seen whether the so-called 'Peripatetic history' was really conceived by genuine Peripatetics like Theophrastus and Praxiphanes, or whether it is merely an adaptation made by outsiders like Duris. Prof. Ullman (ref. F 10) warns us against the name 'Peripatetic tragic history' because Aristotle did not favour that application of poetry to history (l.c. 33, n. 49). His article has raised the problem afresh. Unfortunately he goes to the opposite extreme by attributing to Isocratean influence the whole of 'tragic history'. That is not convincing, and Duris' proem alone should have precluded any such attempt. The problem is really more complicated since we have to deal with Isocratean as well as Peripatetic influences. Also, Prof. Ullman talks as if we knew Aristotle's ideas about possible applications of poetical principles to history, and holds that 'it was a betrayal of

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This then is the general philosophical and literary background against which we must set Praxiphanes' grammatical fragments. He specialized in that sort of literary criticism which, without his philosophical foundation, was just then developing in Alexandria under the name of 'grammar'. Since he seemed to foreshadow that development later times called him 'the first grammarian' (T 8).¹ Seven fragments, accidentally preserved by later writers, cover most of the field of Alexandrian scholarship. He defines and illustrates the parts of speech (F 4, an impressive fragment on the power of particles), makes observations on Homer's style (F 3), collects and explains glosses (F 7-9), discusses the genuineness of early literature (F 5, he rejects as spurious the proem to Hesiod's Works and Days because he had found an edition which was ἀπροομιαστόν), and criticizes style (Homer's F 3, Plato's F 6). This sort of activity, as well as the literary character of some of his books, must have interested the Alexandrians, and we find them acquainted with his work. Aristarchus seems to have agreed with him as to the spurious character of Hesiod *Op.* 1-10. On the other hand, when we find Aristarchus opposed to him as in F 3, the Alexandrian appears as the master owing to his closer observation of Homeric idiom. In his criticism of Homer (F 3), and even more of Plato (F 6), Praxiphanes seems to have little patience with the individual character of the style he deals with. But when he maintains a general principle, as in F 4, his observations seem more convincing.

VI. CALLIMACHUS' ΠΡΟΣ ΠΡΑΞΙΦΑΝΗΝ

I would sum up the result of my discussion as follows:

(1) The title of Callimachus' lost work means 'Against', not 'Dedicated to', Praxiphanes. So much seems indicated by the appearance of Praxiphanes among the opponents of Callimachus (Schol. Flor.) as well as by his Aristotelian principles.

(2) The subject of the work, or at least the chief subject, was the Long Epic (Schol. Flor.), a problem in which, as we have seen, Callimachus fundamentally differed from the Peripatos.

(3) The only² actual fragment of the work appears as fr. 100 g in Schneider's collection (T 5a, above, p. 20), and has been analysed for its bearing on Callimachus' biography: μέμνηται γοῦν αὐτοῦ (Ἀράτου) καὶ Καλλίμαχος ὡς πρεσβυτέρου οὐ μόνον ἐν τοῖς Ἐπιγράμμασιν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς Πρὸς Πραξιφάνην, πάντῃ ἐπαινῶν αὐτὸν ὡς πολυμαθὴ καὶ ἀρίστον ποιητὴν. If this assertion can be trusted³ it adds an important point to our account. If Aratus was praised in a work of literary criticism for his two qualities

Aristotle's creed to apply his pronouncements about tragedy to history' (37). That surely is an over-simplification. Paradoxically, despite *Poet.* chap. 9, we do not know Aristotle's 'creed' in this matter. Aristotle never gave precepts for what history *should* be, and, as at other points where he indicated problems without giving solutions, there originated an intense discussion in his school, to which he himself may or may not have contributed his own ideas. We are unlikely to make much headway before we have recaptured the trend of that discussion, and, in particular, Theophrastus' system of literary criticism—a task to which Prof. Rostagni has brought many stimulating problems in his article in *Stud. It.*, N.S. ii, 1922.

¹ In a different historical scheme he appears, along with Aristotle, as the culmination of the pre-Alexandrian literary scholarship which is

based on the interpretation of Homer (T 9). There may be as much justification in this view as in the one given in the text.

² K. Diltz, *De Call. Cyd.* 18, and O. Immisch, *Festsch. Gompertz*, 1902, p. 273, assigned to Πρὸς Πραξιφάνην the fragment of Callimachus' criticism of Plato. This is not at all unlikely but cannot at present be proved. The fragment occurs in Proclus *Plat. Tim.* i, p. 90. 25 Diehl: μάτην οὖν φληναφῶσιν Καλλίμαχος καὶ Δούρις ὡς Πλάτωνος οὐκ ὄντος ἱκανοὶ κρίνειν ποιητάς. Callimachus was concerned with Plato's interest in Antimachus, cf. *FGH*, 76, F 83 Jac., Antim. T 1 Wyss, Rostagni *Riv. Fil.*, N.S. v, 1927, pp. 166 ff., and Duris was probably referred to by him. The fragment certainly suits our context well.

³ Our criticism above, p. 13 n. 4, concerned the chronological conclusions, not the actual fragment.

of learning and poetic skill, that praise must have arisen from Callimachus' theory of poetry like the points made at the end of the *Aetia*, in Epig. 27, and other poems.¹ I therefore conclude that the didactic epic was mentioned in contrast to the heroic one, as in Epig. 27 Homer and Hesiod are contrasted. In accordance with his literary views Callimachus praised Aratus for the learned character of his work and the λεπτόν or μελιχρόν of his style. This is the doctrine of the new school of literature, and it is directed against the classicists in Athens and elsewhere.

If these suggestions are right it would appear that the transition from Aristotle's school to Alexandria has been over-simplified. The Museion is not a specialized form of the Peripatos. Despite close personal contact in the early years, despite likenesses in organization and method, one cannot say that the younger school is a product of the older. Once the Museion was fully established its anti-Aristotelian features became apparent. The speculative side of Aristotle's philosophy had never been taken up in Alexandria; ethics and rhetoric were not adapted to the conditions in the new capital, and most important of all, certain fundamental Aristotelian principles seemed then superseded and out of date. The city-state character of Aristotle's *Politics*, and his clean-cut division between Greeks and Barbarians, were an anachronism in the period after Alexander, and could certainly not appeal to the Ptolemies. Eratosthenes, Callimachus' pupil, probably echoes the sentiment of the court when he contradicts Aristotle's political doctrine.² In literature the combination of poetry and criticism which is so typical of Alexandria does not betray Aristotelian influence. Moreover, the very principles of Aristotle's literary theory must have seemed out-moded to the dominant party. Callimachus himself is not an Aristotelian in spite of the Peripatetic character of his scholarly work. As a poet and critic he is opposed to Aristotle. His opposition grew out of, and was implied in, his poetry; it seems to have been argued explicitly in the book against Praxiphanes.

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¹ Callim. *Epig.* 27 Wil. (*A.P.* 9. 507) 'Ἡοῖδον τό τ' αἶσιμα καὶ ὁ τρόπος· οὐ τὸν ἀοιδῶν ἔσχατον, ἀλλ' ὁκνέω μὴ τὸ μελιχρότατον τῶν ἐπέων ὁ Σολεὺς ἀπεμάξατο· χαίρετε λεπταὶ ῥήσιες, Ἀρήτῳ σύμβολον ἀγρυπνίης. *Fr.* a. 388 Schn. (Marcus ap. Front. *ad M.* 1. 4, p. 11 N. = I, p. 94 Haines) ποιμένοι μῆλα νέμοντι παρ' ἔχρινον ὀξέος ἱπποῦ 'Ἡοῖδω, Μουσέων ἐσμός δ' ἦν ἴασε, cf. *Aet.* fr. 9. 84 Pf. (Oxy. 1011). . . τῷ Μοῦσαι πολλὰ νέμοντι βοτὰ σὺν μύθους ἐβάλλοντο παρ' ἔχρινον ὀξέος

ἱπποῦ (cf. Hes. *Theog.* 22 f.).

² Eratosth. against Aristotle's political opinions: Strabo I, p. 66; W. W. Tarn, *Alexander and the Unity of Mankind*, 1933. p. 7. Cf. Wilamowitz's convincing argument, *Briefwechsel m. Mommsen*, p. 250, against Mommsen's remark in *The Provinces of the Rom. Emp.* ii. 241, n. 2 (= R.G. v. 562) that the Ptolemies professed Aristotelian politics and that Eratosthenes was opposed to them.

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IMAGERY IN PLATO'S *REPUBLIC*

Of all the dialogues that may be said to be in Plato's normal style, the *Republic* seems to be the richest in imagery. The *Phaedrus* may contain more of such figurative language, but its whole atmosphere and style are so artificial as to place it outside comparison. The *Republic* stands, in this respect as in philosophic content, between the relative plainness of the earlier works and the didactic heaviness of the *Laws*, which is relieved by proverbial, rather than by imaginative, illustration.

The similes and metaphors of the *Republic* do not appear to have been studied separately. G. O. Berg's *Metaphor and Comparison in the Dialogues of Plato* (1904) gives a full and careful summary and classification covering the whole body of Plato's works. Berg takes these figurative expressions singly, studies their form, and tabulates their fields of reference. He does not dwell upon their interrelationship—the mixing and shifting of imagery, or the persistence of a dominating figure through a long passage interspersed with minor illustrations. Nor does he consider that subtle and difficult question, the degree of conscious imagery that may be assumed in the writer's choice of a word metaphorical in origin. Plato's prose is, like any other developed literary prose, full of such words; how far are we to reckon them as the common coin of speech, or how far as still, for him, figurative in their use?

As regards the field of reference, Plato's choice of imagery in the *Republic* is on much the same lines as in his dialogues as a whole. Illustrations from human situations or activities, institutions, arts, and crafts greatly outnumber those from the animal world or from inanimate nature. This is in interesting contrast to the field of Homeric simile. But already in Pindar the human analogies have begun to preponderate—see, e.g., the list in Gildersleeve's index to his *Olympians and Pythians*. Plato's preference for such may be related, as Berg suggests, to their greater usefulness for his arguments; it also obviously reflects the natural background of the citizen of Athens. Among the references to social life, several have the point and elegance of little scenes from comedy; such are the orphan heiress and the bald tinker, 495 c ff.; the supposititious son, 537 c ff.; the father and his dissolute offspring, 569 A ff. (The same quality is of course observable in the passage (e.g.) about the timocratic man and his jealous mother, 549 D ff.) Of illustrations derived from arts and crafts, the references to painting are specially numerous; fewer relate to sculpture, only one (*θρίγκος*, 534 E) to architecture. Actual similes from music are only two (432 A and 443 D), but the figurative use of *ἁρμονία*, etc., is of course frequent. References to athletics and to sport are fairly numerous, and there are instances from games of draughts (487 C), *πόλεις* (422 D f.), dice (604 C), and from marionettes (514 B). Of the illustrations from animals, the dog and the wolf are most frequent; a few others are striking and important, and the drones (552 c ff.) will be specially considered later. A certain number of illustrations are derived from myths, from the poets, or from proverbs.

COMPARISONS AND METAPHORS IN THE *REPUBLIC*

1. Human situations, activities, relationships.	Fall from seat, 553 B-C.	Getting a light, 427 D.
Journey, 328 E, 532 E, 614 E, 621 D; of life, 365 B; of argument, 420 B, 435 D, 453 E, 462 E, 543 C, 588 B.	Sinews cut, 411 B.	Telling stories, 376 D.
Climbing hill, 452 C, 568 C.	Swimming, 453 D, 529 C.	Among wild beasts, 496 D.
Stumbling, 451 A.	Benumbed, 503 D.	Taking shelter, 496 D.
Out of breath, 568 D.	Ailing in body, 425 E, 556 E, 579 C.	Prisoners, 514 A ff.
	Short-sighted, 585 A, 595 E-596 A.	Cruel master, 329 C.
	Dreaming, 476 C, D.	Children, 330 E, 557 C, 604 C.
	Tasting, 496 C, 582 E, 592 A.	Bloom of youth, 601 B.
		Lovers 607 E.

Marriage, 490 B, 495 E-496 A, 603 A-C.

Father and son, 506 E ff., 569 A. Old women, 350 E.

2. Social background and Institutions.

Bathman, 344 D.

Feasting, 352 B ff., 354 B.

Cupbearer, 562 C, D.

Orphan heiress, 495 C ff.

Supposititious son, 537 E ff.

Bazaar, 557 D.

Doctor, 564 B, C, 567 C.

Finance, 345 A, 506 E ff., 612 C, D.

Sanctuary, 495 D.

Mysteries, 378 A.

Theatre, 451 C, 490 C, 554 B, 560 E, 577 B, 580 B.

Marionettes, 514 B.

Law, 337 D, 380 C, 450 A, 580 A.

Exile, 607 B ff.

Monarchy, 509 D, 553 C ff., 560 C ff., 573 D ff., 587 B.

Warfare, 362 D, 368 B, 472 A, 473 E, 534 C, 566 C.

Seafaring, 457 B, 473 C, 488 A-E, 551 C, 553 A, 591 E, 616 C.

Hunting, 401 C, 410 A f., 432 B ff., 462 A, 553 A.

Athletics, 403 E, 405 C, 465 D ff., 503 E ff., 544 B, 583 B, 608 C, 612 D, 613 B, 621 C, D.

Indoor games, 422 D, 487 C, 604 C.

3. Arts and Crafts.

Painting, 377 E, 484 C, 488 A, 500 E-501 C, 504 D, 529 B-E.

Sculpture, 361 D, 420 C, 540 C, 611 C.

Modelling, 377 A *et passim*, 588 D.

Building, 534 E.

Metalwork, 411 B, 415 A, 503 A ff.

Dyeing, 430 A ff.

Embroidery, 557 C.

Use of funnel, 411 A.

Fire-sticks, 435 A.

Bridle, 496 B.

Lead weights (for net) 519 A.

Scales, 544 D, 550 E.

Nest of boxes, 616 D.

Gardening, 589 B, 606 D.

Craftsmen marred in body, 495 D.

Tinker, 495 E.

Music, 432 A, 443 D.

Mathematics, 509 D ff., 534 D.

4. Animals.

Wild beasts, 336 B, 411 D, E, 496 D.

Wolf, 336 D f., 415 E, 565 D ff.

Dog, 375 A ff., 404 A, 416 A, 422 D, 440 D, 451 D ff., 469 E, 537 A, 539 B.

Fox, 365 C.

Pig, 372 D, 535 E.

Colts, 413 D.

Cattle, 586 A, B.

Tame beast, 493 A ff.

Mixed creature, 588 C ff.

Ape, 590 B.

Serpent, 358 B.

Birds, 398 A, 467 D, 548 A, 573 E.

Bees, 365 A, 520 B, 552 C ff.

Gadfly, 577 E.

5. Nature.

Wind, 394 D, 401 C, 496 D.

Hail, 496 D.

Mud, 533 D.

Sea (waves), 457 B, 472 A, 473 C.

Barnacles, etc., 611 D, E.

Whirlpool, 424 A.

Sun, 508 A ff.

Light and darkness, 514 A ff. *et passim*.

Rainbow, 616 B.

Shooting stars, 621 B.

Seed and plants, 491 B ff., 495 A,

497 B, 565 D.

Soil, 401 B, 495 A.

6. Proverbial sayings. 341 C, 426 E,

479 B, C, 498 A, 544 D, 569 B, 596 A, 597 E, 621 B.

7. Myths. 521 C, 529 D, 558 A,

560 C, 565 D, 586 C, 588 C, 590 A, 599 C, 612 B.

8. Anecdotes. 329 E ff., 359 C ff.,

439 E ff.

In considering the incidence and the significance of Plato's figurative language, it is not always easy to draw the line between mere illustrative analogy (particularly frequent in the earlier books of the *Republic*) and instances which, while they may be deliberately adduced in the course of argument, stand out with an imaginative quality of their own. But the main distinction can as a rule be made. Thus, e.g., at 332 D-E or 341 C the work of the κυβερνήτης in a ship is used as an instance of τέχνη. Contrast the extended simile of the Ship, 488 A ff. At 333 B the περρευτικός is used as an instance of χρήσιμος, while at 487 C we have the simile of a game of draughts to illustrate an *impasse* in discussion. At 389 C the man under training appears (among others) as an instance of a situation requiring truthfulness; at 403 E we have a metaphor, ἀληταί μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἄνδρες τοῦ μεγίστου ἀγῶνος. The illustrative analogies, as such, follow the usual Socratic lines; the herdsman, the doctor, the ship's captain are frequent in comparisons with the ruler. Often they occur in groups, as at 389 C, where we have the relationship of ἰδιώτης to ἄρχων compared successively to that of patient to doctor, of athlete to trainer, and of seaman to captain. One of the most striking single illustrations, standing out with the pictorial effect of a simile, is that of the στρόβιλος (436 D) which exemplifies motion and rest combined. Other single analogies prove essential to the development of the argument; thus at 368 D the instance of γράμματα leads on to the idea of justice ἐν μείζονι, and so to the πόλις. At 375 A the instance of the watch-dog develops into an extended comparison which becomes almost an allegory. At 453 D the reference to a swimming-pool proves the introduction to the important recurring figure of the waves of argument—cf. 457 B, 472 A.

The frequency of these illustrations used in discussion raises the question of the real origin and basis of Plato's imagery—how far it is derived from an intellectual perception of similarity, and when (if ever) it springs from some intuitive experience

comparable to that of the poet. It seems undeniable that the intellectual strain predominates, though sometimes we reach another level, as in the imagery of mystical union with truth (484 B ff.), or the exuberant picture of the soul of the tyrannical man (573 A ff.). Plato's fondness for extended allegory (e.g. the Ship 488 E ff., or the supreme instance of the Cave, 514 A ff.) points to a deliberate choice by the mind; so do the passages in which a play on words gives the suggestion for an illustration, as with *τόκος* and the money figure (507 A), *πόλις* and the game of 'cities' (422 D), *ὑπόθεσις* and the climb to knowledge (511 B).

The combination of the various forms of imagery, both in matter of arrangement and in actual mixture of content, shows some interesting variety. Adopting the usual distinction between simile (which Plato introduces most often by *ὥσπερ*, also by *οἶον* or with a comparative construction) and metaphor (varying from the mere use of words figurative in origin to a strongly imaginative phrase), we note the following types of arrangement:

(a) *Simile* > *metaphor*.

432 B-D. *ὥσπερ κυνηγέτας τιὰς . . . περιστάσθαι . . . μή πη διαφύγη ἢ δικαιοσύνη, κτλ. . . καὶ ἐγὼ κατιδῶν, κτλ.*

394 D. *ὅπη ἂν ὁ λόγος ὥσπερ πνεῦμα φέρη, ταύτη ἰτέον.* (On similar fusion in Homer, cf. W. B. Stanford, *Greek Metaphor*, p. 135.)

472 A. *ὥσπερ καταδρομὴν ἐποίησω . . . καὶ οὐ συγγινώσκεις στραγγενομένῳ.*

(b) *Metaphor* > *simile*.

354 A, B. *ταῦτα . . . σοὶ . . . εἰστιάσθαι . . . οὐ μέντοι καλῶς γε εἰστιάμαι . . . ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ λίχνοι, κτλ.* Cf. 457 E-458 A, the same figure and arrangement.

(c) *Metaphor* > *application*.

341 C. *ζυρεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖν λέοντα καὶ συκοφαντεῖν Θρασύμαχον.*

467 D. *πτεροῦν χρή παιδία ὄντα, κτλ. . . ἐπὶ τοὺς ἵππους ἀναβιβαστέον.*

Mixture of content is exemplified in the close juxtaposition of different similes, as well as in the more subtle form of mixed metaphors.

Mixed or closely following similes.

413 D, E. Colts in training > gold tried in fire. *ὥσπερ τοὺς πώλους, κτλ. . . βασανίζοντας πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ χρυσόν, κτλ.*

472 D. Raid on stragglers (simile > metaphor, see above) > third wave (metaphor). *ὥσπερ καταδρομὴν ἐποίησω, κτλ. . . τῷ δύο κύματε, κτλ.*

496 D. Man among wild beasts > man sheltering from storm. *ὥσπερ εἰς θηρία . . . ἐμπεσόν, κτλ. . . οἶον ἐν χειμῶνι, κτλ.*

604 C. Dice-players > children hurt. *ὥσπερ ἐν πτώσει κύβων, κτλ. . . ἀλλὰ μή . . . καθάπερ παῖδας ἐχομένους τοῦ πληγέντος, κτλ.*

Mixed Metaphors.

(a) Words metaphorical, but perhaps no strong image in mind.

382 C. *εἰδωλον, οὐ πᾶν ἄκρατον ψεῦδος.*

424 D. *παρὰνομία . . . εἰσοικισαμένη ἡρέμα ὑπορρεῖ πρὸς τὰ ἥθη.*

520 B, C. *τό γε αὐτοφυνὲς . . . ὥσπερ ἐν σμήνεσιν ἡγεμόνας, κτλ.* (simile).

567 D. *ἐν μακαρίᾳ . . . ἀνάγκη δέδεται, ἢ προσάττει αὐτῷ, κτλ.*

(b) Definite metaphors mixed, or shifting.

365 C. *πρόθυρα . . . σχῆμα . . . σκιαγραφίαν . . . περιγραπτέον, τὴν δὲ . . . Ἀρχιλόχου ἀλωπέκα ἐλκτέον, κτλ.* (Adam, 'The mixture of metaphors is thoroughly Platonic'.)

401 B. Similes and metaphors are here combined into a general image with some shifting in detail and one definite incongruity, *ἰχνεύειν*. *ὥσπερ ἐν κακῇ βοτάνῃ . . . δρεπόμενοι τε καὶ νεμόμενοι . . . τοὺς εὐφυνῶς δυναμένους ἰχνεύειν . . . ὥσπερ ἐν ὑγιεινῇ τῶπῳ οἰκοῦντες . . . ὥσπερ αὔρα φέρουσα . . . ὑγίειαν, κτλ.*

500 D, E. πλάττειν . . . δημιουργόν . . . εἰ μὴ . . . διαγράφειν . . . ζωγραφοί.

534 B, C. ὥσπερ ἐν μάχῃ . . . ἀπτῶτι τῷ λόγῳ διαπορεύεται . . . εἴ πῃ εἰδῶλου τινὸς ἐφάπτεται . . . ὀνειροπολοῦντα καὶ ὑπνώττοντα, κτλ.

411 A-C. This is perhaps the outstanding example of a succession of figures (several are similes) combined with some actual mixing—reinforced, at its boldest, by a tag from Homer. . . καταχεῖν . . . διὰ τῶν ὧτων ὥσπερ διὰ χώνης . . . ὥσπερ σίδηρον ἐμάλαξεν . . . ὅταν . . . μὴ ἀνίη ἀλλὰ κηλῇ, . . . τήκει καὶ λείβει, ἕως ἂν ἐκτῆξῃ τὸν θυμὸν καὶ ἐκτέμῃ ὥσπερ νεῦρα ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ποίησιν μαλθακὸν αἰχμητὴν . . . τὸν θυμὸν δξύρροπον ἀπειργάσατο . . . ταχὺ ἐρεθιζόμενόν τε καὶ κατασβεννύμενον. Gildersleeve's comment on Pind. *Pyth.* 1. 82 is perhaps to the point here: 'In moralizing passages the metaphors follow in rapid succession—not so much mixing as overlapping.'

It is not the purpose of this article to study in detail the relation of Plato's imagery to his argument, or the philosophical inferences to be drawn from it. But certain recurring comparisons or metaphors develop into a system of symbolic language which is characteristic of the whole dialogue, but which becomes especially rich in the later books, as the close argument of the earlier sections gives place to a more imaginative method. Some of these repeated symbols may be mentioned here.

The first simile in the dialogue is that of a journey, 328 E; and the last metaphor (621 D, διελθελύθαμεν) has the same reference, in close association with the literal *χελιέτης πορεία*. The journey of life and the journey of argument recur throughout the dialogue. The analogy between sight and intellectual perception is a commonplace, but in the passage relating to the Good (to be considered below) it is invested with fresh force, and is combined with the symbols up: down, yonder: here. A mystical apprehension of truth is symbolized (484 B ff.) by metaphors from marriage. The figurative use of *τύπος*, πλάττειν, ζωγραφός, etc., is frequent with reference to the theoretical founding of the *πόλις* and education of the guardians. The analogy between state and soul leads naturally to a group of metaphors personifying and interrelating the 'parts' of the soul—*στάσις*, pulling different ways, argument and persuasion, and so forth. The composite creature (588 C ff.) elaborates this idea with the most fantastic bit of imagery in the whole dialogue.

Two passages may repay detailed consideration—the system of imagery relating to the Good (505 E–540 A), and the various applications of the Drone simile (552 C–573 A).

The Good, 505 E–540 A.

From the point of view of our study, the interest of this section of the dialogue lies in the combination of several recurring images—on the whole compatible with each other—with some other and different figures interposed.

Introduced by reference to the *μακροτέρα περίοδος*, 504 B–C, the passage begins with the statement *ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα μέγιστον μάθημα*, and the whole section is an exposition on this theme. The first figure introduced is a comparison with material possession—*πᾶσαν κτῆσιν ἐκτῆσθαι*, 505 B. The metaphor of pursuit (recalling the figure of marriage, 490 A ff.) appears in *διώκει*, 505 E. These are superseded by the figure of light—*ἐσκοτῶσθαι*, 500 A—which has already been used in several passages (478 C is a striking example, where *δόξα* is *γνώσεως μὲν . . . σκοτωδέστερον, ἀγνοίας δὲ φανότερον*), and which now becomes predominant. At 506 C the visual imagery is strong—*τυφλά τε καὶ σκολία . . . φανὰ τε καὶ καλὰ*.

At 506 E the simile of the Sun is prepared for by reference to *ἔκγονος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*. This figure is temporarily held up by a playful image from finance, introduced by *ἀποτεῖσει*, 506 E, and pointed by the double meaning of *τόκος*, 507 A. The main illustration proceeds, starting with the contrast between *ὁρᾶσθαι* and *νοεῖσθαι*, 507 B. At 508 B a curious mixed image occurs referring to the faculty of sight—*τὴν δύναμιν . . .*

ἐκ τούτου ταμειομένην ὥσπερ ἐπύρρυνον κέκτηται. At 508 D there is another mixture, οὐ καταλάμπει ἀλήθεια . . . εἰς τοῦτο ἀπερείσθηται, a return to the figure of mystic union. The parallels between Sun and Good, Eye and Mind, etc., are explicitly pointed in what follows, with the introduction of one or two other figures—ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, 509 B, and βασιλεύειν, 509 D.

The summing-up at 509 E, ταῦτα διττὰ εἶδη, ὁρατόν, νοητόν, leads at once to the fresh illustration of the Divided Line. Here the accepted reading ἀνισα τμήματα is of course symbolic of values. The details in the description of ὁρατά—εἰκόνας, σκιαί, ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι φαντάσματα, κτλ., 510 A—emphasize the prevailing figure of Sight; and σκιαί is a forecast of the Cave imagery. At 510 B there appears a fresh image which becomes important—the often-recurring figure of the journey of thought or argument, combined with that of an upward progress, specially characteristic of this passage. τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ . . . ψυχὴ ζητεῖν ἀναγκάζεται ἐξ ὑποθέσεων . . . πορευομένη, τὸ δ' αὖ . . . ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἀνυπόθετον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἰοῦσα . . . τὴν μέθοδον ποιουμένη. Here begins an interesting example of metaphorical words, not in themselves very strong, combined and applied in significant ways. ὑπόθεσις is taken up in the mathematical sense at 511 A; but with further and clearer references to the upward journey (ἰοῦσαν, ἀνωτέρω ἐκβαίνειν), its etymology is pointed in a vigorous figure—511 B, οὐ αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἀπτεται . . . τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιούμενος . . . τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις, ὅλον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμάς, ἵνα μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου . . . ἴω, ἀψάμενος αὐτῆς, πάλιν αὖ ἐχόμενος τῶν ἐκείνης ἐχομένων, οὕτως ἐπὶ τελευτῇ καταβαίνῃ, κτλ. The image of ascent is here made obvious, and the use of ἀπτεσθαι (here rather literal than mystical) and ἔχεσθαι points vigorously the details of the climb up and down.

The recapitulation at 511 C brings in again the analogy between sight and knowledge—σαφέστερον . . . θεωρούμενον, κτλ. Now sight and ascent are combined—αἷς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί . . . θεᾶσθαι οἱ θεώμενοι, διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἀνελθόντες σκοπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὑποθέσεων, κτλ. In the final reference to the Line, proposing names for the four mental states, the last image is again visual—511 E, οὕτω ταῦτα σαφηνείας ἡγησάμενος μετέχειν.

In the figure of the Cave, which immediately follows, images already used are recalled at the outset in κατάγειος οἰκησις, 514 A, and φῶς . . . ἀνωθεν . . . καόμενον, 514 B, and again in τὰς τῶν σκευαστῶν σκιάς, 515 C (cf. 510 A). ὥσπερ τοῖς θαυματοποιοῖς, κτλ., 514 B ('at the marionettes', see H. Rackham in *C.R.* xxix. 77) is an interesting passing analogy. The introduction of prisoners is a fresh figure, and with it comes also the image of turning towards the light. The current ideas are combined and associated at 515 C, ὅποτε τις λυθείη καὶ ἀναγκάζοιτο ἐξαίφνης ἀνίστασθαι τε καὶ περιάγειν τὸν αὐχένα καὶ βαδίζειν καὶ πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἀναβλέπειν. φεύγειν ἀποστρεφόμενον, 515 E, repeats the figure of turning, and σαφέστερα that of light. The upward journey is next vigorously expressed with the idea of struggle added—εἰ . . . ἔλκοι τις αὐτὸν βίᾳ διὰ τραχείας τῆς ἀναβάσεως καὶ ἀνάντους καὶ μὴ ἀνείη πρὶν ἐξελκύσειν. The analogy between firelight and sunlight, and such phrases as τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἀληθῶν, τὰ ἄνω ὄψεσθαι, πρῶτον μὲν τὰς σκιάς, . . . εἰδῶλα, κτλ., are all reminders of the earlier figures of Sun and Line; and the reference to the Sun brings in the figure ἐπιτροπεύων, 516 B, which seems to recall both ταμειομένην (508 B) and βασιλεύειν (509 D).

The state of mind of the released prisoner having been aptly illustrated from Homer—516 D, σφόδρα βούλεσθαι ἐπαυροῦν ἑόντα, κτλ.—the same images of sight, ascent, and release recur in what follows; and the application which begins at 517 B makes all explicit, with the metaphor of sight at its strongest in the phrase φαίνεται . . . τελευταία ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα καὶ μόγις ὁρᾶσθαι, and a reminder of the figure of parentage (506 E), ἐν τε ὁρατῷ φῶς καὶ τὸν τούτου κύριον τεκοῦσα.

The allegory and its application go on consistently, with this set of images, as far as 518 B. Now begins the exposition of the true nature of παιδεία, carrying on the

figures of sight and of turning, with a different image interposed at 518 C, *φασὶ . . . ἐπιστήμην ἐντιθέναι, ὅλον τυφλοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ὄψιν ἐντιθέντες*—another metaphor relating to the same pervading figure of sight. The two run parallel for some time—518 C, *στρέφειν πρὸς τὸ φανόν, κτλ.*, 578 D, *τῆς περιαγωγῆς, . . . μεταστροφῆσεται, οὐ τοῦ ἐμποιῆσαι αὐτῷ τὸ ὄραν, κτλ.*, 518 E, *ἐμποιεῖσθαι, . . . περιαγωγῆς . . .*. At 519 A, within the general image of turning to the light and upwards, we have a fresh and striking analogy; 519 A, *εἰ . . . κοπτόμενον περιεκόπη τὰς τῆς γενέσεως ξυγγενεῖς ὥσπερ μολυβδίδας, αἱ δὲ ἔδωδαῖς . . . προσφύει γιγνόμεναι κάτω στρέφουσι τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ὄψιν· ὧν εἰ ἀπαλλαγὴν περιστρέφετο, κτλ.* The word *μολυβδίδας* appears to refer to the sinking-lead of a fishing-net; this figure of submersion (though in some sense cognate) is a breakaway from the imagery of the Cave—the first of a number of fresh figures which from now on alternate with definite references to that parable. Thus at 519 D we have *ἀναβῆναι ἐκείνην τὴν ἀνάβασιν, κτλ.* At 520 B there is a figure from horticulture—*αὐτόματοι . . . ἐμφύονται . . . τὸ αὐτοφύες, κτλ.*—immediately followed by a different one, the first appearance of the hive simile: *ὁμᾶς δὲ . . . ὥσπερ ἐν σμήνεσιν ἡγεμόνας τε καὶ βασιλέας ἐγεννήσαμεν.* At once we have a return to the Cave; 520 C, *καταβατέον οὖν, κτλ.* After a reference to *ἐρασταί* and *ἀντερασταί* (521 B), the Cave is again predominant, with a striking comparison to the return from Hades—apparently Plato's only use of the analogy between ignorance and death: 521 C, *πῶς τις ἀνάξει αὐτοὺς εἰς φῶς, ὥσπερ ἐξ ᾿Αΐδου λέγονται δὴ τινες εἰς θεοὺς ἀνελθεῖν.* Immediately a fresh figure follows, deriving from the use of the word *περιστρέφειν* a comparison with the game called *νὺξ ἡμέρα* (see Adam's note)—*οὐκ ὀστράκου ἂν εἴη περιστροφή, ἀλλὰ ψυχῆς περιαγωγῇ ἐκ νυκτερινῆς νιῶς ἡμέρας εἰς ἀληθινὴν, τοῦ ὄντος οὐσαν ἐπάνοδον*—the Cave again.

In the ensuing passage on the curriculum the figures which recur are those of leading (or dragging) and of challenge (or invitation), both clearly traceable to the Cave; e.g. 522 E, *τῶν πρὸς τὴν νόησιν ἀγόντων . . . ἐλκτικῷ . . . πρὸς οὐσίαν.* 523 D, *παρακλητικόν.* 524 A, *παραγγέλλει . . . λέγει, κτλ.* The personification of mental stimuli and of desires, etc., is a feature of this passage. Words directly recalling earlier imagery are also frequent; e.g. 525 A, *τῶν ἀγωγῶν . . . καὶ μεταστρεπτικῶν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ὄντος θεάν.* 525 B, *γενέσεως ἐξαναδύντι.* 525 C, *ψυχῆς μεταστροφῆς.* At 527 D we have a mixture of two metaphors applied to the eye, *ἐκκαθαίρεται τε καὶ ἀναζωπυρεῖται.* At 529 B, C there are two fresh analogies—*εἰ τις ἐν ὀροφῇ ποικίλματα θεώμενος ἀνακύπτων, κτλ.* . . . *κἂν ἐξ ὑπτίας νέων ἐν γῇ ἢ ἐν θαλάττῃ μανθάνῃ.* The use of astronomy is compared (529 D ff.) to the use of diagrams produced by Daidalos or another *δημιουργός*, and this word is used again at 530 A. In the passage on music there is some exuberant imagery—531 B, *τοὺς ταῖς χορδαῖς πράγματα παρέχοντας καὶ βασανίζοντας, κτλ.* At 531 D the figure of *προοίμιον* and *νόμος* enters for the first time (cf. 532 D). From 532 A we have a definite reminder of the Cave, and a recapitulation and reapplication of the whole story.

In connexion with the operation of Dialectic, the figure of a journey is several times used—532 B, *οὐ διαλεκτικὴν ταύτην τὴν πορείαν καλεῖς*; 532 E, *οἱ ἀφικομένῳ ὥσπερ ὁδοῦ ἀνάπαυλα ἂν εἴη καὶ τέλος τῆς πορείας.* The word *ὑπόθεσις* returns at 533 C (cf. 510 B ff.), and what follows directly recalls the Line—*ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνη ταύτη πορεύεται, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναρροῦσα, ἐπ' αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχὴν*—but a fresh and interesting image is at once brought in: 533 D, *καὶ τῷ ὄντι ἐν βορβόρῳ βαρβαρικῷ τινι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα κατορυγμένον ἡρέμα ἔλκει καὶ ἀνάγει.* There was no mud in the Cave, and the mud here seems to be Orphic in origin (see Adam's note on 363 D). The rest of the sentence brings in a new figure—*συνερίθους καὶ συμπεριαγωροῖς χρωμένη . . . τέχναις.* With the comparison *ἐναργεστέρου . . . ἀμυδροτέρου* (533 D) we are reminded of the early simile of sight, and a recapitulation of the names given to the divisions of the Line naturally follows. This may possibly be echoed again at 534 D in the phrase *ἀλόγους ὄντας ὥσπερ γραμμάς.* In the meantime we have an interesting bit of mixed,

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or shifting, metaphor at 534 B, C—ὅς ἂν μὴ . . . ὥσπερ ἐν μάχῃ . . . ἀπῴτῳ τῷ λόγῳ διαπορεύεται, . . . τὸν νῦν βίον ὀνειροπολοῦντα καὶ ὑπνώττοντα, κτλ. The summing-up of this passage on Dialectic explicitly recalls the earlier imagery of 511 B, with the addition of a fresh simile—534 E, δοκεῖ σοι . . . ὥσπερ θρίγκος . . . ἡ διαλεκτικὴ ἐπάνω κείσθαι, καὶ οὐκέτ' ἄλλο τούτου μᾶθημα ἀνωτέρω ὀρθῶς ἂν ἐπιτίθεσθαι. θρίγκος contributes the idea of a building to the original figure of ascent and descent.

The ensuing passage on the training of philosophers brings in a variety of imagery in brief references—535 B, ἀποδεικνύει: 535 C, οὐ νόθους (cf. 495 C) . . . οὐ χαλόν . . . : 535 E, ἀνάπληρον: 535 E, ὥσπερ θηρίον ὕειον ἐν ἀμαθίᾳ μολύνεται (cf. 533 D, ἐν βορβόρῳ): 537 A, σκυλάκας, cf. 539 B, σκυλάκια: 537 E ff., ὑποβολιμαῖος: 538 D, κολακεύει . . . ἔλκει When the process is completed, we return explicitly to the Cave allegory which has been in abeyance—539 E, καταβιβαστέοι ἔσονται σοι εἰς τὸ σπηλαῖον πάλιν ἐκεῖνο—and again farther back to the image of Light and Sun—540 A, ἀναγκαστέον ἀνακλίναντας τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς αὐγὴν εἰς αὐτὸ ἀποβλέψαι τὸ πᾶσι φῶς παρέχον.

With this effective and clear reminder, the Cave illustration comes to an end. A fresh analogy immediately follows—540 C, παγκάλους . . . ὥσπερ ἀνδριαντοποιὸς ἀπείργασαι. This recalls, with a difference, the ζωγραφός of 500 E ff.

A late reminiscence of this central group of images is found at 586 A—κάτω φέρονται, καὶ πλανῶνται διὰ βίου . . . πρὸς τὸ ἀληθὲς ἄνω οὔτε ἀνέβλεψαν πώποτε οὔτε ἠνέχθησαν.

The Drone, 552 C–573 A.

Plato has a number of references to bees, some literal and some figurative in application. Their flight in search of honey is the point at *Rep.* 365 A and *Ion* 534 B; their swarm, typifying any 'crowd', at *Meno* 72 A, *Rep.* 450 B, and *Polit.* 293 D; their sting left behind, *Phaedo* 91 C. We have seen a reference to the hive and its 'kings' at *Rep.* 520 B, ὕμᾶς δ' ἡμεῖς . . . ὥσπερ ἐν σμήνεσιν ἡγεμόνας τε καὶ βασιλέας ἐγενήσαμεν. The special interest of the Drone figure lies in the various modifications which are found in the use and application of this one image throughout a long passage.

The first instance of the figure is, as a simile passing into metaphor, at 552 C, with reference to the development of the Oligarchical Man. βούλει οὖν . . . φῶμεν αὐτόν, ὡς ἐν κηρίῳ κηφήν ἐγγίγνεται, σμήνους νόσημα, οὕτω καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον ἐν οἰκίᾳ κηφήνα ἐγγίγνεσθαι, νόσημα πόλεως; (σμήνους νόσημα suggests a quotation from tragedy.) . . . τοὺς μὲν πτηνοὺς κηφήνας πάντας ἀκέντρους ὁ θεὸς πεποίηκεν, τοὺς δὲ πεζοὺς τοῦτους ἐπίους μὲν αὐτῶν ἀκέντρους, ἐπίους δὲ δεινὰ κέντρα ἔχοντας; καὶ ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀκέντρων πτωχοὶ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας τελευτῶσιν, ἐκ δὲ τῶν κεκεντρωμένων . . . κακουργοί. Cf. 552 E, κακουργοὺς πολλοὺς . . . κέντρα ἔχοντας.

The first use of the Drone, then, is to typify a class of men in the city—or rather two classes, the 'stingless' poor and the 'stinging' malefactors. But very shortly afterwards the image is shifted to the other side of the recurring state: soul relation—554 B, κηφήνώδεις ἐπιθυμίαι ἐν αὐτῷ (sc. the Oligarchical Man) . . . μὴ φῶμεν ἐγγίγνεσθαι τὰς μὲν πτωχικοὺς, τὰς δὲ κακούργους; Cf. 554 D, τὰς τοῦ κηφήνος ξυγγενεῖς ἐνούσας ἐπιθυμίας. The 'drone desires' arise within the individual soul.

At 555 D the reference is again to men; in the transition to Democracy, κάθηνται δὲ . . . οὗτοι ἐν τῇ πόλει κεκεντρωμένοι τε καὶ ἐξωπλισμένοι. 555 E–556 A, οἱ δὲ δὴ χρηματίζονται . . . πολλὸν τὸν κηφήνα καὶ πτωχὸν ἐμποιοῦσι τῇ πόλει. Here the singular κηφήν has a collective sense. In the development of the Democratical Man, κηφήν again applies to the human being: 559 C, ὃν νῦν δὴ κηφήνα ὠνομάζομεν: 559 D, ὅταν νέος . . . γεύσῃται κηφήνων μέλιτος καὶ ξυγγένῃται αἰῶσι θηρῶν καὶ δεινοῖς. Adam (see his notes) refers to 572 C to show that it is human drones that are here meant, not ἐπιθυμίας.

The Drone simile is now for a while in abeyance, being replaced by human analogies—560 B, the fortress, κατέλαβον τὴν . . . τῆς ψυχῆς ἀκρόπολιν, κτλ.: 560 C, Lotus-eaters,

εἰς ἐκείνους τοὺς Λωτοφάγους ἐλθὼν φανερώς κατοικοῖ: 560 E, chorus, λαμπρὰς μετὰ πολλοῦ χόρου κατὰγουσιν ἐστεφανωμένους, κτλ.: 562 C, cupbearers, ὅταν . . . κακῶν οἰνοχόων . . . τύχη. At 564 B, with the development of Democracy into Tyranny, the original figure is recalled—τὸ τῶν ἀργῶν τε καὶ δαπανηρῶν ἀνδρῶν γένος, . . . οὓς δὴ ἀφωμοιοῦμεν κηφήσι, τοὺς μὲν κέντρα ἔχουσι, τοὺς δὲ ἀκέντροις. A mixed, or rather parallel, simile follows: τούτῳ . . . ταραττετον οἷον περὶ σώμα φλέγμα τε καὶ χολή· ὦ . . . δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἱατρὸν τε καὶ νομοθέτην πόλεως μὴ ἦττον ἢ σοφὸν μελιττουργὸν πόρρωθεν εὐλαβεῖσθαι, . . . ὅπως ὅτι τάχιστα ξὺν αὐτοῖσι τοῖς κηρίοις ἐκτετμήσεσθον. At 564 D, still referring to human drones, we have a curious and amusing fusion of man and insect—τὸ μὲν δρυμύτατον αὐτοῦ λέγει τε καὶ πράττει, τὸ δ' ἄλλο περὶ τὰ βήματα προσίζον βομβεῖ τε καὶ οὐκ ἀνέχεται τοῦ ἄλλα λέγοντος.

The next application of the analogy is to human greed: 564 E, πλείστον . . . τοῖς κηφήσι μέλι, καὶ εὐπορώτατον ἐντεῦθεν βλῖττει . . . πλοῦσι . . . οἱ τοιοῦτοι καλοῦνται, κηφήνων βοτάνη. (This phrase, says Adam, 'has a proverbial ring'.) 565 A, εἰ μὴ μέλιτός τι μεταλαμβάνη. At 565 C κηφήν is again collective as at 556 A—καὶ τοῦτο τὸ κακὸν ἐκείνους ὁ κηφήν ἐντίκτει κεντῶν αὐτούς. At 567 D-E the reference is to men who form the Tyrant's bodyguard. πολλοὶ ἤξουσιν πετόμενοι . . . κηφήνας . . . δοκεῖς . . . λέγειν ξενικούς τε καὶ παντοδαπούς.

Finally, the Drone appears again in a psychological reference, at the climax of the brilliant passage describing the development of the Tyrannical Man: 572 E (τίθει) ἔρωτά τινα αὐτῷ μηχανωμένους ἐμποιῆσαι προστάτην τῶν ἀργῶν τε καὶ τὰ ἔτοιμα διανεμομένων ἐπιθυμιῶν, ὑπόπτερον καὶ μέγαν κηφήνά τινα. This 'king-drone', ruling over all the drone-desires, is the overmastering ἔρως in the Tyrant's soul. 573 A, ὅταν δὲ περὶ αὐτὸν βομβοῦσαι αἱ ἄλλαι ἐπιθυμίαι, θυμιαμάτων τε γέμουσαι . . . πόθου κέντρον ἐμποιήσωσι τῷ κηφήνι, τότε δὲ δρυφορεῖται τε ὑπὸ μανίας καὶ οἰστρά οὗτος ὁ προστάτης τῆς ψυχῆς. The king-drone has become a monarch with a bodyguard. It is the first appearance of this metaphor, which rapidly supplants the earlier figure. Thus 573 D, ὡν ἂν ἔρως τύραννος ἐνδὸν οἰκῶν διακυβερνᾷ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαντα. A final transformation-scene dismisses the Drone figure for good. 573 E, ἀρα οὐκ ἀνάγκη μὲν τὰς ἐπιθυμίας βοᾶν πυκνάς τε καὶ σφοδράς ἐννεοσττευμένας, τοὺς δ' ὥσπερ ὑπὸ κέντρων ἐλανομένους . . . οἰστράν καὶ σκοπεῖν, . . .; The desires have become birds, not bees, and the κέντρον possibly a goad, not a sting. The Tyrant ἔρως within the soul is the more natural analogue for the Tyrant in the state.

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¹ S. A.
storgius,
I, p. 532.

² *Arw*
1898, p. 4
Julian's
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³ J. E.
pp. 286, 2

⁴ Cf. F.
ed. Bidez
ὁ παραβά

THE LAST DELPHIC ORACLE

It is, I think, generally believed that the last oracle delivered at Delphi was that given to Oreibasios announcing the inability of Apollo to prophesy there again. This oracle begins with the line: εἴπατε τῷ βασιλεῖ· χαμαὶ πέσε δαίδαλος αὐλά', and has been translated by Swinburne as *The Last Oracle*. Of it Myers wrote: '(It is) the last fragment of Greek poetry which has moved the hearts of men, the last Greek hexameters which retain the ancient cadence, the majestic melancholy flow.'² But there is evidence which suggests that this was, in fact, not the last prophetic utterance of the Pythian god, and no ancient authority implies that it was.

Does it seem likely that Julian would have been deterred from restoring so impressive an appanage of the pagan faith merely because the Delphic priests had grown faint-hearted and had sent him a discouraging answer? Those who know Julian and remember his energetic attempts to restore the oracles of Apollo at Daphne and Didyme³ will scarcely believe it. The discouragement and faint-heartedness of the priests would merely have spurred him on to more fervent efforts to restore the greatest oracle of all.

Positive evidence that the Pythian Apollo delivered one more response after that given to Oreibasios is provided by Theodoret. Writing in his *Hist. Eccl.* iii. 21 (p. 200, ed. Parmentier) Theodoret says that when Julian decided on his Persian expedition, πέμψας εἰς Δελφούς καὶ Δῆλον καὶ Δωδώνην καὶ τὰ ἄλλα χρηστήρια, εἰ χρή στρατεῦεν ἐπηρώτα τοὺς μάντις.⁴ The oracles bade the Emperor proceed with the campaign, and to illustrate their falseness Theodoret quotes one of them in paraphrase: νῦν πάντες ὠρμήθημεν θεοὶ νίκης τρόπαια κομίσασθαι παρὰ Θηρὶ ποταμῷ· τῶν δ' ἐγὼ ἡγεμονεύσω θούρος πολεμόκλονος Ἄρης.⁵ But was this oracle which he paraphrases given at Delphi or at one of the other shrines? Theodoret would seem to imply that it was Delphic, for he proceeds: κωμωδεῖτωσαν οἱ λόγιον θεὸν καὶ τῶν Μουσῶν ἀρχηγέτην τὸν Πύθιον ὀνομάζοντες. The words τὸν Πύθιον here would be rather pointless if the oracle just quoted had been delivered at Dodona, Delos, or some place other than Delphi.

Another passage in the same writer enables us to answer our question with more certainty. In his *Graec. Affect. Curatio*⁶ Theodoret again deals with this oracle. He is here illustrating the disasters that had been brought about by the ambiguity of oracular responses. He first cites the familiar Delphic oracle given to Aristomachus.⁷ He then quotes the Delphic declaration that Croesus would destroy a great empire if he crossed the Halys, and goes on to conclude that the Pythian oracle either claims to know what it does not know or else wilfully ruins those who have tried to serve it well. He continues: παραπλήσιον δέ τι δέδρακε καὶ ἐπὶ Ἰουλιανοῦ τὴν ὁρμὴν ἔχοντος κατὰ τῶν Ἀσσυρίων. νῦν γὰρ, ἔφη, πάντες ὠρμήθημεν θεοὶ παρὰ Θηρὶ ποταμῷ νίκης τρόπαια κομίσασθαι. τούτων ἐγὼ ἡγεμονεύσω θούρος πολεμόκλονος Ἄρης. (It is clear from the

¹ S. Artemii Passio, 35 (Bidez, ed. Philostorgius, p. 77); Cedrenus, Migne, PG. cxxi. 580; I, p. 532, Bonn.

² *Apud* Evelyn Abbott, *Hellenica*, London, 1898, p. 447. For the silence of the oracles before Julian's reign, see that emperor's *Contra Galilaeos*, 198 c.

³ J. Bidez, *La Vie de l'Empereur Julien*, pp. 286, 298.

⁴ Cf. Philostorgius, *Hist. Eccl.* vii. 15, p. 100, ed. Bidez, τοῖς πανταχόθεν χρημαῖσι τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὁ παραβάτης ἀναπεισθεὶς ὡς ἀμαχὸν ἔξει τὸ κράτος,

κατὰ Περσῶν ἐκστρατεύει, Greg. Naz. *Or.* v. 9. Cedrenus, *ap.* Migne, PG. cxxi. 585, p. 538, Bonn, also paraphrases our oracle and distinguishes it from that given to Oreibasios; but he gives no indication that it was Delphic.

⁵ Cedrenus' paraphrase, i.e., agrees verbatim with this one of Theodoret, save that he begins with νῦν μὲν πάντες.

⁶ Migne, PG. lxxxiii. 1069.

⁷ References in H. W. Parke, *History of the Delphic Oracle*, p. 55.

paraphrase that this oracle, like Oreibasios', was in hexameters.) He goes on: προσόμοιον δέ τι καὶ ἐπὶ Ἀθηναίων πεποίηκεν, and cites the oracle beginning ὦ μέλει, τί κάθησθε;¹ In other words, he illustrates his theme exclusively by Delphic examples.

All the other oracles in this passage are taken by Theodoret from Eusebius,² but this one he has inserted from some other source into the list given by Eusebius. Can it not be the case, then, that he has mistakenly placed a non-Delphic utterance in the midst of the Delphic responses drawn from Eusebius? It can; but this supposition involves ascribing an error to Theodoret for which there is no evidence whatever. Is the oracle a Christian forgery? Perhaps; but the authenticity of Oreibasios' oracle, which survives only in the *S. Artemii Passio* (probably from Philostorgius) and in Cedrenus, has not been questioned: it is easy to see why no pagan writer mentions either response. We can, I think, only assume that Theodoret or his source knew that this oracle, given to Julian before setting out for Persia, was Delphic: the subject of δέδρακε in the passage quoted above can only be the Pythian Apollo.

The consultation of the Delphic oracle before the start of the great Persian campaign—an action very characteristic of Julian—is hinted at by Gregory of Nazianzus (l.c.) and is explicitly vouched for by Philostorgius and Theodoret. We cannot but accept it as a fact. I see no reason to doubt that the oracle paraphrased by Theodoret and Cedrenus was the answer given on that occasion. Julian marched out of Antioch on 5 March A.D. 363. Our oracle was presumably delivered during the last few months of 362, while Oreibasios' visit to Delphi, as Cedrenus implies, doubtless took place in the early days of Julian's attempt to revive the pagan religion. Bury³ has pointed out that the games at Delphi appear to have been celebrated as late as A.D. 424, but we know of no oracle delivered there after Julian's consultation of the god in the winter of 362-3.

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¹ Herodotus, 7. 140, etc.

² In Migne, *PG*. lxxxiii. 1073, he gives Porphyry and Oenomaus as his sources for the

oracles, but in fact he used Eusebius.

³ *Later Roman Empire*², (1923), i, p. 370 n. 2: see *CTh*. xv. 5. 4.

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NOTES ON SOME PASSAGES OF ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS DE FATO

THE treatise of Alexander of Aphrodisias *περὶ εἰμαρμένης* is probably the most interesting of his independent works to the general reader. Not only is it one of our chief sources for the Stoic doctrine of Destiny, as a glance at the relevant pages of *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* will show, but it also contains a closely reasoned and exhaustive (if somewhat prolix) criticism of that doctrine from the Peripatetic standpoint. I therefore hope that an attempt to deal with some of the numerous corruptions and difficulties in the text may not be wholly useless.

The passages are cited from the edition of Ivo Bruns (*Supplementum Aristotelicum*, vol. ii, 1887). So far as I know, the only work on the text that has been done since Bruns is that of von Arnim (*S.V.F.* ii) and G. Rodier (*Revue de Philologie*, xxv, 1901). Many of von Arnim's suggestions are valuable, but he is concerned only with passages which give Stoic doctrine, not with the bulk of the treatise which seeks to refute it. Some passages have, I think, been well dealt with by Rodier, and these I have not included. Only four of the passages with which I am concerned—iii, vii, xx, xxvi—are amongst his; and as his paper is sufficiently accessible, I have not thought it necessary to repeat his suggestions on them. Nor have I used up space in reproducing Bruns's *apparatus criticus*, though in the few cases where it has been of any help I have referred to it.

My thanks are due to Dr. R. G. Bury, who has helped me with advice on several passages.

- i. 165. 1. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐνίων δογμάτων <ῆ> κατασκευὴ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τοὺς μὴ ὁμοίως λέγοντας ἀντιλογίαν γίνεται φανερωτέρα (ὡν ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα κατ' αὐτοῦ * * * τε εἰεν μείζω ἢ κατὰ τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους δόξαν εἰπεῖν), ποιήσομαι τὸν λόγον πρὸς τοὺς οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐκείνῳ περὶ τούτων εἰρηκότας, ὅπως ἐν τῇ τῶν λεγομένων παραθέσει φανερώτερον ὑμῖν τὰληθὲς γένηται.

A clue to restoration is provided by the actual structure of the treatise, the first six chapters of which expound the Aristotelian view of Destiny, while the rest is a Peripatetic criticism of the Stoic view. Chapter 6 ends with the words καὶ αὕτη μὲν ἡ περὶ εἰμαρμένης ὡς ἐπὶ κεφαλαίων εἰπεῖν κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ Περιπάτου δόξα.

I start with the conjecture that εἰεν μείζω conceals εἶναι νομίζω, and that the insertion of ἡ before κατὰ was an almost inevitable consequence of this mistake. I take the antecedent of ὡν in the second line to be δογμάτων, and propose: ἐπεὶ . . . φανερωτέρα (ὡν ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτ' εἶναι νομίζω), κατὰ τὴν Ἀρ. δόξαν εἰπὼν ποιήσομαι κτλ. Perhaps τά should be inserted before κατὰ.

- ii. 179. 3. εἰ γάρ, ἐν οἷς οὐδὲν ἡμῖν πλέον ἐκ τοῦ βουλευέσθαι <τοῦ βουλευέσθαι> αὐτοῦ μόνον περιγίνεται, οὐ βουλευόμεθα, δῆλον ὡς ἐν οἷς βουλευόμεθα πλέον τι ἔξοντες ἐκ τοῦ βουλευέσθαι παρὰ τὸ βουλευέσθαι βουλευόμεθα περὶ αὐτῶν † ἐπ' αὐτὸ τε τὸ βουλευέσθαι περιγίνεται καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων βουλευομένοις περὶ ὧν προειρήκαμεν.

In place of Bruns's <τοῦ βουλευέσθαι> it seems necessary to insert τοῦ βουλευέσθαι, since the aorist is used throughout the discussion to denote the completed result of the process of deliberation. The words πλέον τι ἔξοντες are evidently dependent on the following (not the preceding) βουλευόμεθα: this would be made clearer by putting commas both before and after ἐν οἷς βουλευόμεθα. After περὶ αὐτῶν I put a colon, and continue: ἐπεὶ αὐτό γε τὸ βουλευέσθαι κτλ. 'Since the mere deliberative conclusion is secured even if we deliberate about the things previously mentioned.'

The 'things previously mentioned' are τὰ αἰδία, τὰ ἐπ' ἄλλοις, and τὰ παρεληλυθότα. Unlike Aristotle (*E.N.* Γ. 3) Alexander thinks that it is possible to deliberate about these, though, as it is useless, we do not actually do so: this is clear from 178. 28 ff. and (in respect of τὰ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, i.e. τὰ ἐπ' ἄλλοις) also from 179. 20 below: ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν (οὐκ) ἐφ' ἡμῖν δυνάμενοι ποιεῖν ὡς ἀχρηστον ὃν παρητούμεθα.

- iii. 182. 26. οἱ δὲ δέον αὐτόθεν μὴ σώζεσθαι λέγειν καὶ τοῦ μὴ σώζεσθαι ζητεῖν τε καὶ παρέχεσθαι τὰς αἰτίας, ἐπεὶ τοῦτο ἑώρων παντάπασιν ἄδοξόν τε ὃν καὶ πολλὰ τῶν καὶ αὐτοῖς † τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν πᾶσάν τε ταῦτ' οὐκ ἐκ δυνάμεως συνοδεῖον τῷ τῆς εἰμαρμένης λόγῳ, <τῷ> διὰ τῆς ὁμωνυμίας παρακρούεσθαι τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἡγοῦνται φεῖγειν τὰ ἄτοπα, ὅσα ἔπεται τοῖς μηδὲν ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι λέγουσιν.

Alex. is arguing that the Stoics refuse to admit that they reject the principle of 'things in our power' (τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν). The passage is evidently deeply corrupt, and restoration can only be conjectural. I propose: οἱ δὲ . . . ἄδοξόν τε ὃν καὶ πολλὰ τῶν κατ' αὐτοὺς τῷ ἐφ' ἡμῖν πᾶσχοντα ταῦτ', ἐδείκνυσαν συνοδεῖον κτλ. and ἡγοῦμενοι in place of ἡγοῦνται. Possibly τοῦτο should be inserted before ἐδείκνυσαν, but it is not, I think, essential, as the object of ἐδείκνυσαν, viz. τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, is easily understood.

The meaning is: 'Although their proper course was to say straight away that the principle is discarded, and to look for the reasons why it is and set them forth, yet as they realized that this would bring them into discredit, and that many of their own doctrines were likely to suffer the same fate as the principle of 'things in our power', they proceeded to show that it is compatible with their theory of Destiny, believing that by tricking their audiences with an equivocation they could avoid all the absurdities that attend the theory that nothing is in our power.' By πολλὰ τῶν κατ' αὐτούς (in which I take αὐτούς as = ἴψος) Alex. means most of the Stoic ethics.

- iv. 183. 17. ὀνομάτων μὲν οὖν οὐδεὶς φθόνος, τὸ δ' ἡγεῖσθαι πλέον τι τοῖς ζώοις διδόναι ἐν τοῖς γινόμενοις δι' αὐτῶν παρὰ τὰλλα, δι' ὧν τι καὶ αὐτῶν γίνεται, μηδὲν πλέον τοῦ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὀνόματος τηροῦντας αὐτοῖς, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ αἰτιατέον, ὡς αὐτῶν ἀπατωμένων διὰ τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος κοινωνίαν, ἣ ὡς τοῦ ἄλλου ἀπατῶν προαιρουμένων.

διὰ τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος κοινωνίαν cannot be right, for Alex.'s point throughout this discussion is that whereas the Stoics assert that all actions, of animals and inanimate things alike, are performed by Destiny *through* the agent in question, they arbitrarily restrict the term τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς to animals. In effect, they allow the fact, but deny recognition of it, in the case of inanimate things. I therefore suggest inserting οὐ before κοινωνίαν (for which use see L. & S. s.v. οὐ, I. 10). ἀκοινωνίαν is conceivable, and perhaps easier: but it is seemingly a *ἁπαξ εἰρημένον* in one of Plato's letters, where it means 'unsociableness'.

Bruns's own suggestion of τό for τοῦ in the last clause should certainly be adopted.

- v. 185. 15. ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία τῶν δι' αὐτοῦ γινόμενων πράξεων, καὶ τοῦτο ἔστι τὸ εἶναι ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ τοῦ πράττειν οὕτως τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχειν ἐν αὐτῷ, ὡς * * * τῇ σφαίρᾳ τὸ κατὰ τοῦ πρηνοῦς κυλιόμενῃ φέρεσθαι. διὸ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ἔπεται ταῖς ἐξωθεν αὐτῷ περιεστῶσαις αἰτίαις, ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπος οὐχ κτλ.

Bruns is obviously right in marking a lacuna here: and since the last sentence shows that Alex. is contrasting, not comparing, man and a rolling ball, I suggest ὡς οὐκ ἔχει ἐν αὐτῇ ἡ σφαῖρα τοῦ κατὰ τοῦ πρηνοῦς κτλ.

In the second line it would be clearer if a comma were put after ἀνθρώπῳ, showing that τὸ τοῦ πράττειν . . . ἐν αὐτῷ is epexegetic of τοῦτο.

- vi. 185. 23. ἐπεὶ δ' οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει (αἰρούμεθα γάρ, ἃ αἰρούμεθα, ποτὲ μὲν διὰ τὸ καλὸν τι, ποτὲ δὲ διὰ τὸ ἡδύ, ποτὲ δὲ διὰ τὸ σύμφρον, καὶ οὐ ταῦτα τούτων ποιητικά), ἐνδέχεται

νῦν μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ καλὸν κινήσας ἡμᾶς * * * τότε τῶν περιεστώτων προκείμενα, αὐθις δὲ ἄλλα, πρὸς τὸ ἥδὺ ἢ τὸ συμφέρον τὴν ἀναφορὰν τῆς κρίσεως ποιούμενους.

The assumption of a lacuna can be avoided by reading προκρίνεις in place of the unlikely προκείμενα. προκρίνεις seems likely in view of τῆς κρίσεως soon following. τῶν περιεστώτων is partitive with τότε and ἄλλα. The notion is that we can utilize such of the 'surrounding things' as seem conducive to the three ends respectively.

vii. 186. 30. τί ἄλλο ἢ συμβήσεται, πάντας ἀνθρώπους διὰ τὴν τοιάνδε πίστιν τὰ μὲν ὅσα μετὰ πόνον τινὸς καὶ φροντίδος γίνεται, τοῦτοις μὲν χαίρειν λέγειν, αἰρεῖσθαι δὲ τὰς μετὰ ῥαστώνης ἡδονάς; ὥς, πάντως ἐσομένων τῶν ὀφειλόντων γενέσθαι, μηδὲν αὐτοὶ περὶ αὐτῶν † ὥσιν καλόν;

Here I conjecture that ὥς introduces an accusative absolute, and ὥσιν is the termination of an abstract noun. I therefore propose to place a comma after ἡδονάς, deferring the question-mark to the end of the sentence, and to read: . . . ἡδονάς, ὥς, πάντως ἐσομένων τῶν ὀφειλόντων γενέσθαι, μηδὲν αὐτοῖς περιάψον ἀξίωσιν ὥς εἰσιν καλοὶ (or perhaps ὥς οὖσιν καλοῖς).

viii. 189. 9. ἐπαύσαντο δ' ἂν τῆς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις φιλοτιμίας καὶ συγχωρησάντων εἶναι τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐλευθρόν τε καὶ αὐτεξούσιον καὶ κύριον τῆς τῶν ἀντικειμένων αἰρέσεως τε καὶ πράξεως * * * ἐπὶ περιεστώσιν ἀνθρώποις δίκαιος γίνεσθαι πεπιστευμένος ὁμοίως ἰδιώταις τε καὶ νομοθέταις;

For συγχωρησάντων we should accept Bruns's suggestion συνεχάρησαν τῷ. The lacuna is probably extensive, but perhaps begins after, not before, ἐπὶ περιεστώσιν. A masculine noun is required to account for δίκαιος and πεπιστευμένος, and I therefore suggest, as a conjectural restoration, ἐπαύσαντο δ' ἂν . . . αἰρέσεως τε καὶ πράξεως ἐπὶ περιεστώσιν <τοῖς αὐτοῖς, εἰ τοῖς παρὰ πάντων ὁμολογημένοις προσέσχον. ἔστι γὰρ νόμος> ἀνθρώποις κτλ. The next sentence explains what the νόμος is.

ix. 190. 8. οὐ γὰρ ὑπὸ τινος ἐξωθεν καταναγκάζοντος αὐτοὺς ποιοῦσιν ἃ ποιοῦσιν, ὧν ἴσως ἐνῆν αὐτοῖς καὶ φυλάσσειν, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐδὲν ὁλόν τ' ἐστὶν λαθόντας ποιῆσαι καὶ τὰς οὐκ ἂν † αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀμαρτανόμοις αἰτιον.

Alex. has been arguing that the Stoic view encourages scoundrels to claim indulgence equally with those who sin involuntarily.

The genitive ὧν in the second line seems indefensible: I propose ὁλόν, the antecedent being of course τινός. After φυλάσσειν I propose ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐδὲν ὁλόν τ' ἐστὶν λυθέντας ποιῆσαι· καὶ αἰτίας οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀμαρτανόμοις ἀξίον.

The notion of secrecy (λαθόντας) is irrelevant: but it would be as natural for Alex. to twit the Stoics with putting men in bondage to their own immanent nature as it is for Oenomaus to complain that Chrysippus ἡμῖν δούλον ἐπινοεῖ τὸ κάλλιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἐπιδείξαι (von Arnim, S.V.F. ii, § 978).

x. 191. 17. εἰ δέ γε, ὅντος τινός καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ μὴ πάντων γινομένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης, πείθεσθαι μὲν μηδεὶς ἡμᾶς εἶναι κυρίους, πολλὰ παραλείφομεν τῶν δεόντως ἂν πραχθέντων κτλ.

For the impossible πείθεσθαι μὲν B² (the second hand in Venetus 261) has πεισθεῖν. Orelli's conjectures διὰ τὸ πείθεσθαι or πειθόμενοι seem neither probable nor helpful. I propose πείθεσθαι <μέλλω>μεν.

xi. 193. 25. τὸ δ' ὁμοσε χωροῦντας μὲν λέγειν καὶ ταῦτα, καταφεύγειν δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄδηλον εἶναι τινος αἰτία . . . εὐπορίαν ἐστὶ τοῖς ἀπόροις μηχανωμένων.

Alex. has been arguing against the Stoic doctrine that every event is the cause of some later event, and has given instances where this does not appear to be so, viz.

the rotting of fruit and the occurrence of double leaves in plants. It is to these that *ταῦτα* refers. The first clause is unintelligible as it stands, but B² gives the required meaning by λέγειν μὲν καὶ ταῦτα εἶναι αἷτια καταφεύγειν. All that is needed is to insert αἷτια before μὲν.

In the next clause we plainly ought to read εἶναι τίνος. The whole then means 'And to say, when pressed, that these too are causes, and take refuge in our uncertainty as to what they are causes of, marks an attempt to find a way out of an impasse.'

xii. 194. 19. τὰ μὲν γὰρ κυρίως αἷτια ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μόνον ὡς τούτοις δοκεῖ καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἐπόμενον ἔχει τὸ αἷτιον, τὰ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὕτως αἷτια σπανίως γίνονται τῶν τοιούτων αἷτια.

Alex. has been distinguishing causes proper from causes κατὰ συμβεβηκός, illustrating the latter by the case of a man who digs in order to plant a tree, and finds a treasure.

The difficulties lie in the words μόνον, καί, and αἷτιον. For the last there seems little doubt that we should accept αἷτιατόν from B². This verbal adjective, or noun, is rare, but occurs in Aristotle and in Plotinus. For καί Bruns suggests ἢ, but it would be easier to read ἢ καί, and I think this is possible. For μόνον, which is unmeaning, I suggest either ἐπόμενον or ἐσόμενον; the latter is perhaps rather the more likely, its initial letters having been lost through the termination of ἀνάγκης. In either case I suspect that the ἐπόμενον which stands after ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ is an intrusion consequent on the false μόνον.

I would therefore read τὰ μὲν γὰρ κυρίως αἷτια ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐσόμενον, ὡς τούτοις δοκεῖ, ἢ καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἔχει τὸ αἷτιατόν κτλ.

xiii. 195. 1. ὅθεν καὶ θαυμάσειεν ἂν τις αὐτοὺς τὴν τῶν αἷτιῶν ἀπόδοσιν τοῦτον ποιουμένους τὸν τρόπον ὡς αἰεὶ τὸ πρῶτον γεγονὸς αἷτιασθαι τοῦ μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ ποιεῖν ἐπισυνδεδῶσιν τινα καὶ συνέχειαν τῶν αἷτιῶν, καὶ ταύτην τοῦ μηδὲν ἀναιτίως γίνεσθαι φέρονται τὴν αἷτιαν.

Were it not that B² is quoted by Bruns as having φέρεσθαι (last word but two) I should have taken φέρονται as a misprint for φέροντας. φέροντας, parallel to ποιουμένους, is plainly what is wanted. Alex. has used αἷτιαν φέρεω in the same sense at 190. 13 above.

xiv. 195. 13. καὶ ὅτι μὴ <ἢ> νύξ τῆς ἡμέρας αἷτια ἢ ὁ χειμὼν τοῦ θέρους μηδὲ ἐμπέλεκται ταῦτα ἀλλήλοις ἀλύσεως δίκην, † ἂν ἕως ταῦτα γίνονται, ἢ εἰ μὴ οὕτως γίνοντο, διασπασθήσεται ἢ τοῦ κόσμου τε καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ γινομένων τε καὶ ὄντων ἔνωσις.

Alex. is referring to the Stoic doctrine mentioned earlier (192. 8-14), that unless all events have antecedent causes, the unity of the universe must be disrupted and destroyed (διασπᾶσθαι γὰρ καὶ διαρρεῖσθαι καὶ μηκέτι τὸν κόσμον ἕνα μένειν αἰεὶ, κατὰ μίαν τάξιν τε καὶ οἰκονομίαν διοικούμενον, εἰ ἀναίτιός τις εἰσάγοιτο κίνησις· ἢν εἰσάγεσθαι, εἰ μὴ πάντα τὰ ὄντα καὶ γινόμενα ἔχοι τινα αἷτια προγεγονότα, οἷς ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔπεται). He attempts to refute this by arguing that day is not caused by night, nor summer by winter.

ὅτι μὴ introduces a causal clause, which I take to extend down to δίκην. From that point I propose οὐκ ἂν, ἕως οὕτως ταῦτα γίνονται, εἴη, ἢ εἰ μὴ κτλ. 'And since night is not the cause of day, nor winter of summer, and they are not interlocked as in a chain, it is not true that, so long as cause and effect occur in the way they assert (οὕτως), the unity of the universe and all that goes on in it will persist, whereas if they cease so to occur, that unity will be disrupted.'

What in fact preserves the unity Alex. states in the next sentence: 'for the divine bodies with their revolutions are adequate to preserve the continuity of all that goes on in the universe'.

xv. 198. 12. εἰ γὰρ ἦν, ὥσπερ τὰ ἄλλα, οὕτως δὲ καὶ φρόνησίς τε καὶ ἀρετὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις συγγενῇ, πάντες ἂν ἢ οἱ γε πλείστοι, ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ φύσιν αὐτοῖς τυγχάνουσιν, οὕτως οὐ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν τῶν ἀρετῶν δεκτικὴν μόνην, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς αὐτὰς παρ' ἐκείνης ἂν εἶχομεν κτλ.

αὐτοῖς as it stands is unmeaning; I suggest ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων <τῶν> κατὰ φύσιν αὐτοῖς τυγχάνοντων. This does indeed involve an anacoluthon, but an easy one. The writer starts as if he were to continue with οὐ τὴν δύναμιν . . . μόνην ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐντελέχειαν τῶν ἀρετῶν . . . ἂν εἶχομεν. αὐτοῖς is accommodated to the preceding τοῖς ἀνθρώποις instead of to the 1st person of the main verb.

xvi. 200. 19. τὰ γὰρ ἀδύνατα τῇ αὐτῶν φύσει καὶ παρὰ τοῖς θεοῖς τὴν αὐτὴν φυλάττει φύσιν. ἀδύνατον γὰρ καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἢ τὸ τὴν διάμετρον ποιῆσαι τῇ πλευρᾷ σύμμετρον ἢ τὰ δις δύο πέντε εἶναι ἢ τῶν γεγονότων τι μὴ γεγονέναι. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν ἀρχὴν βούλονται † ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων οὕτως γὰρ ἦν ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις δυσχωρία.

A reasonable sense can perhaps be restored to the last sentence by taking οὕτως closely with τῶν ἀδυνάτων, and inserting αὐτοῖς after it.

'For they have not even any wish at all in the case of impossibilities of this sort: the very statement of them discloses their insuperable difficulty.'

It is hard to find a word for *δυσχωρία*, by which I take Alex. to mean such a degree of difficulty as precludes even any wish to do a thing. ἦν I take to be an 'instantaneous' past tense.

xvii. 201. 13. ἐπεὶ δέ, εἰ τὸ προγινώσκειν τὰ μέλλοντά ἐστὶ τὸ ὁποῖά ἐστι τοιαῦτα αὐτὰ γνωρίζειν ὄντα (ἄλλο γὰρ τὸ προγινώσκειν τοῦ ποιεῖν) δηλονότι <ὁ> τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα προγινώσκων ὥς τοιαῦτα προγνώσεται. οὐ γὰρ πρόγνωσις τὸ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ὥς ἐσόμενον ἀναγκαίως ἐσεσθαι λέγειν.

At the beginning it seems necessary either to change ἐπεὶ δέ to ἔπειτα, or to delete εἰ. In the last sentence the sense requires ὥς to precede, not follow, ἐνδεχόμενον.

'Again, if (or since, however,) to have foreknowledge of future events is to have knowledge of them as they truly are (foreknowing being different from making things), it is plain that one who has foreknowledge of things contingent must foreknow them as contingent. Foreknowing does not consist in asserting that what will contingently happen will necessarily happen.'

By ἄλλο γὰρ τὸ προγινώσκειν τοῦ ποιεῖν it is meant that to make a thing is to give matter a form which it had not (strictly, had only potentially) before, whereas in knowing a thing we introduce no new form.

xviii. 203. 4. ἀλλ' εἰ καὶ δεῖ πλέον τι τῶν ἄλλων μάντεων ἔχειν τοὺς θεοὺς, ὥς καὶ συμ-πράσσειν τοῖς ἐσομένοις πρὸς τὸ γίνεσθαι † συνεργούμενον (καὶ γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ τοῦτό γε περὶ θεῶν ὑμνοῦντες διατελοῦσιν, ὅτι ἄρα εἰσὶ δωρητῆρες ἐάων) κατὰ γε τὰ ὑπὸ τούτων λεγόμενα εἰς ἀγαθὸν μὲν οὐδὲν ὁ Πύθιος τῷ Λαίῳ συντελεῖ, ἀγωνίζεται δὲ καὶ πάντα πράττει πρὸς τὸ μὴδὲν τῶν ἀνοσιωτάτων τε καὶ ἀσεβαστάτων παρελθεῖν τὸν οἶκον αὐτοῦ.

In view of *δωρητῆρες ἐάων* we might restore πρὸς τὸ γίνεσθαι *συνέργους* (or *συνεργούντας*) τὸ ἄμεινον.

xix. 204. 12. ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν θεῶν οὐκ εἴη ἂν τὸ εἶναι τοιοῦτοις . . . ὅτι γάρ ἐστιν αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ φύσει <τὸ> τοιοῦτον, οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν οὕτως ὑπαρχόντων ἐπ' αὐτῷ.

In the previous sentence (too long to quote) Alex. has said that τὸ φρονεῖν is in the power of the wise man (ἐπὶ τῷ φρονίμῳ), not in the sense that he now has it in his power not to be wise, but that previously it was in his power not to become so.

It seems plain that ἐπὶ with a dative is needed in the sentence quoted. The choice is between altering τῶν θεῶν to τοῖς θεοῖς, and inserting ἐπ' αὐτοῖς before τὸ εἶναι. I prefer the latter course.

οὐκ εἴη ἂν is Bruns's emendation of the MSS. reading οὐκέτ' ἂν. I think the position of ἂν after εἴη is unlikely, and am not inclined to sacrifice the idiomatic οὐκέτι. Read οὐκέτ' ἂν εἴη. In the next sentence I see no need to insert τό.

'But in the case of the gods it will not be similarly in their power to be what they are . . . since every character they have is immanent as such in their nature, and no such naturally existent qualities are in the power of those who have them.'

xx. 205. 1. τὸ δὲ λέγειν † ἡγεῖσθαι τοὺς οὐχ ἡγουμένους ἐν τῷ σώζεσθαι τὴν καθ' ὁρμὴν τῶν ζώων ἐνέργειαν ἤδη σώζεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν . . . πῶς οὐ παντάσιν ἀγνοοῦντων ταῦτα, πρὸς ᾧ ποιοῦνται τοὺς λόγους ;

I have quoted only enough of this very long sentence (which occupies 13 lines) to show its structure. The corruption lies only in ἡγεῖσθαι. B² has πλανᾶσθαι, Gercke suggests ληρεῖν or νηπιιάζεσθαι, Heine <ἄτοπα> ἡγεῖσθαι. The simplest emendation, I suggest, is ἐψεῖσθαι.

xxi. 205. 22. πῶς δ' οὐκ ἀγνοοῦντων τὰ ὑφ' αὐτῶν γινόμενα τὸ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τῶν γινομένων, ἣν ἀναιροῦσιν διὰ τοῦ δόγματος, αὐτῇ [πρὸς τὸ] κεχρησθαι πρὸς κατασκευὴν τοῦ ἀναιροῦντος αὐτὴν δόγματος ;

I suggest that Alex. wrote προσκεχρησθαι, τό being the insertion of a scribe who did not recognize the compound verb, was confused by the following πρὸς, and did not understand either the argument or the structure of the sentence. The compound occurs seven times, according to Bruns's indexes, in the independent works of Alexander.

The truth so used, as he goes on to explain, is that the existence of praise and blame implies the existence of right and wrong action ; but the Stoics proceed to argue that right and wrong action are involved in the very nature of rational beings, and it is in accordance with Destiny that there should be rational, as well as irrational, beings. But in so arguing, Alex. maintains, they are doing away with the very truth which forms their premiss. If all things were καθ' εἰμαρμένην, there could be no right or wrong action, and consequently no praise or blame.

xxii. 206. 19. ὣν δὲ ἡ ἐξουσία τοῦ πράττειν ἄλλα τινὰ παρ' ᾧ πράττουσιν ὑπὸ τῶν περιεστώτων ἀφήρηται, οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς συντελοῦσιν εἰς τὸ [τὰ] αὐτοῖς περιεστάναι δι' ᾧ πράττουσιν. πῶς ἂν ἐτι τούτους τις ἡ ἁμαρτάνειν ἢ κατορθοῦν λέγοι ;

Thus punctuated the argument lacks logic ; for it represents the non-contribution by the agent to his circumstances as consequent upon his lack of freedom to do something other than what he actually does. Alex. is, in fact, giving two independent, though of course not unconnected, reasons why Stoic doctrine makes it impossible to say that men do right or do wrong : (a) they are deprived of their freedom to do anything else, and (b) they contribute nothing to the circumstances of their actions.

What is needed is to insert καὶ before οὐδέν, and to replace the full stop after δι' ᾧ πράττουσιν by a comma. Diels's ταῦτα for the bracketed τὰ should also be accepted.

xxiii. 207. 19. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα, (οὐκ) ἀπείρηται μὲν εἶναι πάντων γινομένων καθ' εἰμαρμένην κατορθώματά τε καὶ ἁμαρτήματα καὶ τιμαὶ καὶ κόλασις καὶ γέρας ἀξιώσεως καὶ ἔπαινοι καὶ φόγοι.

This is the final sentence of a long Stoic argument (printed in von Arnim, *S.V.F.* ii, § 1003) showing that their doctrine of Destiny is compatible with right and wrong action, reward and punishment, etc.

Von Arnim prints εἰ δὲ ταῦτα (μὴ) ἀνήρηται, μένει, καὶ πάντων γινομένων κτλ. Easier, perhaps, than the insertion of μὴ, or (as Bruns) of οὐ, is to read εἰ δὲ ταῦτα, ἀπερ εἴρηται μένει πάντα, πάντων γινομένων καθ' εἰμαρμένην, κατορθώματά τε καὶ ἁμαρτήματα κτλ. the nouns being taken as epexegetic of πάντα. For εἰ δὲ ταῦτα without any verb compare εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, 201. 11.

xxiv. 209. 22. οἱ δὲ ταύτην τοῦ μὴ πράττειν τὰ κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ἔχοντες τὴν αἰτίαν πρόδηλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν φέγουντο. πῶς γὰρ ἄξιοι; τὸ γοῦν ἐν τοῖς περιεστώσιν καθ' ἀνάγκην αἰτίαις, οἷς μὴ ἐπεσθαι τὴν ὁρμὴν οὐχ ὁλόν τε, οὐκ ἦν ἐκ τῶν νόμων αἰτία, καθ' ἀνάγκην τινὰ καὶ εἰμαρμένην παρεῖναι κεκωλυμένην.

Alex. has been arguing that Law, which enjoins what we must do and not do, and implies our freedom to obey or disobey, is incompatible with a Destiny which makes all our actions necessary actions. He proceeds (at line 18): 'It may be argued that Law is itself one of the necessary causes pre-established by Destiny. But plainly, though it will be amongst the circumstantial causes in the case of persons whose impulsive activity makes them conform to it, it will not be a circumstantial cause for those who do not so conform.'

Then comes the sentence quoted, in which ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν means, I think, simply the existence of Destiny.

The difficulty lies in τὸ γοῦν, or perhaps in τό alone. Bruns, in his note, suggests τότε for τό: by which I take him to mean 'in the latter case of the two above-mentioned'. I do not think this likely, and propose πῶς γὰρ ἄξιοι φόγου, εἰ ἐν τοῖς περιεστώσιν . . .; 'For how can they deserve blame, if those circumstantial necessary causes, which it is impossible for impulse not to follow, do not include a causal factor resident in the laws, such factor being debarred from presenting itself because of an alleged necessity and Destiny?'

xxv. 209. 26. ἀλλὰ οὕτως γε οὐδ' ἂν νόμος ἔτι εἴη ἔχων καὶ πειθομένους αὐτῷ, εἰ γε χρὴ τοῦτω πείθεσθαι λέγειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπομένους, καὶ τοὺς μὴ πειθομένους ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης τινὸς πείθεσθαι κεκωλυμένους.

To restore the balance of this sentence we should probably read and punctuate as follows: ἀλλὰ οὕτως . . . εἴη ἔχων καὶ (τοὺς) πειθομένους αὐτῷ, εἰ γε χρὴ τοῦτο πείθεσθαι λέγειν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐπομένους κτλ.

xxvi. 210. 3. οὐδὲν ἄρα μένει τοῦ ὑπὸ τοῦ μετὰ τοσαύτης τέχνης ἠρωτημένου λόγου κατεσκευασμένου, ἀκολουθήσει τε αὐτοῖς ἀρξαμένων κάτωθεν ἀκολουθία, ἣν ἐπεσθαι λέγουσιν τοῖς ἀναιρεῖν πειρωμένοις τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι ὡς αὐτοὶ τηροῦντες ὁμολογουμένως αὐτὸ διὰ τοῦ προλαβόντας ἄλλοις ἐπιφέρειν αὐτὰ τὸ μὴ δοκεῖν ἔχειν αὐτὰ καὶ τοῖς διαφεύγειν ἡγουμένοις.

Clearly there is extensive corruption here. Von Arnim's restoration will be found in *S.V.F.* ii, § 1004. In the first clause we should probably accept his οὐδὲν ἄρα μένει τῶν . . . κατεσκευασμένων, and later his insertion of τε after τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν. A comma should be put after εἶναι, and as a conjectural restoration of the words διὰ τοῦ . . . ἡγουμένοις I propose διὰ τοῦ προλαβόντες ἄλλοις ἐπιφέρειν αἰτίαν, τῷ μὴ δοκεῖν ἔχειν αὐτὰ καὶ αὐτοὶ διαφεύγειν ἡγούμενοι. The whole may be translated: 'So nothing is left of

the structure of an argument propounded with so much skill; and if we take it in its later steps, it will entail the consequence which they allege to befall those who attempt to do away with the principle of "things in our power": as though they themselves were indisputably preserving that principle by hastening to level a charge against others, in the belief that, by giving the impression that they are not themselves involved, they can escape such a charge.'

xxiii. 212. 9. ἐσόμεθα δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς ἡμῖν ὁμοίους ἄρχοντας εὐχάριστοι † ταῦτα πράττεται εἰς ἡμᾶς τε καὶ ἡ περὶ * * * ὑμῶν οἰκεία προαίρεσις πράττειν ὑμᾶς αἰρέσει τοῦ βελτίονος καὶ τοῦ περὶ τὴν κρίσιν αὐτοῦ φροντίζεν ποιοῦντας ἃ ποιεῖτε, ἀλλ' οὐ προκαταβεβλημένους τισὶν αἰτίοις ἐπομένους, οἷς ἀναγκαῖον ἔπαισθαι ἢ ἂν ἐκεῖνα ἄγῃ.

This is from the final chapter, and compliments Septimius Severus and Caracalla, to whom the treatise is addressed. It cannot be restored with much confidence, but I suggest: ἐσόμεθα δὲ καὶ περὶ ὑμᾶς καὶ τοὺς ὑμῖν ὁμοίους ἄρχοντας εὐχάριστοι, οἳ ταῦτα (or πάντα) πράττετε εἰς ἡμᾶς καθάπερ ἡ ὑμῶν οἰκεία προαίρεσις ὑμᾶς ἄγει, αἰρέσει τοῦ βελτίονος καὶ τῷ περὶ τὴν κρίσιν αὐτοῦ φροντίζεν κτλ.

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HESYCHIANA

βρυχεδανός (of a locust's greed, cf. βρούκος, βρούχος): πολυφάγος, οἳ δὲ μακρός. For μακρός read μάργος.

ζίγγος ὁ τῶν μελισσῶν ἥχος, καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων. L. and S. translate literally, 'humming of bees, etc.'; but to buzz or hum is not a common property of insects, it is peculiar to a few. For τῶν ὁμοίων I suggest τῶν μυῶν. ζίγγος refers especially to the buzz, or 'ping', of a mosquito (μυῖα), LL. *zinzala*, Ital. *zanzara*; cf. Cassiodorus (*cit.* Forcellini, *ed.* De Wit) 'Ciniphes genus est culicum, fixis aculeis permolestum, quas vulgus consuevit vocare *zinzalas*'; and in the Appendix, De Wit adds: '*zinzala*; parva musca, id est culex; unde *zinzalarium*, conopeum ad eas arcendas, Gloss. Ugut. (Hinc vulgo apud nostrates *la zenzaliera*)'—i.e. a mosquito-net. *Culex*, by the way, is an interesting and a homely word; we lack mosquitoes in Scotland, but we know the angry bite of a 'horse-fly' and call it a 'cleg'.

Similar onomatopoeic words to ζίγγος are *zinzicare*, *zinzilare*, *zinzitare*, *zinzilulare*, for the twitter of thrush or blackbird: *Carm. Philom.* 13 'et merulus modulans tam pulchris zinzitat odis'; *ibid.* 43 'Regulus atque merops et rubro pectore progne Consimili modulo zinzilulare sciunt'; etc. But Forcellini, quoting Mai, makes the extraordinary statement that *zinzinnare* means the voice of a leopard; *Thes. nov. Lat.* p. 632, *ed.* Mai, 'Zinzinnare proprium *pardorum* est'. We may safely read *turdorum*.

κίλλα ἀσπράγαλοι ἢ ὄνοι. Read ἀσπράβηλοι ὄνοι, or some such word; from ἀσπράβη, a saddle, i.e. *asini clitellarii*. Cf. Aesch. *Suppl.* 285 καμήλοις ἀσπράβιζούσαις. A cognate Hesychian gloss is μονοσπράβης ὄχος· ἡμίονος, where Alberti has suggested μονοσπράβης ὄνος.

χύρραβος ὄρνις τις ποιός. In my Glossary I suggest that this bird-name, unknown elsewhere, is identical with *scorbatt*, or *scourbatt*, meaning a Rook or Crow in Northern Italy. If so, we had better read in Hesychius *πολιός* rather than *ποιός*. It is the appropriate word; cf. Ar. *Av.* 967 *πολιὰ κορῶνα*.

D'ARCY W. THOMPSON.

NOTE ON THE ATHENIAN CALENDAR

TEN years ago I published a note in the *American Journal of Philology*¹ which showed *I.G.* i². 94 to be evidence that Pandionis was the ninth prytany, and Aigeis the tenth, in the year 418/17 B.C., and hence that the restoration [*ἐπὶ τῆς Πανδιονίδος ἐνάτης*] *πρυτανεύσεις* could be made in the record of borrowings from Athena in that year (*I.G.* i². 302).² The note purported to show also that some part of the conciliar year 418/17 extended into the civil year 417/16 and that the last days of the prytany of Aigeis coincided with the early days of the month Hekatombaion, when the Basileus of 418/17 had left office and might be subject to his scrutiny.

The decree proper carries provisions (a) that the sanctuary of Kodros, Neleus, and Basile shall be fenced and that it shall be leased according to certain specifications, and (b) that the poletai shall let the contract for the fencing, while the Basileus shall sell the lease of the sanctuary. The surveyors, furthermore, are to be sent to fix the bounds of the shrines. All this is to be done before the end of the current conciliar year (lines 9-10: *πρὶν ἢ ἐχσιέναι τένδε τὸν βολέν*) or each person shall be liable to a fine in the amount of one thousand drachmai. A rider provides added details, imposes the cost of fencing the precinct on the man who takes the lease, and changes the liability incurred in case of official delay from one thousand to ten thousand drachmai (lines 18-20: *ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς εἰ μὴ ποιήσει τὰ ἐφσεφισμένα ἢ ἄλλος τις οἷς προστέτακται περὶ τούτων, ἐπὶ τῆς Αἰγείδος πρυτανείας εὐθυνέσθω μυρίασι δραχμαῖσιν*). It also introduces a new definition of time in providing that the individual who had purchased the mud should remove it from the ditch before the end of the conciliar year (line 21: *ἐπὶ τῷδε τῆς βολῆς*), and later a change in the application of the specifications permits the lessee to postpone the task of fencing until the next conciliar year (lines 31-2: *ἐπὶ τῆς βολῆς τῆς εἰσιούσης*).

Milton Giffler³ has rightly rejected my claim that the Basileus, or indeed any magistrate involved, could be held to his scrutiny within eight days of leaving office, it being assumed that the end of the conciliar year did last on into Hekatombaion.⁴ But his argument that the decree belongs late in the conciliar year after Antiphon had ceased to be the eponymous archon, and that Pandionis must therefore have been the tenth prytany, is fallacious. It presupposes, contrary to all the available evidence,⁵ that the identity of the first prytany of one year was known before the close of business of its preceding year, and it posits an error in the record in that Antiphon is in fact named in the preamble as archon rather than his successor Euphemos. More damaging still, according to Giffler's interpretation the decree provides for operations of almost incredible speed. The financial transactions, the work of the surveyors, the removal of the mud, the leasing of the sanctuary all had to be managed in less than a week. It was even contemplated that the fence might be constructed. The fact that this was finally put off till the next year does not make the first proposals any less difficult, if in truth the time available was only a few days.

There is an easier and a better solution. Giffler and I have both been misled by the punctuation employed by Hiller in the text of *I.G.* i². 94. Line 18-20 should not be read as quoted above, but rather as follows: *ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς εἰ μὴ ποιήσει τὰ ἐφσεφισμένα ἢ ἄλλος τις οἷς προστέτακται περὶ τούτων ἐπὶ τῆς Αἰγείδος πρυτανείας, εὐθυνέσθω μυρίασι*

¹ Vol. lvii, 1936, pp. 180-2.

² The text is to be read in Meritt, *Athenian Financial Documents*, pp. 160-1, lines 18-21.

³ *Hermes*, lxxv, 1940, pp. 220-3.

⁴ The precise equation is Pryt. i. 1 = Hek. 9

(417/16). Cf. Meritt, *Athenian Financial Documents*, p. 176.

⁵ Ferguson, *The Athenian Secretaries*, pp. 19-27, and Brillant, *Les Secrétaires athéniens*, pp. 23-4.

δραχμῶσιν. Pandionis remains as the ninth prytany, when of course everyone knew by a simple process of elimination what the name of the tenth prytany would be. If the assigned work was not done by the end of the tenth prytany (Aigeis by name), heavy fines were to be imposed. The intent is the same as in *πρὶν ἢ ἔχουσιναι τένδε τὸν βολὴν* (lines 9-10) and *ἐπὶ τῷδε τῷ βολῇ* (line 21). The time of the *εὐθυναί* was not specified, but the absence of such specification is normal. There is no evidence here for the relationship of the conciliar and civil years, and any earlier claim that there was must be abandoned.¹

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¹ The punctuation is correct in earlier publications: Koumanoudes, *Ἐφ. Ἀρχ.*, 1884, p. 161; *I.G.* i, Suppl., p. 66, no. 53 a; Michel, *Recueil*, no. 77. It is mistakenly given by Prott-Ziehen,

Leges Sacrae, ii. 1, no. 13; Dittenberger, *Sylloge*, i³, no. 93; Hiller, *I.G.* i², 94. Dittenberger and Hiller also erroneously give the form *εὐθυνοῦσθω* in line 20.

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NOTES ON ANTONINUS

THE *Meditations* have come down to posterity through a quite unaccountable accident. There is no trace of this book until the day when Arethas of Caesarea had that one defective exemplar copied from which the extant witnesses derive.¹ These are themselves faulty to an unusual degree. We can never hope completely to eliminate the corruptions which have accumulated since the day when some secretary prepared the deceased emperor's note-books for publication;² but the material, such as it is, admits the progressive correction of the wording and elucidation of its meaning. The relevant studies have of late been summed up and added to by the bulky commentary of A. S. L. Farquharson.³ I have elsewhere sketched my impression of the merits and shortcomings of this laborious work.⁴ Here I offer some observations on the text and interpretation of Ant. which presented themselves during the preparation of that review. I shall illustrate them in the main by instances wherein I differ from Farq. The cases of agreement I shall mark as such.⁵

For the text of Ant. as a whole we have to rely on the two manuscripts A (Vat. 1950, s. xiv) and P.⁶ The latter is lost and only known through Xylander's badly printed *editio princeps* of 1559 (in some cases Xylander gives additional information in his notes). Furthermore, there are two collections of excerpts, one drawing roughly upon the first half and the other upon the second half of Ant.'s book. Each of these collections is preserved in a number of slightly varying copies which, however, actually represent only the two relevant parent manuscripts, C and X. These two combined cover roughly one-half of the whole book.⁷ Finally there is a fair number of quotations in the *Suda* (Suidas). All these witnesses go back to the Arethas archetype independently, none of them directly.⁸ Observation shows that every conceivable combination of them occurs, and that the reading of the archetype may be found in any one of them, or in none. But it is evident that, wherever more than two witnesses are available, the minority reading can only be accepted on strong internal grounds. Here then, as so often, the *recensio* cannot be carried out mechanically.

A case where the majority reading ought never to have been abandoned is 2. 17, p. 32. 14 Farq. The soul is not 'a rhombus', but 'vagrant' *ῥεμβός* (cf. Hadrian's *animula vagula*). This is the reading of all available witnesses, A C P.⁹ The latter indeed, through an easy slip of the pen, had *ῥομβός* (*sic*) in the text. The error, however, so we learn from Xylander, had been put right in the margin. Gesner's compositor failed to notice the correction.

The independent value of X is demonstrated by the fact that this group alone preserves, in 5. 8, p. 80. 22 Farq., 'six words which are certainly genuine'.¹⁰ There is

¹ Themistius, *Or.* 6. 81 refers to Ant.'s renown as a philosopher, not to this particular book.

² Cf. at the end of this article.

³ *The Meditations of the Emperor Marcus Antoninus*, Oxford, 1944. I have used Farq.'s commentary as a repertorium of previous research. Gataker, of course, was indispensable, and so, for textual matters, is Schenkl's *editio maior* of 1913.

⁴ *Journ. Theol. Stud.* xlvii, 1946.

⁵ I have had the privilege of discussing Antoniniana extensively with P. Maas. I shall indicate where I am quoting observations of his,

but my debt to him goes far beyond these clearly definable limits.

⁶ The Darmstadt MS. D is a copy of A; see P. Maas, *J. R. S.* xxxv (1945) p. 145.

⁷ For details see Schenkl's preface.

⁸ Cf. the *stemma* drawn by P. Maas, l.c. He assumes the compilers of the *Suda* to have used an excerpt manuscript of the type C.

⁹ Also the late Munich excerpts M (text and margin). But I doubt whether their evidence has any independent value.

¹⁰ Farq., Introduction, p. xxxiii, line 4 bottom. However, he denies the bearing of this observation on the page immediately following (xxxiv. 3).

has been illustrated from 6. 40 (above, p. 48). There are several similar instances, for some scribes were prone to smooth by an intrusive *καί* what to them appeared to be an improper asyndeton. Farq. was right in following Reiske and Skaphidiotas in removing two such intrusions in 1. 9. 3 and ib. 13, p. 8. 10 and 26. At two other places the occurrence, in one branch of the tradition, of a similar *καί* is indicative of interpolation. In 2. 4, p. 22. 17, A reads *οἰχέσεται οἰχέσῃ*, while P inserts *καί*. It is no use commending the reading of P by reference to the 90th Psalm: of the two variants, the harsher one in A is clearly nearer to the archetype. The dittography was bracketed by G. H. Rendall. Ant. is reminding himself that he must no longer let pass those occasions (*προθεσμίας*) which the gods grant him. If he fails to use them for 'making himself bright' (*ἀπαυθρίσαι*),¹ that is, for living and shaping himself in accordance with the divine reason of which his true self is an effluence, then the span of time allotted to him will be gone (*οἰχέσεται*) and he will not have another opportunity (*αὐθις οὐκ ἐξέσται*, scil. *ἀπαυθρίσαι*; cf. 3. 14, p. 48. 4).

An analogous case is 3. 6. 3, p. 42. 9. The reading of A is . . . *τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἴδιον τὸ σόν*. The insertion, before *τὸ σόν*, of *καί* in P betrays a scribe's uneasiness about this juxtaposition of two synonyms. G. H. Rendall deleted *τὸ ἴδιον* and *τὸ σόν*, and indeed, it was a legitimate idea to regard them both as alternative explanations of *ἐκεῖνο*. Against this diagnosis must be set the consideration that *τὸ ἴδιον ἀγαθόν* is a fixed term of Stoic ethics.² What is more, the whole chapter centres upon the quest of the 'proper (characteristic) good' of man: the term then cannot be spurious in this context. *τὸ σόν* is a miserable gloss on it.³

The progress of corruption is particularly clear in 3. 14, p. 48. 3. Here the final stage is *εἰς τέλος*: Xylander's attempt at correcting the faulty *εἰς τέλος* of his copy P. Meantime we have learned, through the emergence of A and C, that the very letter *θ* which Xylander expelled happened to be the most telling survival of the archetype reading *εἰς θέλεις*. This may well be original; cf. 5. 29, p. 92. 15.⁴ *εἰς τέλος*, by the way, could only mean 'completely'. 'Towards the goal' would be *ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος*; cf. 3. 16. 2, p. 48. 22, etc.

The treatment of the article deserves a section by itself. Its insertion is another typical trick of interpolators bent upon alleviating what to them appeared as harsh constructions. Farq. rightly followed Coraes and Gataker in bracketing two such intrusions in 5. 2, p. 74. 22 and 7. 68, p. 144. 4. Both these are in all extant witnesses, that is, they were already in the Arethas manuscript. In 6. 50, p. 118. 13, on the other hand, *τῶν* is only in P. Menagius may be forgiven for expanding it into *αὐτῶν*. But the omission, now attested by A, restores the correct expression of the archetype.⁵ In 1. 7, p. 6. 1, one can easily see why scribes felt bound to furnish *συγγράφειν* also, like the neighbouring infinitives, with an article (*τὸ* A; *τοῦ* P). Schultz was right in bracketing it, thus recovering the proper parallelism *μὴ ἐκτραπῆναι . . . μὴδὲ συγγράφειν*. Particularly elegant was Skaphidiotas's restoration, adopted by Leopold and Farq., of the typically Antoninian phrasing of 1. 8 end, p. 8. 10, which had been spoiled by the insertion of both the conjunction and the article. It is not implied that an original article might not occasionally have been omitted by copyists. In 1. 8. 1, p. 6. 13, *<τὸ> πρὸς μηδέν*, as Lofft saw, is needed in order to make it clear that the infinitive

¹ Cf. 7. 31.

² Epictetus 1. 29. 2; 3. 7. 14; Ant. 6. 51, p. 118. 20, 9. 41, p. 188. 7 (Epicurean); 11. 16. p. 224. 2; cf. 11. 1, p. 214. 4 ff.

³ A comparable case in 5. 9, p. 82. 8, ought not to have misled Farq. Instead of *μόνα* (P) an ancestor of A had written *μόνον*. The corrector put the correct *α* on top of the faulty syllable.

When this manuscript was copied, the correction produced the conflated reading *μόνον δ*. To give the resulting jumble the semblance of sense the following, original, *δ* was changed into *γάρ*. Here, then, P preserves the true text.

⁴ Cf. P. Maas, l. c.

⁵ For the treatment of the article in P cf. also the instances collected by Schenkl, p. xxiii.

ἀποβλέπειν is on a level with the preceding adjectives τὸ ἐλεύθερον καὶ . . . ἀκίβευτον. And in 3. 13, p. 46. 23, as Coraes observed, the article is needed before ἀνθρώπινα. Without it, 'things divine' and 'things human' would appear to be identical. The whole chapter proclaims their distinctness.

Another group of typical glosses from which the critic must strive to rid the text consists in the addition of the auxiliary verb which Ant. so often leaves to be understood. Clear instances of this tendency are afforded by 3. 4. 3, p. 38. 17, where the conjecture <ἐστὶ>, by the scribe of D, may deserve a place in the apparatus, but not in the text, and 5. 8. 3, p. 80. 11, where X has remained free from the additional ἐστὶ which occurs in A and P.¹ The shorter wording fits the concise style of Ant., but without this manuscript evidence no critic would here have dared to bracket the verb. Consequently, an addition of this kind in the archetype is only traceable if it palpably vitiates the style and the progress of the argument. This, as Wilamowitz saw, holds good of 5. 6. 1, p. 78. 1. The chapter begins with an elaborate tripartition: the parallelism ὁ μὲν τις . . . ὁ δὲ . . . ὁ δὲ τις must not be obscured by an unsuitable punctuation. As it stands, ἐστὶν, oddly separated from its proper reference πρόχειρος, appears to take the position of a common denominator, to be mentally supplied at the following parallel places. This impression, however, is proved false by the introduction of the main verbs διανοεῖται . . . οἶδεν . . . οἶδεν in ll. 3 and 4. Ant. cannot be supposed to have introduced the auxiliary verb, which he quite normally omits, and to have given it so prominent a place, only to obscure the construction of an elaborate period. The removal of ἐστὶν makes the whole structure clear and effects a fitting parallel with 8. 25, p. 154. 15.

In dealing with these last instances we have been induced to work back beyond the Arethas archetype, for most of the glosses which we have removed were already in this manuscript, even though some of them were still in a rather embryonic stage. This archetype obviously represents only an intermediate stage on the way back to the original. But it is necessary to establish this stage definitely. This implies the correct interpretation of the recovered reading. For example, we have to choose, in 4. 32. 1, p. 64. 5-6, whether we shall read ταῦτα or ταῦτά. The original Arethas codex gave ΤΑΥΤΑ.² In 2. 2, p. 22. 1, φ δὴ was in the first Arethas copy, with the marginal suggestion ὦδε (?φ δέ). This assumption explains the variants in A P C. The scribe and the corrector had both failed to recognize, in their *Vorlage*, the itacism 'ΩΔΗ for ὦδῃ (Wilamowitz). This *Vorlage*, as Arethas informs us,³ was in a state of disintegration, difficult to read in many places, and, of course, it was not free from errors of transcription. Small wonder that the scribe employed by Arethas produced a very faulty copy. The wholly corrupt chapter 7. 24 serves to warn us what we must expect. I feel that many more passages than the current editions indicate are corrupt, and that beyond any reasonable hope of restoration.⁴ Thus in 1. 9. 2, p. 8. 5, the dittography αὐτοῖς ἐκεῖνοις παρ' αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον has expelled the original. Upon the wording of the

¹ The relevant note is missing in Farq.'s apparatus ad loc.

² The correct interpretation was given first by Gataker (it is, of course, quite immaterial whether αὐτά is spelt in two words or one: see Farq. ad loc.). It is a matter of some surprise that the striking similarity between this passage and Matt. xxiv. 38, cf. Luke xvii. 27 ff., should not, as far as I am aware, have been noted.

³ See his letter, partly reprinted Farq. p. xvii n. 1; complete in Schenkl, p. xxxix. The βιβλίον παλαιόν of course was written in majuscule letters. Hence, for instance, the error ἐν for ἐν (ETI—ET)

in 1. 16. 10, p. 16. 5, corrected by Gataker. His ability equally to endure the absence of enjoyments and to keep sober in their presence is evidence of Socrates' strength of character. Its two aspects, endurance and sobriety, are co-ordinated by καί—καί. Ἰσχύειν is used with the popular connotation of 'being able'. Gataker saw all this; Farq. missed it.

⁴ Farq. properly indicates corruption (e.g.) 1. 16. 2, p. 12. 9 and 3. 4. 1, p. 38. 5. In the relevant passages of his commentary he takes a different line.

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end of Book 1 (p. 18. 19 ff.) much ingenuity has been expended, but in vain: the corruption of a series of statements, whose reference escapes us, defies cure.¹ In 2. 16, p. 32. 3, ἐν μέρει cannot be right: 'in turn' is a notion unsuited to the context, and no satisfactory emendation has so far been suggested.²

Thus warned, the critic will still find scope for his endeavours. The careful observation of Ant.'s mode of speech and the comparison with relevant parallels will sometimes show that a suspected reading of the archetype is in fact sound. Thus, as Gataker remarked, Xylander's conjecture <συ>σταλῆναι in 1. 16. 3, p. 12. 14, is not called for: L.-S. s.v. 4. 2-4 give instances of the simple verb used in the sense of 'restricting' and 'stopping'; we may add Plut. *Quaest. Symp.* 3. 1, 647 D; Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 2. 105. 3 (2. 170. 26 Staehlin); Methodius *De resurr.* 1. 41 (p. 285. 15 Bonwetsch). Again, in 1. 17. 3, p. 16. 19, the transmitted text stands in no need of alteration. Ant. is fond of resuming a notion previously expressed by a more or less vague τοιοῦτός τις 'of this sort'.³ Here he refers to the preceding σημειωδών. Again, in 4. 50, p. 72. 19, the archetype reading μικρόν should be allowed to stand. This form is not dialectal only (Doric, Boeotian, Thessalian): it occurs, with one or two κs, on Attic inscriptions from 390 B.C. onward⁴ (cf. the names Μικ(κ)ων, Μικ(κ)υλος, etc.), and the papyri of the Roman age show it in popular use in Egypt.⁵ It is highly unlikely that at this one place some scribe should have introduced the popular form into the text of Ant. The reason why Ant. here wrote it is not far to seek. Plut. *Adv. Col.* 33, p. 1127 A, notes that the Epicureans employed it in a sneering reference to the acknowledged virtue of Epaminondas. Thus Ant. He has just recalled the frailty of even the most famous among mortals. Now he continues: 'the whole span (of life)⁶ is petty.' Finally we should not, with Gataker, alter καταληπτικῶς in 7. 13, p. 124. 14 into accordance with 9. 42. 4, p. 190. 11; rather, this typical Stoic term should be restored also at the latter place.⁷ In accordance with his general philosophy, and with Epictetus, Ant. repeatedly urges that volition must be guided by κατάληψις, that is, by the clear cognition which refers and subjects every detail of perception and action to the true, that is rational, nature of man.⁸

Sometimes repunctuating will suffice to rehabilitate the suspected tradition. In 2. 15, p. 28. 2, as usually printed, the phrase νοεῖας δυνάμειος ἐφιστάται 'is introduced very awkwardly'⁹ after the long series of clauses which it is supposed to govern. The following interrogative sentences (τί εἰσιν . . . τί ἐστίν) are left in suspense without any answer, and their continuation by ὅτι (l. 4) finally ruins the syntax.¹⁰ All is well, however, when (as it is actually the case in P) the full stop is transferred, in l. 2, from after ἐφιστάται to after νεκρά. The clauses preceding it are exclamatory, in a style which is typical of Ant.;¹¹ what follows is governed by

¹ It is similar in 1. 16. 8, p. 14. 21, on which see below, p. 54.

² Rendall's ingenious suggestion ἐνώσει results in an inadmissible mode of expression; besides cf. Farq.'s criticism, p. 535.

³ 1. 16. 3, p. 12. 15; 5. 17, p. 88. 4; 6. 50, p. 118. 18; 7. 50, p. 136. 11; 9. 27. 1, p. 180. 20.

⁴ K. Meisterhans, *Grammatik der attischen Inschriften*, 1900, 83.

⁵ See F. G. Kenyon, *Pap. of the Brit. Mus.* ii, 1898, p. 298, no. 239 (A.D. 346); *Fayum Pap.* 127. 12 (2nd-3rd cent.); Preisendanz, *Sam. Griech. Urk.* i, no. 5747; ib. iv (ed. Bilabel, 1931) 7449 (Christian, 5th cent.); *Pap. Ox.* 1655. 9.

⁶ δαίσημα denotes any extension within space or time, with no necessary reference to its actual limitation. Cf. (e.g.) Chrysost. *In Act.* xxii.

183 A (Migne, *Patr. Gr.* lx. 176) μικρόν ἐστι τὸ διάστημα τῆς χειρός ('the grasp', 'capacity'); Basil. Seleuc. *Or.* i. (*Patr. Gr.* lxxxv, 28 A) τὰ τῆς ζωῆς διαστήματα (cf. ib. iv. 3, 73 C); *Acta Philippi* cii (p. 39. 32 Bonnet) ἐκ πολλοῦ διαστήματος 'far and wide'.

⁷ And also, I suggest, in Epictetus ii. 23. 46, which is the only other instance of καταληπτικός (apart from its use as a metrical term).

⁸ Cf. 4. 22, p. 60. 13; 11. 3, p. 224. 26.

⁹ Farq. ad loc. (p. 524).

¹⁰ 'The construction is again awkward', Farq. ad loc.

¹¹ Similar exclamations, with πῶς 6. 27, p. 108. 7; 12. 13, p. 240. 21; with οὗτος 6. 18, p. 104. 21; ib. 59, p. 120. 10; 11. 3, p. 216. 3.

ἐφιστάται.¹ Two other passages which stand to gain from repunctuation are 2. 14. 1 and 5. 6.

We may now turn to some cases where errors in the archetype call for conjectural emendation. Farq. has accepted a fair number of the findings of earlier scholars. I would here specially commend Gataker's brilliant ὑβρίζεις 2. 6, p. 24. 3: the great Puritan had a sounder sense of the ancient mentality than those who, like Leopold, rejected his conjecture. The faulty reading resulted from the last letter of the verb being attached to the following pronoun. But other similarly cogent corrections have been rejected. In 1. 15. 2, p. 10. 18, Reiske's ἀκάκως makes sense of nonsense and accounts for the archetype reading οὐ κακῶς (A P C). In 1. 17. 1, p. 16. 10, Schultz's ἀπαντας (for ἀπαντα) is not even a conjecture in the technical sense of the word, for σχεῖν in P is evidence that once again the ancient *scriptio continua* had caused the letter σ to be wrongly connected. Farq. indeed strives to support the neuter by a parallel from Julian; but the case is in fact different, since Julian has ἀπαντα τὰ τοιαῦτα; moreover, in Ant. the neuter is excluded by the preceding masculine adjective ἀγαθούς. In 3. 1, p. 34. 5, Reiske put right the intolerable string of genitives by writing τὴν θεωρίαν τὴν συντείνουσιν. Without this alteration, the transmitted text would mean 'the intellect sufficing for the perception of facts and of the insight bearing upon the knowledge of', etc. Ant. does not write such empty verbiage. The wrong genitive had arisen from adaptation, by some scribe, to the preceding τῶν πραγμάτων. In 7. 12, p. 124. 8, it seems irresponsible to reject Casaubon's μῆ (for ἡ). Ant. has said that he wants man to be 'erect, not erected' (3. 5, p. 40. 20). It is surely easier to assume that a letter has dropped out in the transmission of the iterated phrase than to suppose that Ant. had reversed the opinion which he had substantiated at the earlier place.² Instead of giving further similar instances I venture to submit a few suggestions of my own.

There is a fault in the archetype reading τὸ οὐ σχετλίως κατεργαστικὸν τῶν προκειμένων 1. 15. 1, p. 10. 16. The adverb is neither a Homerism (against Farq. ad loc.), nor can it mean '(without) complaining'.³ It is frequent, for instance, in Plutarch; always with the notion 'frightful, terrible'. It must therefore be corrupt here. Ant. begins his characterization of the perfect sapiens, Maximus, with a reference to his complete freedom, in every respect, from vacillation. We may accordingly here read οὐ σχεδίως. A majuscule Δ has been misread Λ; thereafter the letter τ was inserted. οὐ σχεδίως is synonymous with οὐ παρέργως: so we learn from one of the scholiasts on the very last verse of Aratus' *Phaenomena*.⁴ οὐδέποτε σχεδίως, so the poet had said, 'never a random guess', will be the weather forecast of those who follow his advice: οὐδέποτε σχεδιάσει . . . ἀλλ' ἀκριβῶσει, as the ancient paraphrase interprets. So here of Maximus. He employed his energies with thoughtful concentration. The structure of these words has many analogies in the following chapter; it suffices to refer to τὸ . . . ἀπαρτρέπτως . . . ἀπονεμητικόν in § 1 and τὸ . . . εὐχαρί οὐ κατακόρως in § 5.

The first word of 4. 51, p. 72. 23, cannot be genuine. 'To run a course' is τρέχειν δρόμον. ἐπὶ must go. Whence it came I cannot say.

In 5. 35, p. 96. 6, a blemish has remained on the text because critics failed to remember a tenet of Stoic ethics. Chrysippus differentiated between fundamental

¹ Retaining the traditional punctuation, Farq. in his translation actually repeats the rendering of this governing verb ('to consider too').—After εὐδοξίαν 'supplendum παρέχουσι, χαρίζονται aut aliud ejusmodi' (Gataker). Farq. superadded καὶ τὴν εὐδοξίαν. Had he put his supplement after instead of before Gataker's, the combination of both would have resulted in a wording suited to account for the lacuna: the omission would thus

be ascribable to the homoeoteleuton εὐδοξίαν—εὐδοξίαν.

² Cf. also 1. 15. 3.

³ So Farq. transl. (after M. Casaubon and Gataker): but 'the evidence for this interpretation is lacking', Farq. ad loc.

⁴ E. Maas, *Comment. in Aratum Reliquiae*, 1898, p. 554, ad v. 1154.

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dispositions and individual acts:¹ the former are ἀρεταί and κακίας, the latter ἐνέργειαι κατὰ ἀρετὴν or κακίαν respectively. Ant. is reassuring himself about a certain act (we do not know which): it has been neither evidence of some fundamental wickedness of his nor had he prompted what would have to be qualified as an individually bad action. It follows that ἐμὴν ought to be ἐμή. The addition of a final -ν, for well-known reasons, is about the most frequent fault in all Greek manuscript tradition. In the present case it was particularly natural for any scribe not imbued with Stoic terminology.

7. 75, p. 146. 1-4, as transmitted, makes no sense: the universal nature having once stirred to create the kosmos, 'either all that comes into being happens by way of consequence, or even the fundamental facts, towards which the world-mind directs a particular impulse, are void of reason'. The antithesis is neither precise nor cogent; moreover, how could this alternative supply the mental calm which Ant. expects from it? The fault is in ἀλόγιστα, which induces the reader to misconstrue all that follows. Read δλίγιστα² and translate '... or it is few things, and that the fundamental ones, towards which ... impulse'. Ant. finds consolation in the idea that whatever happens is either inherent in the original rational structure of the universe, or derives from general causes which have been set into motion by the universal mind. There is no irrational interference by the superior powers with the details of the human life, for *minora di negligunt*.³ Realizing the concatenation of causes within the rational universe, man can be calm. The distinction recurs elsewhere in Ant. He has made up his mind: 'Ἦτοι κόσμος διατεταγμένος ἢ κυκεῶν συμπεφυρμένος' ἀλλὰ μὴν κόσμος (4. 27).⁴ There remains the subordinate question, in which way the experiences of the individual life are related to the rational order of the whole. Here, as generally, Ant. ponders, with some variation of emphasis, the tenets submitted by the philosophical tradition⁵ which have become the substance of his thought and the support of his life. In 3. 11, 6. 36, ib. 44, 9. 28 he is moving within the same orbit of ideas as here; in 12. 14 he reduces the same alternative to the traditional terms of Necessity (Fate) and Providence.

The text restored or recognized to be sound, the critic will use all the means he can command in order to grasp its bearing fully and precisely. Knowledge of the language in general and of the peculiarities of the author's style is the first and last but not the only requirement. Sometimes indeed it will be sufficient to consider thoroughly the purport of the relevant passage. Once he had noticed Trannoy's precise rendering of ἀνασθήτως παραπέμποντα 1. 8. 2, p. 6. 21, Farq. would have done well to dispense with his comment and to translate 'neither allowing himself to appear overwhelmed by favours, nor dismissing them unfeelingly'. With regard to 4. 18, p. 56. 24, grammatical usage suggests that ἐπὶ τῆς γραμμῆς τρέχειν can mean nothing but 'to run on the line'. The very frequent metaphor of the line denoting the goal (usually 'death') then is not here relevant. But 4. 51 (p. 72. 23) τὴν σύντομον τρέχει⁶ is comparable, and John Chrysostom once⁷ uses the simile of the runner not looking right or left but intent on the goal. Every sprinter knows that the course must be somehow marked: the coloured posts which we know the Greeks employed to mark the goal could not by themselves be sufficient to ensure a straight run. How the runners in a Greek stadium

¹ See v. Arnim, *Stoic. vet. fragm.* iii, nos. 104 and 105 (Stob. *Ecl.* 2. 70. 21 W. and Diog. Laert. 7. 98). Chrysippus in fact applied a trichotomy, distinguishing between (a) the fundamental virtues and vices; (b) customs and proclivities; and (c) individual acts referable to either virtues or vices. Ant. was free, for the purpose of his argument, to disregard the second heading.

² This form is frequent in Antoninus.

³ Cicero, *De nat. deor.* 3. 35, 86; cf. 2. 66, 167.

⁴ The text restored by Schultz and Rendall; cf. 6. 10, 9. 39. In 12. 14 Ant. pursues, by way of argument, also the alternative of the cosmic medley.

⁵ Dio Chrys. *Or.* 12. 37 is a good parallel.

⁶ Cf. above, p. 52, bottom.

⁷ In *Hebr. Hom.* vii. 76. 3 (Migne, *Patr. Gr.* lxi. 64) ad *Hebr.* iv. 16, quoting 1 Cor. ix. 26.

were separated we are not elsewhere told.¹ The courses were not roped: fouling did occur. The present passage is evidence that Greek runners ran on a marked line.

The *Koine* which Ant. writes has syntactical features of its own. For example, it admits the genitive absolute where classical usage avoids it. Remembering this, Gataker correctly translated 2. 11, p. 26. 5 ὡς ἡδὴ θανάτου ὄντος ἐξέλαι τοῦ βίου 'ut qui confestim e vita hac possis discedere', thus preserving a thought typical of Ant.² We could wish that Gataker³ had been followed by his modern successors: θανάτον ἐστὶ cannot mean 'it is possible' in the sense of 'it may happen' (as distinct from 'it can happen', 'it is feasible').

With his text so poorly preserved and the subject-matter not rarely beyond our grasp, we cannot even aim at comprehending Ant. as fully as one might purport to understand, say, Plato or Cicero. But progress in detail is attainable, and with this author it is the detail that matters. The *Meditations* do not present us with a coherent and progressive argument, and it is probably not unfair to say that the whole collection does not contain one original idea. Its chief value is in the individual sayings, traditional in content but original in form and coloured by the spirit of the author. Even so, the scholar will not easily resist the urge to find the connecting link between the single aphorisms. Before venturing in this direction he ought to be quite clear about the particular character of his subject. For this is indeed a unique book, at least in ancient literature: a book not written with any reader in view; the dialogue of a great soul with itself. If context there be, it cannot be that which is naturally expected in a work written for publication, or even in letters which always, even the most private ones among Cicero's, are intended to be understood by an addressee. It can only be the kind of loose unity, in repetition and progress, which characterizes private meditation. It is therefore quite useless to aim at removing inconsistencies by the transposition of individual sections. We are here dealing with private note-books which have been edited with that scrupulous care which the ancients applied to posthumous writings. The editor made every *libellus* into a separate book (hence their small size) and embodied in one continuous text what he found in the body and on the margins of the autograph. Hence we find in the text occasional short notes, sometimes defying grammatical analysis, the reference of which escapes us. Thus at the end of 1. 16 the note 'as in the illness of Maximus', and a little earlier (p. 14, 21-3) the references to Lorium, Lanuvium, and Tusculum: it is useless to apply conjecture to such jottings. In 5. 6, p. 78, 5-10, two or more tentative formulations of the same idea have been conflated, and the reference (l. 7) to horse, hound, and bee, with the participles attached, stands outside the grammatical structure.⁴ It is a marginal note by Ant. We can guess its purport, but it has not been worked into the context. Having once realized this, we shall refrain from attempting to force upon the text a consistency which it in fact never had.

At the end of the note-book which in the edition is represented by Book 1, Ant. had added 'written among the Quadi on the river Gran', and likewise, under what is our second book, 'written in Carnuntum'. The editor left these notes where he found them, and added, in the ancient manner, the number of every book at its beginning as well as at its end. Or had Ant. already numbered them? We cannot tell. Those two colophons afford the only datings we have. Their correct reference, in accordance with the ancient literary custom, to the preceding Books 1 and 2 respectively disposes of the assumption that Book 1 was written in Rome and intended to serve as a preface to an edition of the *Meditations*. Even this book, the most finished of the twelve, was

¹ E. N. Gardiner, *Greek Athletic Sports*, 1910, 278; cf. id. *J. H. S.* xxiii, 1903, 266.

² Cf. 2. 2, p. 20. 18; 2. 5, p. 22. 21; 3. 12, p. 46. 17.

³ Quoted by Farq. 517.

⁴ The attempt, in A., to connect this clause, by ὡς, with what precedes it results in an absurdity (the ideal well-doer being as like the vine bearing grapes as is a horse running, etc.).

produced in the solitude of the military camp. I can see no valid reason why it should not in fact have been the first book of the *Meditations* to be written. But the question of the relative chronology of the twelve books is hardly relevant. We should in any case know too little of the history of the time to correlate it with the very scanty references in them, and the attempt at detecting a 'development of thought' in the writer is probably futile. Throughout his meditations, Ant. ponders the same set of traditional ideas. He emphasizes now this aspect, now another one, as the occasion and his momentary state of mind bid him. But we should hardly look for signs of 'development' in a writer who, at the time when he produced this diary, was a fixed character and well past his fiftieth year.

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THE MIRROR OF THE SARONIC GULF

Aeschylus: *Agamemnon* 305-8 πέμπουσι δ' ἀνδράοντες ἀφθόνη μένει
φλογὸς μέγαν πύγωνα καὶ Σαρωνικοῦ
πορθμοῦ κάτοπτρον πρῶν' ὑπερβάλλειν πρόσω
φλέγουσαν.

κάτοπτρον, which is in all the manuscripts, was emended by Canter to *κάτοπτον*, and this emendation, or Headlam's *κατόπτην*, has been received by subsequent editors. Those who read *κάτοπτρον* have been in the habit of taking the word to mean here 'looking down upon', and in support of this interpretation they sometimes adduce a scholium in M, *κατόψιον*. This does seem to prove that the scholar, whose note is copied in our scholium, found *κάτοπτρον* in his text. Presumably he took *Σαρωνικοῦ πορθμοῦ κάτοπτρον* to signify 'descended from the Saronic gulf', having very possibly in his mind the phrase in Euripides, *Hippolytus* 30, where the temple of Cypris is said to be *κατόψιον γῆς τῆσδε*, visible from Troezen. At least we ought not without proof to lay to his account what appears to be the solecism of regarding *κάτοπτρον* as if it meant 'looking down upon'.¹ Headlam's *κατόπτην* has at least an active force, but I cannot find that it means 'one who looks down upon', if that is the sense desired; it is a 'spy' or an 'inspector'. And, at the end of all discussion, when one asks what in fact is this peak or headland that 'looks down upon the Saronic crossing', then commentators take refuge in silence or tend to contradict one another. An emendation that nobody can be sure he understands can hardly be regarded as satisfactory. It may be feared that what has happened is this. In order to get rid of *κάτοπτρον*, which appeared to them devoid of meaning, editors have introduced into the text a word which does not mean what they want it to mean, and which, if it had that meaning, would still present us with a picture which no man can recognize.

Let me say at once that I have formed the opinion, which I now venture to put before the readers of the *Classical Quarterly*, that *κάτοπτρον* is sound, and that the whole passage in which it appears has been misconstrued, and consequently misunderstood and mistranslated.

Discussion will be clearer if we keep in mind some obvious points about the transmission of news by fire-signal. One is this. The number of beacons will not be needlessly multiplied; the fewer the better; partly because this saves the trouble and expense of extra maintenance, and partly because with every additional fire there is an added risk of confusion. It is the business of the man responsible to choose where he can some eminence that overlooks a plain or a considerable stretch of water. He will not, if he can help it, seek to transmit his message through mountainous country, where one hill tends to shut out the view of another. A second point, which may seem too obvious to mention but has not proved too obvious to be overlooked, is this. The beacons will be arranged as nearly as possible in a straight line between the starting-point and the goal. These two conditions—minimum number of beacons and strictness of alinement—modify and to some extent defeat one another.

The geography of Aeschylus is thought to be vague, but he observes the principles of signalling by fire. His chain of beacons starts from a summit of Ida because from there, though a long way south of Troy, he knew, or at any rate believed, that it was possible to signal over the whole distance to Lemnos, from Lemnos all the way to

¹ I am not yet convinced that even *καθορᾶν*, generally at a distance or in some reflecting medium like water or a mirror, in isolation from any defining context, ever means 'to look down' at all; it is 'to descry',

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Athos, from Athos all the way to Makistos, which must be in Euboea. Remark how at all these stages Aeschylus makes use of the sea, because the sea gives him distance while at the same time giving him as straight a line as the topography of the Aegean permits. That Makistos is somewhere in the extreme north of Euboea may be inferred from the fact that otherwise the distance from Athos would be too great, as perhaps under any circumstances it is; from the fact that there must be an unimpeded prospect from it in the direction of Thrace; from the fact that there is an intermediate beacon between it and Cithaeron. This intermediate beacon is upon Messapion, which looks southward to Cithaeron across 'the plain of the Asopus' (πεδῖον Ἀσωποῦ), a reasonably certain emendation of the text presented by M.

It is after Cithaeron that the succession of the beacons has most actively stirred doubt and controversy. Where was the *λίμνη Γοργώπις*, where was Aegiplanctus? The Arachnaean mountain we may regard as having its position fixed by Pausanias, who says it rose above Lessa, a village said to lie behind Epidaurus.¹ From the Mons Arachnaeus, which he ascended, Frazer tells us that the mountains of the Megarid are impressively visible. Surely then Aegiplanctus was one of these. Otherwise we shall be offending against the principles of fire-signalling; for, as the eye travels from the Geraneia towards Corinth, the heights rapidly become less conspicuous, and finally pass out of sight.² There is another and perhaps more decisive argument. The beacon light on its way to Arachnaeus crosses a part of the Saronic gulf; now if you kindle your beacon on some lower height west of the Geraneia summit, the light will only skirt the gulf or even travel overland all the way. Therefore, we must conclude, Aegiplanctus was in the Megarian country; and, as this is confirmed by the M scholiast, we may regard it as proved.

What now of the *λίμνη Γοργώπις*? If the flame travelling—so Aeschylus imagines it—from Cithaeron to a Megarian summit is reflected in the Gorgopis, then the Gorgopis must lie somewhere between them. Some commentators have allowed themselves to be perplexed by an entry in Hesychius. According to the most probable correction of the sadly deformed text the entry runs as follows. *Γοργώπις Κρατῖνος ἐν Πυλαίᾳ. λίμνην φασὶν ἐν Κορίνθῳ, εἰληθέναι δὲ τοῦνομα διὰ τὸ Γόργην ἐμπεσεῖν εἰς αὐτήν.* Now of course no one believes that the *λίμνη* was 'in Corinth', but it has been suggested that *ἐν Κορίνθῳ* is loosely used for *ἐν τῇ Κορινθίᾳ*. Nobody who has read the *Epistola ad Millium* will maintain the inerrancy of Hesychius, but so gross a confusion seems less likely than the careless haste of a transcriber. Let us suppose then that the Corinthia was meant. Some light is thrown on the matter by the *Etymologicum Magnum*, which says this: *'Εσχατιῶτις λίμνη κειμένη μετὰ τὸν Ἰσθμόν. . . ὕστερον δὲ Γοργώπις ἐκλήθη ἀπὸ Γόργης, τῆς Μεγαρέως θυγατρὸς, γυναικὸς Κορίνθου, ἧτις ἀκούσασα τὸν τῶν παίδων φόνον περιαλγῆς γενομένη ἔρριψεν αὐτὴν εἰς τὴν λίμνην.* It is plain from the story of Gorge that the same *λίμνη Γοργώπις* is meant. But the *E.M.* places it *μετὰ τὸν Ἰσθμόν*, beyond the Isthmus. Since nobody imagines that the Gorgopis was in the Peloponnese, this can only mean that it was in the Megarid or, perhaps more probably, in the Corinthian Peraia, now called Perachora. Hesychius, if he knew himself what he meant, may have meant the Perachora.

To look for Gorgopis on the map is probably a waste of time. There is a lake or lagoon near Cape S. Nicholas which might well be named from its situation *'Εσχατιῶτις*, and from its form, which is roughly oval, almost circular, *Γοργώπις*. But it is far out of the direct line of transmission between Cithaeron and the Megarian peaks. Of course Aeschylus may not have realized this; he had no map to correct his impressions. And there are other possibilities. The *λίμνη* may have disappeared. I am told that shallow lakes, sometimes of considerable extent, will often disappear in a surprisingly short time, either because they are overgrown and absorbed by vegetation

¹ 2. 25. 10.

² Acrocorinthus of course does not concern us.

or because, in a limestone country, they seep away through cracks opened in the ground. We may as well admit our ignorance. Yet it is not unimportant to remember that this ignorance was certainly not shared by Aeschylus and his audience. They knew both Aegiplanctus and Gorgopis. At the time when the *Agamemnon* was composed the Megarians were on friendly terms with the Athenians; Athenian troops were posted at strategic points throughout the Megarid. There was probably hardly a man of military age in Athens who had not been at least once over the Geraneia.

May we go further? In 458 B.C. Athens not only held the Megarid but was in alliance with Plataea and Argos. That is to say she controlled, directly or through her friends, Cithaeron, Aegiplanctus, and Arachnaeus. It is not easily credible that in this happy conjuncture there was not some means of communicating by fire-signal, some *φρυκτωρία*, between the three powers. It was a regular, as it was the speediest, way of sending the news of an invasion. Now *Κιθαίων* and *Αιγίπλαγκτος* and *Αραχναίων* are lofty-sounding names, and Aeschylus had as much as any poet who ever lived *la science de noms*; but one may doubt if it was merely the sonority of their designations that made him light his bale-fires on just these three. At least it would add to the thrill and point of the splendid lines if the Athenians knew as a matter of fact that the beacons stood ready at all times on these very summits to tell them, when the need arose, that the Argolid or the lands of Plataea had been invaded.

Dunedin the high blazes saw
From Soutra and Dumpender Law,

and knew that the English were coming. Aegiplanctus and Arachnaeus may have been the Soutra and Dumpender Law of Aeschylean Athens.

We come now to the *πρῶν*. What was it, where must we look for it? The question has been rather evaded by commentators, but some have tried to answer it. Sidgwick (from whom one always gets at least common sense) would look for the *πρῶν* in the Geraneia. Mazon suggests the line of heights that fringes the bay of Cenchreae. That is certainly wrong, unless Mazon has some particular height in mind; for *πρῶν* would not be used of a series of heights; it must be used of a single peak or promontory. Secondly, these heights are quite unremarkable, while the *πρῶν* of Aeschylus dominates the Saronic gulf. There may be other theories. None can be in any degree convincing which does not explain why the *πρῶν* seems to be given no name by the poet himself. Who can believe that in the great roll-call of mountain titles this *πρῶν*, so important in the series, alone was left innominate? 'The height or headland that commands the Saronic Gulf'—if that is what you mean, can you not point to it and tell us which it is? There are at least a score that might answer the description. Unless the name of the *πρῶν* were given, the audience could not then, any more than the reader now, have any longer followed the flame, although the whole purpose of Clytemnestra's speech is to mark its itinerary.

My own view is this. The *πρῶν* is not given a name because it has been named already; it is Aegiplanctus. To establish this view, which I hope may be possible, it will be necessary now to advert to the syntax of the whole passage. The current explanation involves the assumption that *ὑπερβάλλειν* is a consecutive infinitive, having the same force as if it had been introduced by *ὥστε*. The construction, especially with that *καί* intervening, has been allowed to be harsh and unexpected by all good scholars, at least since the time of Blomfield, who wondered if it would even be intelligible. Harsh it is, and for an auditor, with no text to follow, exceedingly hard to grasp. But there is a much simpler and clearer construction possible, which has, so far as my knowledge extends, eluded the notice of commentators, misled no doubt by *κάποππον*. According to this the determining word is *πέμπονσι*, which here possesses (as of course it often does) a jussive or mandatory implication. The probability that

it has this force may perhaps pass into something like certainty for anyone who will read with that in mind the whole speech of Clytemnestra. Apart from specific words like *σημαίνει* (293), *ἤγειρεν* (299), *ᾤτρυνε* (304), *πομποῦ πυρός*, *emissarii ignis* (299), it will be observed that every beacon is represented as ordering the next to carry on the message. *πέμπουσι* then will naturally, and almost necessarily, mean here 'they send on the order', and, since it has that sense, it will be followed as a matter of course by an infinitive. That is not a difficult construction. Here is an exact parallel from Xenophon: *δοκούντος δ' αὐτοῦ οὐδὲν ποιεῖν, πέμπουσιν οἱ ἔφοροι ἀπολιπόντα Λάρισαν στρατεύεσθαι ἐπὶ Καρίαν*.¹

The next point to observe is that *πρῶν* is not the accusative after (governed by) *ὑπερβάλλειν* but the accusative before it. The *πρῶν*, like the other peaks, is commanded to send on the message, to cast it over the sea to Arachnaeus. When that is seen, it is also seen that the *πρῶν* is Aegiplanctus itself. *ὑπερβάλλειν* is transitive and governs not only *φλέγουσαν* (*φλόγα*) but also, through the force of *ὑπέρ*, *κάτοπτρον*. Translate then somewhat as follows: 'Kindling a great beard of flame . . . they send the message that the peak (i.e. Aegiplanctus) cast it (i.e. the flame) even over the mirror of the Saronic gulf, blazing on and on. . . .' The imagination of the speaker is haunted by the image of fire reflected in water. She sees the long beam, red as gold (*χρυσοφεγγές*), travelling across the Aegean (286 f.); for her the Gorgonis comes staring out of the darkness like a great blood-shot eye; and so here the flame is repeated in the mirror of the gulf. Whatever may be thought of this explanation, it may at least claim the merit of restoring to the text that magnificent *κάτοπτρον*, too long extruded by the incorrect and paltry *κάτοπτον*.

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¹ *Hellen.* 3. 1. 7.

BORROWINGS IN THE ARCHIDAMIAN WAR

IN my first study of the borrowings from Athenian sacred treasure to finance the Archidamian War I assumed, in common with others, certain irregularities in the stoichedon order of IG. i². 324.¹ The text has subsequently been amplified and improved by Tod, notably with the addition of one amount of interest due to Athena (line 101) and of the total amounts of principal credited to the Other Gods (line 119) and to all the gods (line 122).² This further expansion, however, has introduced additional irregularities, the restoration [τάδε τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς ὀφέλοισι τόκο ἐ]ν ἑνδεκα ἔτεσ[ι: - -] being too long by one letter in line 120 and the restoration [τάδε ἅπασι τοῖς θεοῖς ὀφέλοισι τόκο ἐ]ν ἑνδεκα ἔτεσ[ι: - -] being likewise too long in line 123.

But irregularities toward the end of the document had already been assumed as early as lines 102-5:

- 102 [τάδε ἐλογίσαντο τοῖς ἄλ]λοις θεο[ῖς ἐν τοῖς
τε]τταρσιν ἔτεσιν ἡ δὲ ἰοὶ πρότεροι λογι[σται]
103 [λελογισμένα παρέδωσαν ἐ]ν τοῖς ἡε[π]τά ἔτεσιν
πε]ντακοσίους ταλάντοις διακοσίους τ[αλάντ]
104 [οἱς ἡεχσέκοντα ταλάντοι]ς ἡέχς ταλ[άντοις χιλί]αις
ἐνεκόντα δραχμαῖς πέντε δραχ[μαῖς π]
105 [έντε ὀβολοῖς τόκον ἐν τοῖ]ς τέτταρσιν ἔτεσιν
Α]ΑΑΤΤΤΧΧΗΗΔΔΔΓΓΓΗΗC *vacat*.

Here the first restoration in line 102 is too short by one letter,³ and the mistake should probably be remedied by writing [τόκον ἐλογίσαντο τοῖς ἄλ]λοις θεο[ῖς - -]. In this case the word τόκον is to be removed from line 105, where the necessary requirements of space are satisfied by reading [τέτταρσιν ὀβολοῖς ἐν τοῖ]ς τέτταρσιν ἔτεσιν - -]. This seems a desirable change also because of the present awkward division of πέντε between lines 104 and 105. Below line 79 there is a noticeable tendency to divide the ends of the lines syllabically. Indeed, except for πέντε here, ταλάντοις⁴ immediately above, and ταλάντοις in lines 107-8, every line from 79 to 110 may be assumed to end with a complete syllable. One wonders whether ταλάντοις ought not also to be divided ταλάν|τοις, though this would compel the omission of the aspirate from ἡεχσέκοντα in line 104. In view of ἡέχς in the same line and of ταλάντοις below, it is probably better to retain the aspirate and not to insist on such nearly complete uniformity of division at the ends of the lines.

The restoration of line 106 may now be made on the analogy of line 102: [τόκον ἐλογίσαντο καὶ τοῖ]ς Ἀθηναίαις τῆς Νίκης⁵ ἐ]ν τοῖς τέτταρσιν ἔτεσιν - -, and line 109 may be similarly begun [τόκον ἐλογίσαντο τοῖς τῷ]ς ἡερμῷ - -. The phrase τόκος τούτοις ἐγένετο now disappears from lines 110-11, and the figures representing the interest on

¹ B. D. Meritt, *The Athenian Calendar in the Fifth Century* (1928), p. 29: 'below line 75 there were never more than 74 letter spaces, though sometimes less, in each line. In this lower part of the inscription, especially from line 94 on, the stoichedon order of letters and numerals, especially numerals, is often neglected.' See also the text as given by the same author in *Athenian Financial Documents* (1932), pp. 136-43.

² M. N. Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*,

no. 64.

³ The disposition can best be studied in the drawing published by Meritt, *The Athenian Calendar*, Plate I.

⁴ There is a misprint in the text of Meritt, *Ath. Fin. Doc.*, p. 142, line 104: the line should begin [οἱς ἡεχσέκοντα - -].

⁵ For Ἀθηναίαις τῆς Νίκης -] see τῆς Νίκης Ἀθηνῶν of IG. i². 298, lines 20-1. The text is given in Meritt, *Ath. Fin. Doc.*, p. 93.

the loan follow immediately after the amount of the loan (written in words), as was the case also in line 108; but for the sake of an improved restoration to be made later in line 122 the amount of the principal should be increased by three drachmai, reading *τρίσι* in place of *τόκος* at the end of line 110 and *δραχμαῖς* in line 111.

So far as the inscription gives evidence, only the amounts of principal need be reckoned as the moneys owed. Though the interest must have been owed too, a statement to that effect is not part of the epigraphical record, and perhaps ought not to be so restored. The phrase *τόκος ἐγένετο*, for example, similar to that used in line 100, may better be substituted in line 113 in place of *τόκον ὀφέλουσιν*, and elsewhere the verb *ὀφέλουσιν* should be omitted in subsequent lines which involve the records of interest. Such a change has the additional advantage of allowing the restoration of a correct stoichedon pattern, which was not possible so long as the verb *ὀφέλουσιν* was employed.¹ I suggest for the last line of the inscription (123) [*κεφάλαιον τόκο ἡπάσαι τοῖς θεοῖς ἐν ἑνδεκα ἔτεσιν*:- - -] as giving the necessary statement of fact, and as conforming precisely to the stoichedon order. With a similar phraseology, line 122 should probably be read [*κεφάλαιον ἀναλόματος τῷ ἀρχαίῳ ἡπ*] *αῖσι τοῖς θε[οῖς ἐν ἑνδεκα ἔτεσιν*:- - -].

[illegible]

In lines 119 and 120 the same formula is to be followed, with κεφάλαιον placed at the end rather than at the beginning. One will also note that the accepted figure for the principal in line 119 must be reduced by one obol because of the change introduced above in line 105. The words [τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς ἀναλόματος τῷ ἀρχ]αῖο ἐν ἔνδεκα [ἔτεσιν κεφάλαιον - -] occupy 56 spaces of the available 74, leaving 18 spaces for the necessary restoration of the numeral [𐀀𐀁𐀂𐀃𐀄𐀅𐀆𐀇𐀈𐀉𐀊𐀋𐀌𐀍𐀎𐀏𐀐𐀑𐀒𐀓𐀔𐀕𐀖𐀗𐀘𐀙𐀚𐀛𐀜𐀝𐀞𐀟𐀠𐀡𐀢𐀣𐀤𐀥𐀦𐀧𐀨𐀩𐀪𐀫𐀬𐀭𐀮𐀯𐀰𐀱𐀲𐀳𐀴𐀵𐀶𐀷𐀸𐀹𐀺𐀻𐀼𐀽𐀾𐀿𐁀𐁁𐁂𐁃𐁄𐁅𐁆𐁇𐁈𐁉𐁊𐁋𐁌𐁍𐁎𐁏𐁐𐁑𐁒𐁓𐁔𐁕𐁖𐁗𐁘𐁙𐁚𐁛𐁜𐁝𐁞𐁟𐁠𐁡𐁢𐁣𐁤𐁥𐁦𐁧𐁨𐁩𐁪𐁫𐁬𐁭𐁮𐁯𐁰𐁱𐁲𐁳𐁴𐁵𐁶𐁷𐁸𐁹𐁺𐁻𐁼𐁽𐁾𐁿𐂀𐂁𐂂𐂃𐂄𐂅𐂆𐂇𐂈𐂉𐂊𐂋𐂌𐂍𐂎𐂏𐂐𐂑𐂒𐂓𐂔𐂕𐂖𐂗𐂘𐂙𐂚𐂛𐂜𐂝𐂞𐂟𐂠𐂡𐂢𐂣𐂤𐂥𐂦𐂧𐂨𐂩𐂪𐂫𐂬𐂭𐂮𐂯𐂰𐂱𐂲𐂳𐂴𐂵𐂶𐂷𐂸𐂹𐂺𐂻𐂼𐂽𐂾𐂿𐃀𐃁𐃂𐃃𐃄𐃅𐃆𐃇𐃈𐃉𐃊𐃋𐃌𐃍𐃎𐃏𐃐𐃑𐃒𐃓𐃔𐃕𐃖𐃗𐃘𐃙𐃚𐃛𐃜𐃝𐃞𐃟𐃠𐃡𐃢𐃣𐃤𐃥𐃦𐃧𐃨𐃩𐃪𐃫𐃬𐃭𐃮𐃯𐃰𐃱𐃲𐃳𐃴𐃵𐃶𐃷𐃸𐃹𐃺𐃻𐃼𐃽𐃾𐃿𐄀𐄁𐄂𐄃𐄄𐄅𐄆𐄇𐄈𐄉𐄊𐄋𐄌𐄍𐄎𐄏𐄐𐄑𐄒𐄓𐄔𐄕𐄖𐄗𐄘𐄙𐄚𐄛𐄜𐄝𐄞𐄟𐄠𐄡𐄢𐄣𐄤𐄥𐄦𐄧𐄨𐄩𐄪𐄫𐄬𐄭𐄮𐄯𐄰𐄱𐄲𐄳𐄴𐄵𐄶𐄷𐄸𐄹𐄺𐄻𐄼𐄽𐄾𐄿𐅀𐅁𐅂𐅃𐅄𐅅𐅆𐅇𐅈𐅉𐅊𐅋𐅌𐅍𐅎𐅏𐅐𐅑𐅒𐅓𐅔𐅕𐅖𐅗𐅘𐅙𐅚𐅛𐅜𐅝𐅞𐅟𐅠𐅡𐅢𐅣𐅤𐅥𐅦𐅧𐅨𐅩𐅪𐅫𐅬𐅭𐅮𐅯𐅰𐅱𐅲𐅳𐅴𐅵𐅶𐅷𐅸𐅹𐅺𐅻𐅼𐅽𐅾𐅿𐆀𐆁𐆂𐆃𐆄𐆅𐆆𐆇𐆈𐆉𐆊𐆋𐆌𐆍𐆎𐆏𐆐𐆑𐆒𐆓𐆔𐆕𐆖𐆗𐆘𐆙𐆚𐆛𐆜𐆝𐆞𐆟𐆠𐆡𐆢𐆣𐆤𐆥𐆦𐆧𐆨𐆩𐆪𐆫𐆬𐆭𐆮𐆯𐆰𐆱𐆲𐆳𐆴𐆵𐆶𐆷𐆸𐆹𐆺𐆻𐆼𐆽𐆾𐆿𐇀𐇁𐇂𐇃𐇄𐇅𐇆𐇇𐇈𐇉𐇊𐇋𐇌𐇍𐇎𐇏𐇐𐇑𐇒𐇓𐇔𐇕𐇖𐇗𐇘𐇙𐇚𐇛𐇜𐇝𐇞𐇟𐇠𐇡𐇢𐇣𐇤𐇥𐇦𐇧𐇨𐇩𐇪𐇫𐇬𐇭𐇮𐇯𐇰𐇱𐇲𐇳𐇴𐇵𐇶𐇷𐇸𐇹𐇺𐇻𐇼𐇽𐇾𐇿𐈀𐈁𐈂𐈃𐈄𐈅𐈆𐈇𐈈𐈉𐈊𐈋𐈌𐈍𐈎𐈏𐈐𐈑𐈒𐈓𐈔𐈕𐈖𐈗𐈘𐈙𐈚𐈛𐈜𐈝𐈞𐈟𐈠𐈡𐈢𐈣𐈤𐈥𐈦𐈧𐈨𐈩𐈪𐈫𐈬𐈭𐈮𐈯𐈰𐈱𐈲𐈳𐈴𐈵𐈶𐈷𐈸𐈹𐈺𐈻𐈼𐈽𐈾𐈿𐉀𐉁𐉂𐉃𐉄𐉅𐉆𐉇𐉈𐉉𐉊𐉋𐉌𐉍𐉎𐉏𐉐𐉑𐉒𐉓𐉔𐉕𐉖𐉗𐉘𐉙𐉚𐉛𐉜𐉝𐉞𐉟𐉠𐉡𐉢𐉣𐉤𐉥𐉦𐉧𐉨𐉩𐉪𐉫𐉬𐉭𐉮𐉯𐉰𐉱𐉲𐉳𐉴𐉵𐉶𐉷𐉸𐉹𐉺𐉻𐉼𐉽𐉾𐉿𐊀𐊁𐊂𐊃𐊄𐊅𐊆𐊇𐊈𐊉𐊊𐊋𐊌𐊍𐊎𐊏𐊐𐊑𐊒𐊓𐊔𐊕𐊖𐊗𐊘𐊙𐊚𐊛𐊜𐊝𐊞𐊟𐊠𐊡𐊢𐊣𐊤𐊥𐊦𐊧𐊨𐊩𐊪𐊫𐊬𐊭𐊮𐊯𐊰𐊱𐊲𐊳𐊴𐊵𐊶𐊷𐊸𐊹𐊺𐊻𐊼𐊽𐊾𐊿𐋀𐋁𐋂𐋃𐋄𐋅𐋆𐋇𐋈𐋉𐋊𐋋𐋌𐋍𐋎𐋏𐋐𐋑𐋒𐋓𐋔𐋕𐋖𐋗𐋘𐋙𐋚𐋛𐋜𐋝𐋞𐋟𐋠𐋡𐋢𐋣𐋤𐋥𐋦𐋧𐋨𐋩𐋪𐋫𐋬𐋭𐋮𐋯𐋰𐋱𐋲𐋳𐋴𐋵𐋶𐋷𐋸𐋹𐋺𐋻𐋼𐋽𐋾𐋿𐌀𐌁𐌂𐌃𐌄𐌅𐌆𐌇𐌈𐌉𐌊𐌋𐌌𐌍𐌎𐌏𐌐𐌑𐌒𐌓𐌔𐌕𐌖𐌗𐌘𐌙𐌚𐌛𐌜𐌝𐌞𐌟𐌠𐌡𐌢𐌣𐌤𐌥𐌦𐌧𐌨𐌩𐌪𐌫𐌬𐌭𐌮𐌯𐌰𐌱𐌲𐌳𐌴𐌵𐌶𐌷𐌸𐌹𐌺𐌻𐌼𐌽𐌾𐌿𐍀𐍁𐍂𐍃𐍄𐍅𐍆𐍇𐍈𐍉𐍊𐍋𐍌𐍍𐍎𐍏𐍐𐍑𐍒𐍓𐍔𐍕𐍖𐍗𐍘𐍙𐍚𐍛𐍜𐍝𐍞𐍟𐍠𐍡𐍢𐍣𐍤𐍥𐍦𐍧𐍨𐍩𐍪𐍫𐍬𐍭𐍮𐍯𐍰𐍱𐍲𐍳𐍴𐍵𐍶𐍷𐍸𐍹𐍺𐍻𐍼𐍽𐍾𐍿𐎀𐎁𐎂𐎃𐎄𐎅𐎆𐎇𐎈𐎉𐎊𐎋𐎌𐎍𐎎𐎏𐎐𐎑𐎒𐎓𐎔𐎕𐎖𐎗𐎘𐎙𐎚𐎛𐎜𐎝𐎞𐎟𐎠𐎡𐎢𐎣𐎤𐎥𐎦𐎧𐎨𐎩𐎪𐎫𐎬𐎭𐎮𐎯𐎰𐎱𐎲𐎳𐎴𐎵𐎶𐎷𐎸𐎹𐎺𐎻𐎼𐎽𐎾𐎿𐏀𐏁𐏂𐏃𐏄𐏅𐏆𐏇𐏈𐏉𐏊𐏋𐏌𐏍𐏎𐏏𐏐𐏑𐏒𐏓𐏔𐏕𐏖𐏗𐏘

A brief statement is required about the numeral in line 113. The figures have been given traditionally as --]ΔΔΔΓ||C. I recorded them as such in *The Athenian Calendar*, and they were so reported by Hiller in *IG*. i². 324 (line 118). This was Boeckh's interpretation (*CIG*. i. 156) of a reading by Dodwell, who published the numeral as ΔΔΔΗ||C.³ Obviously Dodwell's copy needed emendation, and Boeckh at least made an intelligible numeral of it. But the stone was also seen and copied by Sir William Gell in 1805. Gell gave the numeral intelligibly as ΔΔΔΓ||C and made other improvements over Dodwell's version. He wrote Attic lambda and added the punctuation after ΓΟΛΙΑΔΟΣΞ, where Dodwell had written ΓΟΛΙΑΔΟΣΞ; he wrote ΟΚΤΟ where Dodwell had Κ|Φ; and he gave correctly the disposition of the letters on the fragment, especially along the left margin where Dodwell had been in

¹ See Tod, *op. cit.*, note on p. 142.

² Tod, *op. cit.*, no. 64.

³ Edward Dodwell, *A Classical and Topographical Tour through Greece*, i (1819), p. 372.

error. The new readings were included in the *Addenda et Corrigenda* of Boeckh's *Corpus* (p. 905); the improved disposition did not become apparent until the stone was united with other fragments.¹ Kirchhoff (*IG. i. 273*) accepted Gell's improvements but quite wrongly attributed the numeral $\Delta\Delta\Delta\Gamma\text{IIIC}$ also to Gell. This error persisted, and Gell's true reading did not come to my attention until I saw the page in his notebook on which his copy of the inscription appears.² If one wishes to give greater credence to Dodwell than to Gell, the most one can say is that the numeral may have been $\Delta\Delta\Delta\Gamma\text{IIIC}$, and that Gell omitted an obol sign.

Otherwise the new text is significantly different from the old only in line 117 (see below), and in their entirety the concluding lines of the inscription may now be read as follows:

IG. i². 324, lines 98-123³

[τάδε ἐλογίσαντο ἡοι λογιστ]αὶ ἐν τοῖς τέτ[ταρσιν]
 ἔτεσιν τόκον τοῖς τῆς θεᾶς ἡὰ ἡοι πρό[τεροι]
 [λογισταὶ λελογισμένα παρέ]δοσαν [ἐν τοῖς ἡε]πτά
 ἔτεσιν τόκον τετρακισχίλις ταλάν[οις]
 100 [ταλάντοι τετρακισχίλια]ς πεντα[κοσίας εἴ]κοσι
 δυοῖν δραχμαῖν· τοῦτοῖς τόκος ἐγέ[νετο]
 [HΠΔΔΔΔΔΔXΠHHΔΓΓΓΓIIII?] *vacat*
 [τόκον ἐλογίσαντο τοῖς ἄλ]λοις θεο[ῖς ἐν τοῖς
 τέ]τταρσιν ἔτεσιν ἡὰ ἡοι πρότεροι λογι[σταὶ]
 [λελογισμένα παρέ]δοσαν ἐ[ν τοῖς ἡε]πτά ἔτεσιν
 πε[ντακοσίοις ταλάντοις διακοσίοις τ[αλάντ]
 [οἱς ἡε]χσέκοντα ταλάντοις ἡὲς ταλ[άντοις χιλί]αις
 ἐνέκοντα δραχμαῖς πέντε δραχ[μαῖς]
 105 [τέτταρσιν ὀβολοῖς ἐν τοῖς] τέτταρ[σιν] ἔτεσιν
 ΔΔΔΔTTXXHHHΔΔΔΓΓΓΓIIII *vacat*
 [τόκον ἐλογίσαντο καὶ τοῖς] Ἀθηναῖα[ς τῆς Νί]κες
 ἐ[ν τοῖς τέτταρσιν] ἔτεσιν ἡὰ ἡοι πρότ[εροι]
 [λογισταὶ λελογισμένα π]αρέδοσαν ἐ[ν τοῖς ἡε]πτά
 ἔτεσιν εἴκοσι ταλάντοις δυοῖν ταλ[άντοις]
 [ιν τρισχίλιας ἐνέκον]τα δραχμ[αῖς] ὅκτ[ο]
 [δραχ]μαῖς δυοῖν ὀβολοῖν TΠΔΔΔΔΓΓΓΓIIII *vacat*
 [τόκον ἐλογίσαντο τοῖς τῷ] ἡερμῷ ἐν [τοῖς]
 τέτ[ταρσιν] ἔτεσιν ἡὰ ἡοι πρότεροι λογισταὶ λ[ελογι]
 110 [σμένα παρέ]δοσαν ἐν τοῖς ἡε[πτά] ἔ[τεσιν] ταλάν[τοις]
 τ[ετρακοσίας ἐνέκοντα] δραχμαῖς [τρισι]
 [δραχμαῖς -- *summa pecuniae* --] *vacat*

¹ Cf. Meritt, *Ath. Fin. Doc.*, p. 135.

² A photograph of Gell's copy is given by Meritt, *op. cit.*, p. 137. Tod, *op. cit.*, no. 64, has the correct reading in line 113, but he must have

used the old reading in computing the total in lines 117-18.

³ The lines are numbered as by Tod, *op. cit.*

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¹ For
below.
² The
χρέμασιν
³ The

- [*Ἀθελαιας Νικες ἀρχαίον ὀφέλοσιν ἐν*] ἔνδεκα
ἔτεσιν:(Δ Δ) $\overline{\Pi}$ TTTXXX $\overline{\Pi}$ Δ Δ Δ Δ Γ TTT $\overline{\Pi}$ *vacat*
 [*Ἀθελαιας Νικες τόκος ἐγένετο*:($\overline{\Pi}$...)] Δ Δ Δ Γ Π C¹
 [*Ἀθελαιας Πολιάδος ἐν ἔνδεκα ἔτεσιν*] τὸ ἀρχαίον
 [*δ*]φέλοσιν: χ χ χ χ $\overline{\Pi}$ HH Δ Δ Δ Δ $\overline{\Pi}$ TTT $\overline{\Pi}$ $\overline{\Pi}$ H[H $\overline{\Pi}$ Δ Δ Γ]
 115 [*Ἀθελαιας Πολιάδος τόκος ἐγένετο ἐν*] ἔνδεκα ἔτεσιν:
 χ HH Δ Δ Δ Δ TTTXXX $\overline{\Pi}$ HHH Γ TTT *vacat*
 [*ἐν ἔνδεκα ἔτεσιν Ἀθελαιας Νικες καὶ*] Πολιάδος:
 [χ χ χ χ] $\overline{\Pi}$ HH $\overline{\Pi}$ (Δ) Δ TTTXXXHH[H Δ Δ Γ TTT] *vacat*
 [*ἐν ἔνδεκα ἔτεσιν κεφάλαιον τὸ Πολιάδος καὶ Νίκ[ε]ς*²
τόκος]: χ HH Δ Δ Δ Δ $\overline{\Pi}$ TTT[----]
 [---- *vacat*]¹ *vacat*
 [*τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς ἀναλόματος τὸ ἀρχαίο αἰὸ ἐν*
ἔνδεκα] [*ἔτεσιν κεφάλαιον*:($\overline{\Pi}$ HHHH Δ Δ Γ -
 χ $\overline{\Pi}$ Δ Δ Δ Γ TTT)]
 120 [*τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς τόκο χσύμπαντος ἐν*] ἔνδεκα
ἔτεσιν κεφάλαιον:(-----)
 [---- *vacat*] *vacat*
 [*κεφάλαιον ἀναλόματος τὸ ἀρχαίο ἡπ[α]σι τοῖς*
θε[ο]ῖς ἐν ἔνδεκα ἔτεσιν:($\overline{\Pi}$ $\overline{\Pi}$ $\overline{\Pi}$ Δ Δ Δ Δ $\overline{\Pi}$ TTTXXX $\overline{\Pi}$ HHHH)
 [*κεφάλαιον τόκο ἡπ[α]σι τοῖς θεοῖς ἐν*] ἔνδεκα ἔτεσιν:(-----)]

It may be shown that the loan from Athena Nike which was made between 433 and 427 (lines 106-8), if made at one time like the loan in 423/2 from the same treasure, must have been made either in 430/29 or 429/8, probably in the earlier year. The conditions are that the total interest of Nike in line 113 must be determined by subtracting the sum in line 115 from the total in lines 117-18, and then that the amount of interest for the Seven Years be determined by subtracting from this remainder the interest for the years after 426 as given in line 53 and in line 108. The operation involves accounts in maxima and minima.

TABLE OF INTEREST FOR ATHENA NIKE

Line 117	(max.) 1250 Tal. — Dr.	(min.) 1248 Tal. — Dr.
Line 115	(min.) 1243 Tal. 3804 Dr.	(max.) 1243 Tal. 3804 Dr.
Line 113	(max.) 6 Tal. 2196 Dr.	(min.) 4 Tal. 2196 Dr.
Line 53 ³	302½ Dr. (min.)	302½ Dr. (max.)
Line 108	1 Tal. 592½ Dr. (min.)	1 Tal. 592½ Dr. (max.)
Lines 53 and 108	(min.) 1 Tal. 894½ Dr.	(max.) 1 Tal. 895½ Dr.
Interest for Seven Years	(max.) 5 Tal. 1301½ Dr.	(min.) 3 Tal. 1300½ Dr.

The loan itself was 22 Tal. 3098 Dr. 2 Ob. (lines 107-8), with interest at the rate of a drachme per day per talent.⁴ Hence the interest for one day amounted approxi-

¹ For a possible restoration of this number, see below.

² The line may also be restored [*κεφάλαιον χρέμασιν Ἀθελαιας Πολιάδος καὶ Νίκ[ε]ς τόκος*]ο - . .

³ The minimum for line 53 is taken from the

calculation in Meritt, *The Athenian Calendar*, p. 74, but it seems desirable to allow a maximum an obol or two greater as being nearer the result obtained with decimal notation.

⁴ Tod, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

mately to $22\frac{3}{8}$ Dr. It appears by trial that 857 days will yield only slightly more than 3 Tal. 1296 Dr. This sum is just under the minimum interest possible, so it is evident that the loan was outstanding at least one more day, or a minimum of 858 days. It appears also by trial that 1391 days will yield 5 Tal. 1320 + Dr., a sum just greater than the maximum interest possible. So it is evident that the loan could not have been outstanding more than 1390 days. These limits fix the time of the loan either to 430/29 or to 429/8.

So much is quite certain, and does not depend on restoration. If the suggestions made above for line 113 are correct, the figure to be restored in conformity with these limits is a maximum of $[\overline{\Gamma}TXX]\Delta\Delta\Delta\Gamma\|C$ or a minimum of $[\overline{\Gamma}H\overline{\Gamma}\Delta]\Delta\Delta\Delta\Gamma\|C$.¹ Adopting these epigraphical limitations one finds that the maximum interest for the Seven Years is 5 Tal. 1136 $\frac{1}{2}$ Dr. (6 Tal. 2031 $\frac{5}{12}$ Dr. minus 1 Tal. 894 $\frac{1}{2}$ Dr.). This permits an upper range in date of as much as 1382 days. The minimum interest may be similarly computed for the same period as 3 Tal. 5296 $\frac{1}{2}$ Dr. (5 Tal. 191 $\frac{5}{12}$ Dr. minus 1 Tal. 895 $\frac{1}{2}$ Dr.). This permits a minimum range in date of 1035 days.

Further computations are possible, and I recommend them to anyone who is not wearied by long application to figures. Testing each possible date between the limits of 1035 and 1385 days with the known amount of principal and the known rate of interest, one will achieve a series of amounts of interest each of which in turn may be added to $T\overline{\Gamma}\overline{\Gamma}\Delta\Delta\Delta\Delta\Gamma\|[\overline{\Gamma}]\|$ (line 108) and $H[\overline{H}H\Gamma\Gamma\Gamma]$ (line 53), to see whether the resultant total is a sum that can be restored in Greek numerical characters as the interest in line 113. In my opinion only one combination satisfies all the requirements: the principal sum of 22 Tal. 3098 $\frac{1}{2}$ Dr. yields in 1274 days interest of 4 Tal. 4686 Dr., a trifle less if decimal notation is used, a trifle more if interest is reckoned at $22\frac{3}{8}$ Dr. per day. The date is midwinter of 430/29, and the money may have been used against Poteidaia.

If the amount of interest for Athena Nike in line 53 may be taken as 302 $\frac{5}{12}$ Dr., then the addition is as follows:

Old interest from 433-427 (as calculated)	4 Tal. 4686 Dr. 1 Ob.
Interest from line 53	302 Dr. 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ Ob.
Interest from line 108	1 Tal. 592 Dr. 5 Ob.
Amount of interest in line 113	5 Tal. 5581 Dr. 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ Ob.

This last figure may be restored in the text as $[\overline{\Gamma}\overline{\Gamma}\overline{\Gamma}\overline{\Gamma}]\Delta\Delta\Delta\Gamma\|C$, but I have not made the restoration because of the uncertainty that the amount of principal represents only one loan. I regard it as not improbable. If such was the case the grand total of interest for Athena Nike and Athena Polias in lines 117-18 will be $\chi\overline{H}H\Delta\Delta\Delta\Delta\Gamma\|TTT[TXX\overline{H}H\overline{H}\overline{H}]\Delta\Delta\Delta\Gamma\|C$, and I should so divide the numeral between the two lines.

B. D. MERITT.

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¹ Technically, one might perhaps restore still a fifth figure; but there is no reason here to be saving of space, and I believe now (as in 1928)

that it is best to give the mark of punctuation a little room and allow the broad first figure to fill the second space.

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